




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


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
















































## Law of Charter party.

Whenever a merchant agrees with a master or owner of a vessel to carry goods to a certain place he is said to charter the vessel (Am. Dig. Merchant §. 2.)

It commonly is so much per ton ~~the~~ sometimes as per in gross. the agt. must be in writing to be binding on a charter party, unless it is in this form, when <sup>hard</sup> by <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ A vessel is sometimes chartered for outward voyage only, sometimes for the inward, sometimes both.

The law if charter parties differs from the C. L. If the chartered vessel does not arrive at the port of delivery <sup>the merchant is not to pay</sup> - If she is lost returning, the inward voyage is not to be paid for where the two voyages are engaged separately.

But if the voyage outward & inward is made one only then whether lost going or coming the charterer has nothing to pay. 2 Vent. 212

This is mercantile law. C. L. knows nothing of it - It goes upon the principle of securing the loss for the encouragement of commerce, the merchant losing the goods & the owner or master the ship.

Suppose the ship is chartered out & in - she carries safe but there is no return freight - the merchant provides none - he must pay <sup>freight both ways</sup> - But if it was owing to the captain or owner that she returned empty the merchant is to pay only the outward freight - the master is liable for damages



Notice of the act and amount is to be given by the merchant  
to the master by a simple note the first opportunity.

The <sup>5</sup> ~~4~~ if parcel it is binding if retained up to (but not bound to  
writing) & if cannot move is p. & the party remains as he may while  
it remains in parcel unless the cannot is forfeited.

Suppose instead of being lost she gets damaged & the goods are injured - the merchant may either do the goods & <sup>then</sup> he need not pay the freight, but if he will not <sup>abandon</sup> he must pay the whole freight. He of course will abandon if the freight is worth more than the cargo saved - if not. he will not 2 Bur. 882. 888.

Suppose again the ship disabled by storm without fault of the master he puts in to repair & there proceeds it is the same as if she was not injured. - If he cannot repair he may abandon the job. Or engage another vessel to carry the goods and save his bargain. - He may have a reasonable time to repair.

If the vessel cannot proceed. if the supercargo can & will take the goods & proceed with them in another vessel he must pay pro rata. - and this is not an uncommon method

This contract of a charter is different from all other mercantile transactions - They are sealed.

It agrees by parol to charter B's vessel for \$1000 & pays \$100. He may afterwards be off but for freight the \$100 earnest money & this right is reciprocal if B. is off he must pay back the \$100 & also \$100 more. & this even if the contract is in writing if not sealed. & is perfectly



1 L. Rep. 18.78.

Stand. Rep. 85.194

Mulloy. 220.

1 Kent. 190.238

1 Mod. 85.

L. Rep. 918.

In the case of carriers the words acts of God means  
such acts only as could not happen by the act of man. 1 T.R. 33

Ships not governed by admiral law while in a corpus constatu

1 Kent. 238.

non amable. —

Damages Injury to the ship may arise from the imprudence of the master or sailing in a storm or unforeseen, &c. the loss falls upon the master and the owner <sup>of ship</sup> both. but if the damage is by the act of God the merchant loses. —

The owner of a vessel is always liable for the misconduct of the captain or any crew who has the command of the vessel. whether they know of the given voyage or not. the master may be answerable over to the owner however. Many persons in Eng & U.S. live by ship owning

The owner sometimes enters into a contract with the charterer under penalty to answer all damages and the effect is increase the damages. as the penalty is commonly greater than the damages. — Owners are

also answerable for all the goods on board by the hands of the master even when he knows nothing of the losses employed. by M. L. (In Eng<sup>d</sup> however the liability extends only to the worth of the ship.) I have been speaking of sea voyages

but packet masters & coasters are viewed in the same light as common carriers, being liable for every loss except by the act of God or a public enemy. — There is another power that

masters of vessels have to bind the owner for supplies for provisions, repairs &c & this altho the master might have been furnished with money for those



Observe however that the master cannot bind the owners be-  
yond the value of the ship. 12 R. 78. & if the owner will  
abandon the ship he is not liable on the Captain's contract.  
The master is the servant of the owners. 2 Vin. 643.

Hard. 85. 195.

Extr. 26

Th. R. 235

2 Vin. 643.

L. R. 223. 1285

Hard. 475.

1. Vint. 297.

purpose - The common way is to mortgage the ship  
& the ship will always be liable. - & the master's  
contract binds the owner. - this is for the encourage-  
ment of commerce. - The ship must be paid  
down & in strips - These debts are considered as  
unconditional debts of honor. 1 Haidn 376. 2 Vern  
443. Boupr. 636. 1 T. Rep. 73. 108. 1 Hen. Bl. 119.

if the contract is to be for the benefit of the owner, they are liable - And  
here where the owner has no interest in the voyage  
the vessel has gone out of his hands & leased to  
some one - & he knows nothing of the voyage.

The owner of a ship are about to send their ship on  
a voyage - there being a number of owners the  
majority of interest direct the voyage - The  
minority cannot be obliged to contribute any-  
thing, if they do nothing they lose the voyage  
If the vessel is lost the majority lose the cargo  
& ~~expensive loss~~ - but the minority get nothing for their part of the ship. -

The majority may apply to a court of Ad-  
miralty & secure the share of the vessel to the minority  
the majority have all profits, or the minority may apply for securities.  
If a good voyage is made when neither party have  
applied the minority can compel the majority to  
divide the profits by paying up their share of the  
expenses & the interest. -



Nov. 85. 194

2 haba 259

The master as agent for the owner has an implied authority to do all that is necessary as to his hands - to save goods from a wreck &c.

Whom may happen to be owner as in case of insurance when the owner abandons he is an agent for the insurers - this is contrary to the C. D. rule

The master by the Law Merchant is answerable for all damages that accrue from his own default or sailing in tempestuous weather or sails with out a pilot & damage ~~recesses~~.

The goods are a security for the freight this is a lien upon them - & the freight is due at the port of delivery -

The owner is answerable as well as the master. It has however been questioned whether the owner would be liable for damage occurring in unlawful trade. - It has however been settled that he is, if the trade in a foreign country is such as would be contrary to the laws at home -

But the owner is not answerable for damage that arises from deviation if the master has leased the vessel who is then owner pro hoc vice and is an exception to the general rule



Question in 1817. whether the owner of the ship was liable for the service of the master. 2 Ca. 239. decided not. not being an officer or crew for whom he is liable. —

It is piracy etc. is a capital offence. by genl. Misd. pirates are to be tried by admiral's Ct without appeal. but in Eng & U.S. they are to be tried by the constitution.

In all ca. in wh. the master refuses to assist to save the ship. or abandons himself at the time of sailing. he loses the wages that he would have been paid.

2 Vern. 275.

If the ship is lost in the outward passage. seamen lose the wages. the master his goods & the owner the ship. if on the return. the sailors get their wages for the outward voyage. <sup>if they get the ship</sup> 179 and any agreement of the sailors will not make the master free from the liability to pay them their wages if they insist on it. 2 Vern. 72.

3 Burr. 1884  
1845.

## Mariners.

If a sailor is quarrelsome turbulent & can may be put out of the ship among civilized people on being paid half his wages, but he forfeits all the property he has on board, & the rest of his wages. If however he goes so far as to use weapons he may be imprisoned & not home to be tried. I do not know the punishment only that all the wages are forfeited.

If he is discovered to be in a conspiracy for a mischievous purpose to drive the capt from his antient course, then the punishment is death, if the object is wicked. There have been cases in which it was absolutely necessary to confine the capt as when he was drunk &c.

The mariners, when enlisted the only for going such distant voyages - they cannot leave the ship until she is unladen & taking down, <sup>or they lose their wages</sup> & if there are three or more carriers or carriers they must act as such but are paid for this last mentioned service.  
2 Ann. 727

Their wages are due at the port of delivery and if the ship is lost they lose their wages. this is to make the trade safe. 2 Ann. 278.

As to what constitutes the port of delivery for the purpose there has been some question but it is now settled. to be where the cargo is to be left (not at the first port touched) & actually is left.



What comes within the scope of this business is to be deter-  
mined by the usage of the country. & country firms  
do not usually trade in London.

Partnerships. Two or more persons enter into partnership in trade & go by some <sup>proper</sup> name - Now either partner can bind the firm as far as the business of the firm extends - as the purchase of goods &c. that go to the use of the firm. - A Firm in a city in new groceries is different in its articles of trade from one in country merchants. - The rule proceeds upon the implied authority & one can bind the whole in the business of the firm. -

But we are not to understand that if the property purchased is for the private use of the one who bought it & known to be so by the seller that the firm would be bound. The presumption at first is that the firm is bound but if this circumstance of service should appear ~~which~~ must be proved by the firm - the individual only is holder but he is presumed to know in what article the much to trade -

e.g. suppose one of the firm buys property for the use of the firm & signs only his own name the firm is bound by it & may be sued on it. stating the facts in the declaration & this even if the seller did not know of the existing partnership. -

The partners enter into an illegal trade as to cheat the revenue - & promise the payment to a smuggler - if one pays with the knowledge



16) <sup>then</sup> although they are secret partners it is the long 356.371  
agreement made between them that they 3 J. W. 402  
will share the profits & bear the loss of 1 Nov. Bl. 372  
the trade together which makes them Bl. Rep. 998  
partners.

It is a mere technical diff<sup>y</sup> that prevents being said together. viz. cannot arrest  
the body of Ex<sup>r</sup> nor have a bill of exchange & him by him. — On these  
matters the law is bound to the profits & goes into survivor's hands  
origly they were joint, but not now. 1 Gal. 444

over that that survivor might join an indiv<sup>d</sup> debt  
of his own in a debt for co. debt. but it is now  
given up. —

3 J. Rep. 433:5  
1 Show. 183.188  
190

edge & consent of the others the firm can be forced to pay him. — if not with this knowledge he must lose it, if they are not willing to pay him. The remedy in this case could not be covered by law. It is not necessary in order to constitute a partnership & to make the partners liable, that they all be known as partners. (b) Suppose a man suffers his name to be joined to others to give credit to the firm without sharing the profits he is liable.

Now the in co. are tenants in common of this property & there is no joint accrual. the the same proceeding at b. l. would make them joint tenants. If one dies the partnership is dissolved & his E<sup>x</sup> owns an undivided moiety as the testator did & may give receipts & sell property — Nothing survives to the survivor but the right of suing & being sued. The E<sup>x</sup> & survivor are to account to each other. The survivor has a right to all the books notes &c. It was formerly the idea that they must be joined in the suit, but it is not so now for the inconvenience of making an execution as it would go against the body of one & the goods of the other.

If the partners estate are solvent their partnership & personal property are both liable for the partnership debts. the estate is not confined to the partnership property only.





If it is insolvent the partnership is dissolved & all the partnership property is liable. — You may come upon the company property for a private debt of a partner but still you cannot take the other partner's property. In case of the insolvency of one partner, that is as an individual. The mode of carrying this business is ~~with~~ <sup>by</sup> levying upon double the amount & sell it & return half to the other partner. This has been complained of as obliging a man to sell his property against his will. — & could not be supported more than practice.

The most <sup>common</sup> way is to sell one undivided moiety of the article so that the purchaser & the other partner are then joint owners. <sup>Part in bond</sup> The objection to this is that the property does not sell so well unless the purchaser is bound to hold with another.

There is another way which is always the best where it can be executed which is to divide the property & sell one half to the partner & sell the other half —

The principle you are is the same in all, to pay the debt & not increase the partnership property.

There is no necessity that either partner should be insolvent to bring these rules into operation & where they are not the law only dissolves the partnership as to the particular article —





Of the mode of settling insolvent partnerships etc.

They apply for the benefit of the act. the partnership property pays the company debts & the private the private debts. If any thing remains after the payment of the private debts of one of the partners that goes to increase the dividend on the partnership debts. - If any thing remains after the payment of the company debts it is to be divided between the partners. -

Cases drawn by Judge New to exemplify these rules.

1<sup>st</sup> The company of A & B. owes \$2000 & the company property amounts to 1000. A's private debts are 500 & his private property 1000. he is solvent & has \$500 left to go to the Co. creditors. B's private property is 1000 & his debts 500 B is solvent & 500 go to the Co. creditors this makes the Co. solvent.

2<sup>d</sup> The Co. owes 2000. the Co. property is 1000. A owes 500 his private property is 1000. A is solvent & 500 go to the creditors of the Co. B owes 1000 & his private property is 500. B is insolvent & his private creditors receive 10/ on the pound. The Co. is insolvent & the Co. creditors receive 15/ on the pound. A has paid 250 more than B. which B owes to A. -

3<sup>d</sup> The Co. property is 2000 & the debts of the Co. 1000 A's private property is 1000 his debts 500. B's private property is 1000 his debts 2000. A & B the Co. is solvent. the



and the course by bill is universally followed by most of the 1890  
States that have a bill of exchange. It begins in the form of Sec. 187  
and says: "and only makes no difference" 2 Vol 265

creditors are paid & 1000 are left to be divided between A & B. So that A's property is now 1500 he is solvent & is really worth 1000. B's private property is 1500 but his private debts being 2000 he is insolvent & his creditors receive 15/ on the pound —

It is very important that these rules should be understood for the occasion, in which they are applicable grow more & more frequent in our country. — Beanes Lect. Merc. Part

I have mentioned that the act being ag<sup>t</sup> the surviving partner. he is a bankrupt. but the Ex<sup>r</sup> of the dec<sup>d</sup> one is rich — The suit is brought ag<sup>t</sup> the survivor & the Ex<sup>r</sup> lays the foundation of a bill of Ch<sup>g</sup> to recover satisfaction of the Ex<sup>r</sup>. this is long practice & was once, that in Ch<sup>g</sup> now we bring an action directly ag<sup>t</sup> the Ex<sup>r</sup> at law founded on the neg<sup>l</sup> stating it to be ineffectual. —

There is a practice among merchants carrying on business separately, to agree to share profits but not losses. but they are liable for each others debts. 1 P.W. 682. 2 Str. B.L. 247.

Of the rights Partners have ag<sup>t</sup> each other. — A & B are Partners & at the dissolution B has the most of the partnership property. how should A get relief — formerly in Eng<sup>l</sup> the only remedy was by act<sup>n</sup> of ass<sup>l</sup> & the books were referred to assessing & then settling, but



If one of the partners had turned the property into money it was  
said that indiv. ap<sup>t</sup> would be the remedy but it is not so  
for you have to remain and sell the acct. which cannot be  
done in this case. This act would be if the part 2 T. Rep. 478  
may need explanation then see it & found somewhat different.

1 Lalk 292  
Bl. 2. 993  
bush. 449.

1 Ann. Bl. 45-8  
L. T. Rep. 705  
727

it happened that the number of partners in carried  
this method would be an endless job. but now the  
usual method is by bill in b.L. who settles it  
by compromise. thus all the documents and  
papers may be ordered in. which could not be  
done at law. besides it would take a long  
a whole - time. - If however there were but  
two partners an action at law might answer  
which is the best practice commonly. the a bill in b.L. would prob<sup>ly</sup> lie.

I see no room for an act<sup>n</sup> of ind<sup>ty</sup> of p<sup>r</sup>. to lie  
by one partner ag<sup>t</sup> another except for a liquidated  
balance - for in this act you cannot go  
into all the acc<sup>t</sup>. between the partners. -

It is a  
common thing for one partner to be authorized to  
settle all the acc<sup>t</sup>. of the partnership custom<sup>ly</sup>  
as when the partnership is dissolved - It has  
been questioned whether this one could bind the  
co. in a note signed by him in this name.  
but it has been decided that he cannot. he  
must pay the money or sign his own name &  
call on the other partner. - because the partnership is  
dissolved.

Whether private partners can be sued was formerly  
but it is now settled that they can be either be trusted to the  
credit of one only. -

In order that partners may  
swear themselves of the dissolution they must give no  
tice of it!



The intellectual goods are perishable they may as soon be swept by a solo.  
an endie.

If you can show the man knew of the infraction it is enough - & also if the infraction was a matter of notoriety when he is presumed to know. One of this kind notice was published in a daily paper six weeks that the Plff took - it was notice. - Another case was it was published in a paper that he did not take, but it had been published a long time the Ct. determined that he did not know. - 1 Galb. 292. Bl. Rep. 993. Comp. 449. So that it depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. Thus when the man was proved to have access to the newspaper at the coffeehouse where several papers were read which contained the notice. -

### Factorage: -

A factor & a broker are very much alike the first is employed in a foreign country from a commission for a merchant <sup>meaning then</sup> "to buy & sell property as if it was your own" - this gives power to sell on credit & in case of loss the factor loses nothing if he acts with out negligence - 1 B. & L. 103. Yelw. 202

Sometimes the commission <sup>means then</sup> "to sell & dispose" these words give no power to sell on credit & if loss occurs in consequence the factor loses. 2 M. & L. 105. 15 M. & L. 144. Mology 493. (this com<sup>m</sup> is special) & acts as a



as between the merchant & factor this is all right & he  
must pay them -

Sta. 1178  
1182.

2 Km. 638

factor to B & C separate merch<sup>t</sup>. under a general commission to sell goods on credit. He sells property to a man who fails. B & C must divide all that it gets as a dividend in proportion to the amt. of sales

All that is required of a factor is integrity. Co. Lit. 89. Maly 495. & to an ordinary diligence

Suppose a factor whose duty it is to pay the duty - thinking he can run the goods safely - runs them. - & then charges all the duties to the merch<sup>t</sup>. - The factor runs all the risk of value & even more as to his life. the merch<sup>t</sup> must pay. How. Id. 265. Bac. abg<sup>t</sup>. Tit "Factors"

The factor's sale binds the principal, & yet the factor cannot use the property altogether as if it was his own for he cannot pledge therefor his own debts. this supposes the factor known as such but if the property is held up as his own property - it is so in relation to all but the real owner.

Altho the commission giving no power to sell upon credit, <sup>it is known to the purchaser</sup> yet if he sells the purchaser gets a good title. tho the factor may lose & there is a singular feature in the laws of factorage viz. that if the factor gives more than his commission warranty or exceeds his



back 253

Jan. 489.

1 Vy. 509

2 Vy. 39

\* Because if he had sold the goods at two diff<sup>t</sup> market in the way the money incl. i. ~~had~~ <sup>should</sup> have been divided --

2 Vy. 39

commission he forfeits his wages.

If the merchant is fearful that the factor will fail & gives notice that no payment is to be made to him, if money is paid to him it must be paid - <sup>g<sup>o</sup></sup> to the merchant. if it is known that he is a factor.

The factor has a lien upon all the property in his hands not only on acct of his commission but for any balance he may have ag<sup>t</sup> the principle. - Suppose the factor gives more than the commission warrants. the merchant is not bound to take them but if the merchant takes them he must pay the factor all he gave for them.

If factor sells his own goods & those of the merchant to the same man, <sup>both on credit</sup> this means he becomes a bankrupt but some money is recovered - the factor must pay the merchant in full before he takes anything on his acct. - This seems not equitable but it is a principle of policy to make factors careful.

There is a practice singular to the usual - the merchant writes to the factor to insure his goods this he is bound to do & if he does not he is considered as the insurer. - <sup>When a factor dies all the goods that can be identified go to the principle</sup>  
policy

1 Salt. 160



If the property cannot be satisfactorily secured it is part of the factors  
estate and is subject to the debts in favour of the comp. 295  
principals. —

Agent acts for other persons but the contract is made with him &  
the suit is brought in his own name. — Another question if agent is ordered to state  
off a certain price (comp. 395) not under, he should make the offer  
he is liable. decided note. —

With respect to auctions it has been long  
a question whether if a man is employed to bid off  
goods at a certain price set by the auctioneer he can have them  
on the highest bidder. the courts decided it to go to the highest bid-  
der. I might think. When a man makes a bar-  
gain at b.l. it is the man to whom it is sold. yet by  
the mercantile law the seller may stop these goods  
in transit if the buyer is discovered to be a bank-  
rupt. If, to be sure, it has got to its destina-  
tion or is assigned bona fide it cannot be  
stopped

## Bills of Exchange

A bill of exchange is defined to be a request in an open  
letter from one man to another to pay to a man or his order,  
such an instrument as this ordinary person to whom this  
bill is payable the legal title - holding or ~~paying~~ or  
drawn who can sue in his own name the drawer  
Suppose the drawer does not execute. he has not be-  
come an acceptor. then the holder has a right of ac-  
tion in his own name ag<sup>t</sup> the drawer drawer or  
endorser. Now this negotiation of a check in ac-  
tion is contrary to the rules of b.l. for instance a  
bond is sold. it must be sued in the name of the  
original payee - suppose a man should sell a



1 H. B. 612. 60 L. 332

1 M. 229. 1 V. 411

3 P. 129.

The incense at ~~off~~ a bill would have the legal title. but of  
a ~~state~~ of hand he would only have an equitable title &  
could only recover in ~~law~~

2 Bl. 1272

1 H. 20

3 T. 182

5 P. 683

9 that is the consideration of a specialty cannot be inquired into.

bond & covenant that the buyer should collect the money  
it would be in vain -

But at length <sup>as noted to me</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> bill intervened  
& protected the sale when done ~~honestly~~ <sup>honestly</sup> even if  
a bond was sold & the promisor had notice. if he  
pays to the seller <sup>the</sup> bill will oblige the promisor  
to pay it over again - It must state however  
be said in the name of the promisor - & if the  
promisor gets a release from him it would be  
good at law & then the buyer must apply to  
bill. The mercantile law is different. & the  
whole right & title is immediately vested in the buyer.  
If then a note negotiable was sold the buyer could  
use the document in his own name. *N. T. Rep. 763*  
& *T. Rep. 340*. & *T. Rep. 621*.

The consequence of the bill  
under subjects the owner to great inconvenience - namely  
the promisor may withdraw the suit give a release  
to the bill of bill compels the man who gets the dis-  
charge to pay the note when he ought to -

<sup>no</sup> This prin-  
ciple of all mercantile law applies to policies of in-  
surance. bills of lading & respondentia bonds but never  
to those instruments not of a mercantile nature -  
another difference from bill contract. it is in the shape of  
a simple contract but has the qualities of a specialty  
this principle is extended to bills of exchange after



B Lark 70  
1 Bl. 445

unless it was so corrected

Beck 182

endorsement - but before that it may be proved.  
that there was no consideration at a suit on it  
but if it is indorsed this cannot be done. for it  
would destroy all confidence in dealing. men  
The principle is different from that which prevents  
proof of this, or specially for in that you pre-  
sume from the notoriety of dealing that there  
was consideration & it must not be questioned.  
but in relation to mercantile instruments it is  
to ensure confidence & afford facility to commerce.

The maker of the bill is called the drawer the  
person in whose favour it is drawn is the payee  
& the person on whom it is drawn the drawee  
when he has accepted he is called the acceptor  
when the payee has indorsed it over to one  
he becomes indorser & the person to whom it is  
indorsed is indorsee.

Whenever A draws a bill in  
favour of B upon C. the law presumes that C  
owes A & C, acceptance of it proves it.  
unless something destroys this presumption.

There is no  
certain inference to be drawn that the drawer owed  
the payee - & suppose he did owe him this bill  
does not pay him. it has however this effect to op-  
erate as a waiver of thought of the payee to sue the



& if it is not accepted he may sue on the original  
debt or on the bill. —

1 N. B. 586

602.

Bankers notes are always payable to bearer other notes are so some  
times but not necessarily so. Thus pass by mere delivery. —

An infant may certainly sue on a bill in his favour. Chit. 24  
Ky 2. 30. Rec. Inf. 16. & Except in the case of endorsement by some court. It  
seems that the drawer endorsed by / some incompetent, it will still be  
valid as to a competent party. Chit 25. 6

1 T. R. p. 40.

drawn in title it can be found whether the drawee accepts it.

Checks. There is a species of negotiable notes or bankers, made payable to bearer. I shall not write upon them at present.

If a bill is drawn to the payer to make it negotiable it must be indorsed by the payer. — Bills are due always when the term is out. Banker bills must be demanded before it can be paid. — A Bill of ex. does not pay the debt but a banker's bill does if you take it, its being negotiable. When you run upon this you shall run upon it the same as upon a bill of Ex.

Mytho can make bills of Ex. It was thought that no one but merchants could. but the fact is that every person capable of contracting can make a bill of Ex.

What will you I would say that genl. (at C L) a minor is not bound by his contracts except for necessaries & there is no distinction between a specially <sup>in measure</sup> simple contract, — because you must go into the examination of the consideration of the instrument. for this reason he is not bound by a bill of Ex. after it is negotiated — before it is negotiated he is bound because you can then go



1 T. Rep 648

(a) and if it passes to E by delivery only it must even after pass  
by delivery.—

(c) for money had without consideration. — & then it might be paid back  
to the drawer. —

1 T. Rep 760

which is an acceptance supra protest.

L R 980

Banc 83

into the consideration. If he arrives at a spot from  
in pay it. he is bound so that the bill is only  
voidable not void. —

A is the drawer. B. Payee C. the  
drawee. B accepts then he becomes acceptor. B endorses  
to D who is indorsee — who can pass it to E by delivery.  
But B endorsed it in blank & delivered it to E & E  
to F & so on — the holder may fill up the in-dorse-  
ment of B & then run B. But no one can be sued  
upon the bill but B or the drawer. — But <sup>any of</sup> all those  
whose names are endorsed may be sued by the holder.

If the bill has been passed by delivery the holder can  
sue the man from whom he rec<sup>d</sup>. it <sup>(c)</sup> but no other one  
tho' who has it has passed without endorsement. So  
that there must always be one endorsement to make  
a bill negotiable —

A man can make himself party  
to a bill without the knowledge of the drawer, as  
when a man accepts a bill to prevent dishonor of the  
drawer or endorses who are then holders to him. —

An endorsement may be made by an agent. He should in-  
dorse by his own name in behalf of his principal  
if he does not state the "behalf" he becomes liable  
himself as indorser. —

It is not every request to pay money  
to one or his order that is a bill of Ex.

A bill that



2 Sta. <sup>3</sup> 1241

Sta. 591.

There is one more directly to the point.

L. H. and. 25.

several requisites - It must be for money & not any  
other matter - it must be on personal credit &  
not payable out of a particular fund. which  
may not be productive. it may ~~be~~ in this  
way be a good contract between the parties but  
is not a bill of Ex. L Ray. 1361. 3 Wils 307.  
it could not be indorsed 10 mod. 294. 316.

However it may appear payable out of a partic-  
ular fund when it is not in fact - being on the  
description of that fund from which the drawer  
could refund himself L Ray. 1481. 1525. It is  
said there is no instance of a note of hand

another quality indispensable to a bill of Ex is that  
it must be paid at all events & not depend upon  
any condition which may not happen. 2 Stra 1151  
3 Wils 213. D Ray 1362. 1396. 1563. 1 Burr. 323.

It is enough if it will certainly happen on the death of  
a man. or if the condition is morally certain  
as the paying off of a public ship - it is not good  
policy to doubt that the public ships will be paid off  
Burr. 217. Stra 1217. In all these cases the con-  
tract as between the parties will be good but it  
will not be good as a negotiable instrument.

As to the words "value received" there are many ob-  
tuse opinions that these words are not necessary.



Judge thinks the words "value recd." necessary if the instrument  
is sent before endorsement.

Stand. 278. 358

2 Will. 253.

As long as the bill before it is negotiated can be set aside  
by the illegality of the consideration but its character is changed  
by negotiation and the purchaser knows of its illegality.  
etc.

I cannot conceive why a bill that has been once negotiated should need the words "value recd." they are only evidence of consideration & the proof of that is sufficient by the enclosures.

It has been said that the word "order" is not necessary but it has been decided in *N York* *Map. & Law*. that that word is necessary to make the note or bill negotiable. Whitty recommends that the words value received be always used.

When the considerations are illegal under the law <sup>as to negotiability</sup> *Miscantit* is diff<sup>r</sup> from *b. & L.* for when a bill of *Ex* is negotiated the consideration can not be questioned. — The *Miscantit* law allows it in some cases — *b. & L.* always; for by *b. & L.* if the consideration of a bond is illegal it destroys the bond even the hands of a bona fide purchaser as well as of the obligor — the maxim is that whatever equity the assignor had the holder will have by *b. & L.*

In *Miscantit* *Law* the is allowed to destroy the bill in some cases — if a bill is on hand considered it is bad in the hands of the payee but if the payee negotiates it, if the holder knows of the illegality it would be void in his hands. if he did not it would be good against the discoverer if it does not come within that description of instruments which by stat are void to all intents & purposes.



1 Bl. 445

E. p. 166

6 T. Rep 61

<sup>x</sup> It being considered as a loan of 100. the 5 be deducted. - this rule however applies only to negotiable instruments & not to bonds. See 3. 3 R. 2 P. 152. 8.

<sup>y</sup> Not so as to stamp on bills - or as to wills. —

If the assignee know of the illegality of the conside.<sup>n</sup>  
the instrument is void & whether he knew or not  
it will be void if it comes within the statute as  
of usury or gaming. — If any thing is void it  
can never be ratified. Sta. 1155. Doug. 736. 1 N. Pl.  
469.

It has been much litigated whether it is usury to  
receive the interest at the time of lending — it has  
been determined not to be by the customs of banks  
& bankers. — It is plainly taking more ~~and~~ than  
the legal rate. 2 Bl. Rep 772. 3 Wils 256. 2 T. Rep  
52 —

It has become a practice to draw bills payable to  
a fictitious person and then endorse it in the name of  
the fictitious payee — Courts have now determined that  
it is the same thing as if made payable to bearer  
in which case no endorsement is needed.

"The genl. rule of law <sup>as to the validity of this inst.</sup> is that an instrument must be  
good according to the law <sup>of the country</sup> where the instrument is  
made & Sta. 733. However the time of paym<sup>t</sup>  
is regulated by the law of the country where it is  
to be paid. As there are different numbers of days  
of grace in different countries. —

Usance is a term used  
in bills it means the time which it is the usage of the country  
between which bills are drawn, to appoint for pay<sup>t</sup> of them. B. 1192  
The requisites of the bank.



Beaver. 454

Camp. 572

Therion by Hunt Bay

of the country when the bill is made gives it validity the time of pay<sup>t</sup> is regulated by the laws of the country when it is payable. —

State of the Parties & their obligation to each other. — Of the Acceptor. the same obligations lie upon the drawer of a note & the acceptor of a bill.


The acceptance of a bill is an engagement to pay the bill to any man that has ~~the~~ it, & not particularly to the presenter. 1 Chlt 715. Brown. 466. 3 Bm. 1663.

It is an man who previously engaged to accept a bill. has accepted it & may be so declared a g<sup>t</sup>. it is no matter whether presented before or after the time of pay<sup>t</sup>. if it is accepted B & P 240. Harrow. 74. Stm. 1000

An acceptance may be by writing or parol & is good both ways tho the common way is by writing. the acceptance is not a promise to pay the debt of another. Stm 648. 3 Bm. 1674. 1563. but his own debt. —

This acceptance is not necessary to be made to the holder it may be accepted to the drawer —





Now a bill may be accepted in part so as to hold the acceptor - the holder is not bound to accept that but he may if he chooses - it is no harm to the drawer if he pays his debt in part. so he may accept if he please a promise of pay<sup>ment</sup> at a future day. this you will remember is at the option of the holder. H. & 174. 11 Nov. 190. Cases 481-


There may be also a conditional acceptance as if such an affair must arise & if the condition happens it is bound on W. & 9. Comp 574.

What is an acceptance? any thing that is said or written that does not amount to a refusal is an acceptance as writing the word "seen" or a direction to some one to pay it H. & 648. Gil Exp 618

An acceptance is an engagement to pay the holder or any indorser who pays it & he may bring his action for it against any of the previous endorsers by erasing the intermediate endorsers - the name may be done at law.

The acceptor renders himself liable to the drawer as if one the bills not being paid the drawer is sued & he pays it. He can then come upon the acceptor & sue him if the drawer has effects in the hands of the acceptor to pay it. but if the acceptor can show that he had not. he will exculpate





himself. the law presumes that he had effect.

If the bill is payable to bearer it may be transferred by delivery, but if to order it must be endorsed. — The drawer & all the endorsers are liable to the holder & so is the acceptor after acceptance. Endorsements are usually in blank. 1 Ld Ray 575 3 T. Rep. 80. Doug. 611. 633. 551.

This bill when drawn & presented is dishonoured unless accepted within 24 hours. There is an implied ag<sup>t</sup> on the part of the drawer that the drawer shall be found. This does not mean that he shall not have moved or gone on a journey &c he must be looked up, but if he has absconded or never lived then the bill is dishonoured. — It may be accepted by an authorized agent or one who is accustomed to do such business. —

An acceptance is irrevocable by the gen<sup>l</sup> rule of Law Merchant. The holder however may waive the acceptance if he chooses. Doug 247 as when the holder found the drawer had no effects in drawer's hands & the endorser able to pay. There was a case much litigated when the acceptor had paid a part & got a longer time to pay the remainder. the question was whether this discharged the acceptor. the court held it to be a discharge only as to that time. —



When a bill or note passes by delivery & the party receiving it is a stranger to the bill, if not accepted, he is answerable by the law merchant in satisfaction as well as any of the parties to the bill but by C. L. he may sue the man who transferred it to him. - But if it were accepted the holder might sue the acceptor.

1 Show. 165

1 Galt 12 8730

2d Reg. 871

Of indorsement. It drew a bill upon C payable to  
bearer who presents it. C would not accept it  
he cannot maintain his act. <sup>against</sup> any of the parties by law. Now  
a bill was drawn in favour of B upon C. & indorsed  
to D & D to E in blank. This bill may be filled  
up by an indorser for two purposes to vest in self  
the property or with a power ~~of collecting~~ <sup>to collect</sup>  
it which <sup>thereby</sup> destroys its negotiability.

Another case. C  
accepted the bill before the time of payment. B an  
indorser presents it for pay. & C puts the bill in  
his pocket without pay. B loses his act. of  
tort. the objection was that B had parted with  
his property by the blank indorsement to C. but this  
was no way sustained. for it might have been given to C  
to collect & the Ct. sustains the act.

When the drawer draws this  
bill & delivers it over there is an implied  
contract to pay the bill not only to B but  
to his order or to any indorser or his order. The  
common way is to indorse in blank one after the  
other. — All previous indorsers are liable to the  
last. — the indorser then holds the bill with all  
the security that the payer did & as much more  
as the credit of intermediate indorsers.

Suppose the payer  
has not a valuable consideration from the indorser the



1 Gal 130





Sta. 516

Beam 469

3 W 4 1

Cart 5.166

2 Shro 509

Beam 266

This is often done and the money is usually paid in such cases  
if it is not it seems to be a bill of exchange.

litigated. that is now at an end — It was said that  
the payers were guilty of a partner in trade, but it  
was overruled. Doug. 2 E. 2. 4 pp.

In two states of York & Mass it was said that  
they both were liable because they held their names out  
as partners — It is still a question *veritas*.

Then are some  
persons empowered by law to endorse as the husband of  
a feme sole who was made payee — so the assignee  
of a Bankrupt. so Ex<sup>r</sup>. Ad<sup>m</sup>. a trustee. & many more  
don —

A bill cannot be divided by partial endorse-  
ments so as to make the drawer liable in more  
actions than one. — as of 500 to 500 B. & C. with  
it can be endorsed so as to subject the acceptor to  
in one suit unless he excepts after these divisions  
are made. — 5th. 516.

The different kinds of bills, or bills <sup>made</sup> payable  
able "to B or bearer." "to bearer." "to B or order" —  
as to the first "to B or bearer" — the property passes by  
endorsement or delivery — when "to bearer" it passes by  
delivery — when "to B or order" then must be an  
endorsement and after that it passes by delivery  
or unless quiet endorsement of the holder. B. payable  
to B, by endorsement <sup>in blank</sup> when it becomes a negotiable instrument  
Parsons on Bills & Notes 1 Am Bl. 606. saw the effect of  
B's name in blank is to convey the property to B or



18 Atkins


18 How 63

to give B a power of atty to collect it. & there is no  
certainty which entails it is filled up or passed  
for a valuable consideration. — something must be done  
with the bill to determine what is meant by the  
blank endorsement. If B does fill it up in the  
name of himself the action must be brought  
in the name of B. If it remains blank the  
name of B may be struck out & the action  
then brought in B's name. —

After endorsement it  
passes by delivery any future holder may fill  
up the blank endorsement of B to himself or  
if it had been ~~been~~ originally endorsed to him.  
suppose there were half a dozen blank endorsements  
& it was in the hands of G. he may strike out all  
the intermediate endorsements & run B. the endorsement  
of B being filled up to him. — let there be every so  
many blank or special endorsements the holder may  
strike out all the endorsements till he comes  
to a blank endorsement & use that endorsement. &  
to save a multiplicity of suits when one would  
do as well. — So long as there is a blank endorsement  
so long it passes by delivery. But its negotiability  
may at any time be restricted by filling up the  
endorsement with power of atty. as to pay E for my  
use. or take this bill & give credit for it.

Suppose





some one indorses who has nothing to do with the bill,  
is a stranger to it to give credit to it. this is  
a different thing the import of which is a war-  
rantee that the bill is then due & will be paid  
if due diligence is used. the only defence for  
such an indorse against the action on the warranty is to show that  
due diligence has not been used to collect it.

Engagements of the several parties.

Of the Drawer - He as must <sup>as if he had specified it</sup> engage to pay  
the paper if the payee is not capable of binding  
himself - 2 that the drawer is to be paid  
3 that the drawer will accept it & that he  
will pay it where it becomes due & that he  
will hold himself under the same obli-  
gations to all that hold under you or due.  
but not to all who come in possession by delivery who  
cannot owe a party to the bill by M. L. but by b. L.  
he even the man from he received it.

In case of non acceptance he is liable for not  
only for the contents of the bill but for certain  
damages - this is by the Law Merchant. all that  
you recover by b. L. is interest in a note of hand.  
if it is an contract to build a ship the damages may  
be very great.

at first in notes or bills damages were inquired  
into; at length, certain damages were settled by  
the custom of the merchants. - before the revo-



A man may render himself liable as drawer without actually  
drawing the bill or by writing his name on a paper &  
delivering it to be filled up by another. 1 N. Bl. 313

2 Show. 441. 494.  
3 Mod. 86

lution in our country the damages were 20% of the  
besides the interest. Now they are different in the dif-  
ferent states. in N York 20. In Boston 10. This is to be  
known as other customs are.

It was not long since that this question has been  
settled. whether a drawer could be sued upon the  
refusal of the drawee to accept. you must de-  
mand twice. — Sta. 949. Chitford is Mayor Doug  
It was decided in Cal & Penn. that he could be.

There is much case of some difficulty. the drawer  
covenants that the drawee is to be paid. if he  
is paid after returning from a journey or moved  
& it is accepted as soon as possible the bill is  
is not dishonoured: each case depending on its own circum-  
stances.

Of the Endorsers engagements.

The engagement of  
the endorser is the same as that of the drawee  
in the all subsequent holders — one endorser is  
a new drawer of the bill & nothing will dis-  
charge him that will not discharge the  
drawer.

There are certain things that will dis-  
charge him at C. L. that will not at the  
M. L. An effectual judgment has the same  
effect at C. L. & M. L. & if you do not get



2 Bl. Rep. 1235

an ineffectual judgment against one in tort discharges at least the  
others but not so in contract. But even in contract  
where there is an Ex. by C. L. a discharge to one is  
good for all. —

15 Rep. 717

15 Rep. 170

the money out you may owe the other. But we  
imperfectly. Even by C.L. does the act of L.M. it  
does not. or if the debtor is taken and im-  
prisoned & then released the right of action  
a joint debt is at an end by C.L. for the  
maxim is that the discharge of one is a  
discharge of the other - originally meaning  
a discharge by pay<sup>ment</sup>. But by M.L. you  
may owe & imprison all hands till you  
get pay. It is strange the law is not the same  
law is not applicable to both.

The holder of the bill there is entitled to re-  
cover but there is something for him to do.  
He must present in proper time & manner, ~~not~~  
let it lie too long. nor neglect to give notice.

If the bill becomes due at a certain time after  
sight he must show it to the drawer within  
a reasonable time. for the drawer may become  
insolvent or the drawer get his effects out of his hands.

If the bill is payable at a certain  
time after date if the payee or endorser shows  
it to him at the time of payment he must  
do his duty. I do not consider this as settled for it is questionable.  
<sup>said before</sup> it is said it ought to be <sup>so</sup> Where it is presented in proper time  
& it is dishonoured he must give notice to all  
that he intends to make liable & then are <sup>liable</sup> not



and there are contrary decisions as to whether he must give a  
prior notice that he looks to them for pay. —

1 L.R. 410

1 L.R. 743  
Sta. 829.441  
815.649

The notice would be good tho not given by this method if  
given in a reasonable time, and the rule as to inland bills  
generally

who do not have notice. the drawer must have notice that he may accept his acct<sup>t</sup> with the drawer - but if he had no property in the hands of the drawer he need not have notice.

The endorsers must have notice that they may incur this liability in season if there should be failure. 5 Bur. 2670. 18 Rep. 712. Sta. 442. 2 Bur 669.

Now the drawer may accept a bill varying from the time of its due to a longer time of pay<sup>t</sup> by which the drawer is bound. the holder must give notice of this fact by its variance.

The holder must present within the time of pay<sup>t</sup> for acceptance & then again at the pay day. The law states persons he will pay it. Beanes 261. 761. 2 Bl. Rch. 742.

The time of notice for all foreign bills must be given by the first post after the refusal to accept & also after the refusal to pay when presented on pay day. If there is no post, it must be given by the first opportunity. 18 Rep 169. 67.

The question as to what is diligence & what is negligence is to be run up to the jury by the count



15 Rep 170

3 Bac. 514

and if the same notice be given of the dishonour of an inland  
bill as is required for a foreign it gives the same extra  
allowance. & by this the power of giving the same notice  
is granted. -

As to the manner of giving notice  
when inland bills require no particular form of <sup>giving</sup> notice  
it only requires notice in a reasonable time. & the same  
rule applies to a promissory note. — What is a rea-  
sonable time is a question of law arising on the  
facts. — As to the requisition of notice in case of the  
dishonor of these two bills they are made alike  
by an Eng Stat. —

Mode of foreign bills the form  
is specified & the method must be followed so  
the holder loses his security. —

When the drawer  
refuses <sup>to accept</sup> the holder must go to a notary public or  
some judicious <sup>respectable</sup> person if there is no notary, who goes  
& draws under & then sets down on the bill the time  
circumstances <sup>called minuting</sup> he writes down the date of all  
the facts & signs it officially, this is called a  
protest — all this is to be done in the regular  
hours of business — This protest is then sent  
away to give notice by the next mail & a copy  
of it being preserved by the notary & the notary  
having <sup>which is evidence</sup> certified it. — When the time of pay-  
ment comes the same process is gone over — then  
the bill itself is sent to the drawer & the copy  
taken by the notary is the evidence in that  
So too if the drawer is in case <sup>not</sup> to be found  
or if he accepts the bill & is absent from its time



us to accept collateral articles in lieu of money if  
the holder receives such acceptance it is at his own  
risk.

It is usual for drawers to write to the man whom credit is  
drawn & if he agrees to it all is well.

the same receipt is presented unless indeed the holder will accept such a variant acceptance when he is bound by it.

When the holder proceeds after the acceptance & before pay day that the acceptor will fail, the holder is compelled to demand security - the law teaches this can of the drawer & indorser & a protest must be entered if the drawer does not give it.

Of the effect of notice - The holder if he has complied with the legal requisitions he is entitled to all his damages - by U.S. no one recovers more than the interest by way of damages - but by all U.S. he can.

At first the holder recovered all he had suffered but then being allowed with inconvenience the amount of it was fixed by custom. There is a bill now before Cong. to make the damages uniform throughout the U.S.

There is a species of bills drawn on one upon the credit of a third person. As by A in favor of B upon B on the acc<sup>t</sup> of C. In this case there is no contract between the drawer & drawee - there is no presumption of the effects of A in the hands of B. - B is bound if he accepts - anyone may accept it for the honor of the drawee & the acceptor <sup>& holder</sup> must get the bill protested in advance



15. Rep. 269

of this kind and this raises the contrast between the drawn & exceptor.

When it is thus protested for non ac-  
ceptance he must give no notice or protest to for  
non pay<sup>t</sup> if the drawer having notice of the  
first protest shirks him, self pleased with the ac-  
ceptance.

If the drawer has no effects in the hands of the drawee & the bill is paid the drawee has a right of action ag<sup>t</sup> the drawer at C. Lomas. I suppose —

It is a great rule of all. & that an acceptance  
cannot be revoked altho the drawer is liable to  
fail or he has accepted without consideration.

In the mercantile law there are a vast many cases in which a man is bound in contract when there is no consideration, & the reason is that there are third persons ~~are~~ concerned - but by C.L. if there is no consideration the contract is not binding - & even by C.L. if no third person is concerned a contract without consideration will not bind - so there a medium pactum is a thing known to C.L.

The holder of a bill may discharge the acceptance by writing or signature & he will be bound by it. even tho' there is no possible consideration for it unless indeed in the wish to oblige the drawer —



Song. 237

Stk. 733

247  
Song. 235

\* The acceptor is holden untill the Stat of limitations runs  
away from the contract.

2<sup>d</sup> Ray  
734  
1 W. 48

So when the holder discharges the <sup>acceptor</sup> drawer from a note he has commenced a <sup>similar</sup> consequence of a bond from the drawer. the drawer is solvent & the holder suffers.

As indulgence in the amounts to a <sup>draw</sup> that the holder will not look to the acceptor will release him as when the holder looks to the drawer for pay<sup>t</sup> & in P.D. of him a while <sup>this</sup> does not discharge the acceptor - neither does a <sup>maker or indorser</sup> receipt of part of the money from the drawer, except for so much.

If due notice is not given to the acceptor of the receipt of this money from the drawer & any injury comes to him <sup>as by paying into other hands</sup> though he is discharged.

It was once thought that the holder was first to resort to drawer but that is done away. 441. 2 Bur. 669. this is fully settled by the case in Burrow.

As to length of time short of the date of time. discharges the acceptor of a bill. Suppose after acceptance the holder applies to the drawer & gets his obligation for the money this does not release the acceptor it only adds to the security of the holder -

When the acceptance is variant



37R554

the holder may receive the amount accepted & the  
drawn is liable for the rest if the bill be regularly  
protested

When the holder has  
indorsed the acceptance & let it lie along without  
giving notice of non payment. he runs the whole risk

If the drawer or indorser promises to pay he will  
be liable - although he has no consideration. if there  
is a moral obligation to pay it he ought to pay  
it, if not he ought not to be obliged to so it  
seems to me that this principle is questionable  
& there are different decisions. this is a 6<sup>th</sup>  
promise.

The 6<sup>th</sup> however has said that if the promise  
is made under the idea that he would otherwise  
be bound. he is not obliged to be bound by it  
Art. 102. note. I should suppose that if the drawer  
had lost nothing he would be forced to pay it  
the moral obligation being the criterion.

There is a species of notes called bank notes <sup>drafts on</sup> banks  
drafts &c. Bank notes are money and pass by that  
name in all well dec. & when the state issues cash  
it includes bank notes. - The 6<sup>th</sup> has said that  
if it pay a day not object because they are  
bank notes & not gold & silver it shall be a  
tender.

Bank notes are called cash as are checks



1 Sta. 415

1 Sta 516

Sta

and so pass. the demand must be made within  
a reasonable time. That was decided to be  
24 hours after it has been u.p. in London.  
A case: a note was taken at 2 o'clock & <sup>the holder</sup> demand  
was paid at 4 o'clock next day. the court  
said that as the banker had failed the  
holder would not lose it. another case was  
the holder left the note within 24 hours & then  
called after 24 to take the money when the  
banker had failed the b<sup>t</sup> said he had not  
been negligent. — On the case in the 500  
the last decision was questioned. —

another case was  
where the holder called early enough

Another case was  
the bill was u.p. after dinner & presented within 24  
hours. no loss at a. 1240. Another case where  
more than 24 had elapsed it was said a loss  
in. B. case 488. a case of the same kind the court  
charged the party to find a loss. they did not  
& the b<sup>t</sup> granted a new trial.

There was a case where  
the parties to a bill of Ex lived near each other. it was not  
considered as governed by the same rule as other bills. b<sup>t</sup>  
motion was said to be enough.



The first of these is the fact that the  
the second is the fact that the  
the third is the fact that the  
the fourth is the fact that the  
the fifth is the fact that the  
the sixth is the fact that the  
the seventh is the fact that the  
the eighth is the fact that the  
the ninth is the fact that the  
the tenth is the fact that the

the eleventh is the fact that the  
the twelfth is the fact that the  
the thirteenth is the fact that the  
the fourteenth is the fact that the  
the fifteenth is the fact that the  
the sixteenth is the fact that the  
the seventeenth is the fact that the  
the eighteenth is the fact that the  
the nineteenth is the fact that the  
the twentieth is the fact that the

Month is a term denoting a certain length of time seen  
formally <sup>much</sup> used see Kid 4. In Eng & U.S. & all the  
Eng. Col. it means a month. a calendar month &  
not a C. L. month which are here or 4 weeks

Days of grace are the time given beyond the time of  
pay<sup>t</sup> in Eng & U.S. they are there as they are  
in most of the mercantile world.

By all L. if  
the pay<sup>t</sup> day falls on Sunday. pay<sup>t</sup> is to be  
made on Saturday. By C. L. on Monday.

There has been much dispute as to words from  
the day & from the day of the date. it was  
decided at first at C. L. that from the day included & from the  
day of the date excluded the day of the date.

But by a decision here. it has  
been determined that the words are nearly ag.  
nominal. — R. L. Mansfield says it must  
go according to the apparent intention of the  
parties. — a life estate was given for life to com-  
mence from the day of the date as a freehold  
could not commence in futuro. the words were  
held to include the day. — But in all L.  
there has been no difficulty for by both expressions the  
day always was & still is meant to be included.



the 6<sup>th</sup> or Statute makes them negotiable.

When a bill is payable at sight there are no days of grace. — tho' it would seem they were more necessary here than in any circumstances — but this is the law. —

If a note was given payable to order it was questionable whether such note was negotiable — the Stat. of Mass. made it so. It was before the act a disputable question & is really in favour of this construction of the Act since the Par. that this the correct interpretation of it. — This Stat. has been copied by nearly all the States of Union. & it is quite understood that when there is no such Stat. that they are not negotiable. — Chipman Judge of Vt. has settled to my mind however the other way. He says that the note is a promise to pay to the bearer & to all to whom he shall order pay.

The drawing of a bill of Ex. & of a note of hand are different characters & by confounding them there is much confusion. the law that applies to the acceptor of a bill of Ex. applies equally to the maker of a note.

Previous to a Stat. of Mass. corporations used to draw & accept bills by their agents not by that Stat. they are prohibited. there is no such Stat. with us —



16 Nov. 8

10 Nov. 286

1861. Rep. 485

303 m. 1516

Bian. 481

A bill in favour of the order of B is the same thing as a bill in favour of B or order & the declaration on both is the same

still payable to bearer paper by delivery and it may be endorsed & the endorser makes himself party - if it is not endorsed or accepted no one is liable but the drawer.

It gives a note whereby he promises to acc<sup>t</sup> with B or order to ~~account~~ for \$50 this means it is understood as a promise to pay

It promises to accept to the drawer is an acceptance & if the drawer will not pay it may be protested for non pay<sup>mt</sup> & a suit bro<sup>gt</sup> or neg<sup>d</sup> the acceptor now it is said in some cases there is no consideration that the rule is that if a third person may be a loser not that he actually is. The person is bound by his promise according to ell. C. & there is no medium pactum in ell. C. where a third person is concerned. Mason vs Hunt Doug.

I have observed that a man may accept a bill variant from the tenor of it. if he does he is holder by it. & when you sue the acceptor the Dec<sup>r</sup> may be that it was accepted according to the tenor of it. A case was that the holder attired Jan<sup>y</sup> to Mech in the bill as the drawer accepted.



24<sup>th</sup> Nov 87

by L. L. was forged, & would have destroyed the bill, but by  
all L. the drawer was bound.

It was once questioned whether if a man writes his name  
in blank & gave it to a person to fill up it was  
a good note. but in Langstaffs case it was  
held good. Doerg. —

A drew a bill in favour of B upon  
C. B endorsed it to D. C. put it in his pocket. if  
he loses it, it will sustain an action of trover.  
but B bro't the action & used D as a witness  
the order to bring in blank & recovered: — for the  
property had not passed

Bills payable to bearer or  
to A or bearer are transferred by delivery & are  
fully the property of the holder as if he held by  
indorsement. — The law presumes effects in the  
hands of the drawer. — If the payee is a cred-  
itor of the drawer, the bill is no pay<sup>r</sup> & if the  
bill is lost without negligence the drawer  
must give another, or owe the payee the money as  
much as he ever did —

Negotiable promissory notes  
are put up on the same footing as bills of Exchange  
Law. 9. 17.

Irish bills of Ex are not governed by L. 11.  
& were not within our Eng Stat. law in 17.

When you give





common notice you recover damages as at C. C. if such notice as is required by Foreign bills you recover extra damages.

In U.S. the rule generally is that bills inland as to one state are governed by C. C. but if drawn upon another state they are treated as foreign bills.

The last convenient point of the day of pay<sup>t</sup> is the time to make a tender & if made in the morning & he is not at home it is no tender. whereas if made at the last convenient<sup>pt</sup> it is —

By C. C. any time in business hours is good. tho the earliest time of business on that day is sufficient for a tender & protest.

### Of the Remedies —

This brings up to view the whole law on this subject — When there is a pivity between the parties the suit may be bro<sup>t</sup> at C. C. as B may sue C. & if B induces C. to D. D may bring his act<sup>n</sup> at C. C. ag<sup>t</sup> B. but not C. now if D papers it by delivery to C. C cannot sue any body by L. M. but by C. C. he can sue D & him only.





The custom of *Munch* is not such a custom as  
of that of London - it is as much the law  
of the land as the *C.L.* is - the court is  
presumed to know it.

Suppose the indorsee was  
about to sue *A* the drawer. the old method  
was to state the custom that if one draws  
on another who does not accept the drawer  
became liable. stating it at length & then it  
states the facts of the particular case showing  
the circumstances by means whereof the drawer  
became liable & the course was the same if the  
suit was brought *ag<sup>t</sup>* the acceptor. - But this method  
is now at an end - They only now allude to the custom  
but not as formerly to give the provisions in detail  
but saying only that *it* according to custom  
<sup>of *Munch*</sup> draw a bill. in favour of *B* upon *C* that *B* presents  
the bill & is refused to pay it whereby he is damaged  
so much & need not state that he had effects  
in his hands. this the law presumes: but if the  
acceptor sends the drawer he must state the fact  
that the drawer had no effects in his hands.

The indorsee being sent has paid it. he states as before  
and that he procured the protest & recovered *ag<sup>t</sup>*  
*B*. & that *A* had notice of the protest. & then repeats the  
promise - Thus all that is necessary to be done  
must be done in.



2 L<sup>y</sup> 1544

2 Shov. 180.422

2 L<sup>y</sup> 964.1542

1376. 2 Sta. 817.

1 W. 185.

Used in Helwyn at P. 383. 7<sup>th</sup> R 596 25<sup>th</sup> 185. that the delivery & the  
page must not be alleged as it is a constitutional part of the  
making.

You must state according to law. Thus if a note  
purports to be signed by two & is signed only by  
one it must be said as if signed by both. If signed  
by one

If a person who is clerk agent or serv<sup>t</sup> <sup>signs</sup> the operation is  
the same as if done by the master and is so to be  
declared.


To recover there you must state all the  
facts making your claim - as protest &c.

Some things are indispensable &c. The making of the  
bill, requesting pay<sup>t</sup> directed to the drawee & given  
to the payer <sup>to payable to him or order</sup> the time of making is not  
indispensable to be stated tho it is usual. That it was  
presented accepted & pay<sup>t</sup> was refused must be stated even  
if it was paid when pay<sup>t</sup> only need be averred. the  
quo modo is not necessary to be stated in L.M. by C<sup>t</sup>  
the quo modo must be stated as well as the quid.

<sup>The same</sup>  
need not be stated for there is ~~not~~ the same nicety required  
in all L. transactions as C.L. when according to C.L.  
we describe so particularly it is <sup>to show</sup> that the instrument was  
drawn according to law.

If the ac<sup>t</sup> is ag<sup>t</sup> the acceptor the  
acceptance must be stated. presented for accep-  
tance need not. not the manner of acceptance.





Suppose the evidence of acceptance turns out to be  
after the time of pay<sup>t</sup>. the acceptor is not liable.  
The endorser binds to act ag<sup>t</sup> the acceptor of  
the bill, who does not pay it. — all these facts  
before specified must be stated & also that B in-  
dorsed this bill to the endorser D. which shows  
D right to the bill. — The word indorsement is all  
the technical word necessary if that is all  
the indorsement is to be filed up at bar if the  
title under it is disputed. — If there are inter-  
mediate indorsements you must strike out those  
that the conveyance be directly to the holder who owns  
if the former were blank or special until you come to the last or  
fill up all the blank indorsements & declare specially in them

The word indorsement implies a written assignment & delivery  
& the indorsement only & not the assignment & delivery need be stated.

If a bill is made payable to bearer it is necessary  
to state any indorsement if there is one it may be  
stated & must be if you wish to prove an indorsee to have  
been a bearer —

Suppose an act<sup>n</sup> bought by an endorser who has already  
paid the bill. C dishonours the bill & regular notice  
is given. — one of the endorsers pays up the bill or D  
he brings in the hands of C. when D brings the action  
he states those facts above under necessary stating  
the indorsement to show his title. then the dishonour by  
which he became liable to pay & did pay, whereby



5 Aug. 1915  
1 Sat. 128  
6 Oct. 509

the drawer or a previous indorser become liable to him & is frequently done to secure the indorser against the drawer

It is not necessary to state any promise for the law implies it. at L. Mo. But at C. L. there is the promise no reason for it & I think a debt without the promise would be good on debt. for every liability is stated there is nothing added: the promise is never proved & assumed for it is never made. the promise is assumed by the facts - & I think as necessary you never can draw the promise from the facts for the facts & know whether the facts alleged are a good ground to raise this promise. because by doing you allow the promise. This is on the ground of an implied promise.

The holder has a great security - can he sue all? the C. L. maxim is that he may sue all his notes at once & sue them all at once. suppose he should sue them he may recover judgment on all & yet he can never have but one satisfaction for the debt the he can recover all the costs. - One defendant put a stop to the whole by paying all the costs & the whole debt. that stops the whole - Suppose he pays up the debt & his own costs. Plff can have Ex. for the costs only - as to the others. if he gets Ex. for more it is contempt of court. & he may be fined & imprisoned & be forced to pay back the money.



"2" c. but the cam is the same as the rest of them.

Rec. 20 p. 6268

& if after judgment is rendered the <sup>money</sup> should be tendered by the Def<sup>t</sup>.  
he is bound to take it & if he takes out Ex<sup>pt</sup> it is  
contempt.

In the act. by holder a g<sup>t</sup> the indorser must  
state in addition to what is before mentioned. that you got  
it ~~for cash~~ & gave Def<sup>t</sup> notice. — & a foreign bill, the  
kind of notice is to be mentioned. in inland bills the manner  
will not be stated.

Suppose B gives the note  
to pay B or order — if there is no collusion then & B dies  
he could not recover. but if B indorsed it over  
to D. If D should sue he would recover.

It is common  
to draw a bill payable to the drawers order. — such  
a bill if accepted & then it endorses it over, it  
is a good bill. — it is a receipt for it to raise  
money.

Now in all these Sect. you must state accord-  
ing to the operation of law.

There was a question very  
much agitated in Westminster Hall as to the effect  
of a fictitious payee & the drawer indorsed in  
the name of the payee. The rule at first was that  
the payee's hand writing must be proved but the  
being inconvenient it was determined to be the same  
thing as a bill payable to bearer 1 T Rep 485, 183  
the Bl. 315.

A bill payable after date you must aver



24<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1082

12 mod. 1246

1<sup>st</sup> R. 364  
built. 459

10 mod. 36  
Am 131. 89

it to have been made on the day of the date. if the  
is no state that it was made on the day of delivery.

By the date & delivery as to time are the same thing for  
me for this being the presumption. it may however  
be rebutted.

If a bill were signed or indorsed &c by an authorized  
agent it is stated to have been drawn by the principal  
without noticing the agent.

So if the acceptance were variant the name need  
not be stated. the acceptance only.

When an indorser signs it is  
said he is entitled to state that he has demanded of the  
drawer - when the payee or indorser is said that  
this is done away & it is not now necessary for all  
the parties are equally bound.

There is a question in which  
it is said that on no direct authority - viz. can  
the drawer ever become the indorser of the bill  
& are any body upon it. I cannot see why  
he should not. - in the case in Black. the bill had  
been dishonored so that its negotiability had  
been destroyed.

The drawer brings his action against the draw-  
er because he did not pay when he had accepted.  
the question is ought he to state further that he had  
presented in the drawers hands? He did not. for  
the law presumes it & if the other side prove



Palk 128. built 409.  
1 Q. 598

5 Nov. 914

had not the drawer cannot recover - But if  
the acceptor sues - he states the conversion fact &  
further must remove the legal presumption of  
the effects in his hands by an averment that  
he had not. -

When the honour acceptor sues he  
must state the protest & notice & that for the honour  
of the drawer he accepted him with & gave notice to those  
for whom honour he accepted. -

Altho the consideration of a bill  
after negotiation cannot be acquired title, still the plead-  
ings are as on a simple contract. - non ap<sup>t</sup> or if on  
the fact of dish. the Def<sup>t</sup> would rely non ap<sup>t</sup> in pay-  
ment. - There was a case of a special plea  
of a bond, made by an <sup>in full consideration of the obligation</sup> ~~admission~~ the Pl<sup>t</sup> held the plea not  
good for it amounts to the fact of payment. I should have  
thought it a good plea. -

in pleading means that. Def<sup>t</sup> is not liable <sup>at L. M.</sup> ~~to~~  
that he never <sup>is not the author of C. M.</sup> ~~considered~~ & seems to be an improper  
plea in some cases - In C. L. cases the plea is non  
ap<sup>t</sup> & the give away this in evidence that it stops  
the liability. non ap<sup>t</sup> is no <sup>there</sup> more in validity than  
in a debt. -

Of the manner of holding proceedings up  
kept. -

The holder may have recovery of the drawer, draw-  
er & endorsers - one of them may prove a bankrupt.



JMS. 13

1 Bl. Ref. 390  
Q. Roy 244  
Sta. 946  
Bus. 1504

could he may carry the debt & prove it before  
the bankrupt commissioners. — and receive the dividend  
if out of 100. the drawers dividend being 25. then  
the drawers dividend is to pay upon the remainder of  
75. — If all are bankrupt. the whole debt is proved  
before the Com<sup>r</sup> of all & according to priority of  
time receives dividends on the whole until he  
gets the whole debt. 2. P. W. 89. 207. 1 & 2. 107  
110. 2 V. 114. 115.

When a man becomes bankrupt the Law  
his debts cease if he turns out solvent the Law  
revives.

C accepts the bill without consideration. B the  
payer who has become bankrupt is to be paid  
and the drawer has become a bankrupt. & B goes to  
C & obliges him to pay it. as the bankrupt having  
been discharged of his debts the question is. does  
it release his debt to C who paid that bill with-  
out consideration. — & the principle is that the  
debts must be not only due but owing at the  
time of the commission of fraud.

The holder runs the acceptance. the drawers hand  
was not be proved. for by acceptance the acceptance  
admits that fact. the Law supposes that. but  
if it is in one of those kind of cases where he is  
said when a promise to accept. it not requiring



17 Rep. 654

to any particular bill the drawers hand must be proved. —

The hand of the acceptor in this act is to be proved: — if the bill were to become that would be all that is necessary to be proved. —

The holder suing his indorser. He must show & prove the writing of any blank <sup>payable to order</sup> before him, & they show his right. — he need prove only one if that paper the right to him. & if the indorsements are special you must prove the hand writing of all. if not you can strike out. — But why does not, it is said ~~also~~ with the acceptance prove the hand writing of the indorsers? the reason is the indorsers are strangers to the acceptor. —

The acceptance was conditional if the drawer is dead the event upon which way the acceptance must be proved.

The indorser now sues the indorser. He then has to prove the hand writing of the indorser. Am. Bl. 313. the indorser who is holder brings his act ag<sup>t</sup> an indorser. besides the his writing he must prove that he has given notice by way of protest that he shall look to him — if he does the drawer he must prove his hand writing & also the notice. — But if the indorser sues the hand writing of the drawer



Decy 174  
Stat 464  
2 Jan 65

3 Mils 18

All previous endorsers are admitted by his endorsement & so need not be proved - if however he skips his immediate endorser, the acquisition of that - alone will not help him.

If the drawer owns the acceptor he must have acceptors hand writing or sign and by the holder, & that the bill has been returned to him & he has been obliged to pay it. but need not prove effects in acceptor hands

If the act. be not by the acceptor or by the drawer, & payment by himself & also that ~~the~~ had no effects in his hands, this is proving a negation.

The act. is not by an endorser who has not been <sup>or any such</sup> discredited, but seeing he must pay it, goes & pays it he may then go & sue any of the previous parties. - but in order to show his right to sue he must prove the pay<sup>t</sup> by himself. In the case in Wilson imprisonment of the endorser was considered pay<sup>t</sup> so as to enable him to come ag<sup>t</sup> the others.

As to the notice - This protest is conclusive evidence & cannot be got rid of - if it is said to be a forgery it is not necessary to prove the handwriting of the notary, all you have to prove is that the notary is regularly constituted by a certificate from the Execution. - The forgery must be proved. It is



Gal. Co. 118

3 T. R. 29. 201

1 St Bl. 98

10 mod. 37

1 W. 4. 185

1 T. 29. 169

is to prevent the inconvenience & clog to business were I left to take the case.

When the Def<sup>t</sup> suffers a Default. when they come to appear the day after it is too late to prove any thing as to handwriting. the default. admitting all that is necessary to substantiate the suit.

It is a common thing in the mercantile world to draw accommodation notes. nothing can be recovered by B the payee; but after its negotiation the drawer is liable - Unless it comes again into the hands of B who never can recover any thing on it. it is not equitable that he should for & owed him nothing, then being so consideration.

I gave you a number of cases by which it seems to appear that as to inland bills checks drafts &c the presentment for pay<sup>t</sup> must be within 24 hours.

A gave a note to B or over. B endorsed it over to C. it was payable on a certain day. all parties lived within 20 minutes walk of each other. - B early in the morning called for the money. A was not at home & he left word for him to come & take up the note. the next day he promised to come & pay it within banking hours. - The suit was brought & the court said the note was dishonoured on the day of pay<sup>t</sup> & was



2 Bl. Ref. 170

Gil. Ev. 118

Molloy, 281

ties ought to have been given that day to the  
drawer as it was not. — The court grants a new  
trial after verdict in Plff. because they said  
the court only used to judge of a reasonable time  
of notice. — & this point was established. —

As to factors. They have a lien upon the property  
of their principals. — If the principal had been  
in the habit of drawing bills on all the factors  
& all of accepting them. — We drew a bill which  
was not a bill of exchange or being payable  
out of the next proceeds &c. — M. accepted it —  
before pay<sup>ment</sup>. We became bankrupt. & M. would not  
pay it. The court held that although a principal  
is not answerable for the factor in such a case, if the factor  
accepts bills generally he shall pay them. He ought  
to have accepted specially if he would secure himself. —

I would remark several things that I have omitted. The law  
as it is in Eng<sup>land</sup> & as we have adopted it is a mercantile  
custom & not the old L. general. —

Whenever there is a refusal to accept if the drawer  
upon notice will <sup>give</sup> ample security to pay the contract at  
double the time. He shall not be sued in Eng<sup>land</sup> however  
& U.S. the suit may be commenced immediately. For  
this see Doug. Mitford & Mayne.



Boothin. 146. 15. 4.  
2 J.B. 336. 24 Bl. 61.

Exp. N.B. 516

A. T. R. n 70  
1 H. Bl. 528  
521. 282

3 J. R. n. 301

It has been contended that if the drawer or endorser  
actually have become bankrupts they cannot make  
defense of "no notice" — 3 Br. Chl. Case Bankers  
168. There are contradictory opinions & so it is  
not settled.

If the drawer has absconded unless he has  
left an agent it will never give him <sup>no</sup> notice.  
The sudden death or sickness of the holder will  
excuse immediate notice for a reasonable time  
Chitty. 89. — Formerly whenever prop<sup>d</sup> by default  
with the Chl. or M.L. the damages were ascertained  
by jury. — But now it is not done so if nothing  
is to be done for a principal but by plain com-  
putation it is done by the Chl. This was always  
our practice. — — It seems to be useless to call a jury  
for all is allowed. — But if it is claimed there is  
a profit then is all the reason for calling a jury  
as in any case; however it is done with us by  
the Chl. See B. 278. — We have seen that no-  
tice is required in a particular manner — when  
the suit is brought the notice & also the grounds  
on which protest must be alleged. — & tho the jury  
find a promise there can be no recovery for the  
jury find only what is proved & nothing is proved  
but what is alleged — suppose no consideration was  
alleged verdict would not aid — if the notice  
was alleged but informally verified and tho a



Beams 86

Beams 231

a drummer would have means to act<sup>on</sup> Tuckton or  
Aspinwall Doug. — That all this business can be  
done by agents is a settled point in all L.L. The only  
question is who is authorized. for if the agent does  
what is not in his power to do the principal is not  
bound. — a factor has power to do all that the  
principal could. — he must be supposed to have  
at any rate. — this proposition improving no stranger  
But with us at home the principal is bound as  
far as the agent has authority. — because  
given to power to get a bill discounted to get  
money & told AB not to refuse it. I would  
not purchase however without AB would in-  
dorse in the name of C. — On the reversal,  
it did not come out that C. around no indorse-  
ment. — A was held bound then being im-  
plied authority in the premises. 3 T. Rep. 707. An  
approp<sup>riate</sup> authority is not necessary if the thing done  
is in the usage of business it is enough. — Ag<sup>t</sup> if  
it is a thing not in usual practice. still if the  
agent had been in the habit of doing this it  
is fair to presume he had authority. — And if the  
he has no authority of any kind if the man  
applies to it, it is enough. — A man has employed  
a servant to do business of certain kind. in all bu-  
siness of this kind the master is bound — by hypothesis  
connection is dissolved. — then the master must give



qbo. 75

6 7R52

Bull et. P. 271

Cook Rub. 168

L. Reg. 744

Str. 745

notice to all his correspondents individually or he  
will be bound by the acts of that agent in the  
business — if it advertised in a paper it must be  
proved that the man saw that paper or had the  
means of seeing the advertisement. — A man was  
sued & gave his creditor a bill & he was discharged  
the bill was dishonoured. it was held that the man  
might be so in answer on that point. P. Kyrle  
said the man had no authority to give the bill  
& as it was thus a fraud it might be treated as  
a nullity. But if a case should be without such  
apparent fraud such release would be affected.  
It has been said that holder cannot accept a part ~~and~~  
<sup>without consent of the parties</sup> ~~order & discharge by Bankrupt commission~~ he makes  
the bill his own. But there is no reason in it. In  
case of taking a bond for it & giving credit is a  
different thing 3 Mod. 87. The court often call for  
evidence to prove the usage of merchants & will show  
there is a particular custom different from the  
general one. It is proved. But if it is a custom very well  
known no witnesses will be called. It has been de-  
termined that if Ex<sup>r</sup> accepts a bill it is an ac-  
nowledgment of assets in his hands. — As to inland bills  
there was no particular form of notice required unless  
the state of them with which we have nothing to do.  
any notice answers — I don't know that there is any such  
law in the U. S. 6 Mod. 80. P. Ray 992. As to further



it was notice to write a letter: it has been determined to  
be good notice — If a bill is sold it is a bargain with  
out. If the seller knows the bill to be of no value  
the buyer may recover for it is a fraud. & the remedy  
is to sue the seller for a fraud. — Now it is the same  
thing as a sale of a bad horse. — you must however  
see an act of fraud. — I should say that the con-  
tract ought to be void and entirely of T. R. 427. It is  
as criminal to conceal as to tell falsely. as to a bill  
payable by installments. it is said that if the first is  
not paid a suit will recover the whole though some have  
contradictory opinions. 1 Q. B. 521. See L. 555. Andover. 370  
The bill is that if nothing is said of date date is due  
from the day of age. But by ell. L. there is no right  
of date till you make a demand. — the reason is that  
by ell. L. you cannot sue until demand. it is not so  
at B. L. for there you do not demand at. — why the old  
rule was for date to stop when the suit commenced. but now  
it is that date goes down to judgment. — Bur. 1085  
If a note begins "We the sub-" & signed by several. it is a joint  
note if such note begins "I the & C" it is several. —  
Is an indorser liable for all, the bill of & able to retain its in-  
solidarity as by indorsing to pay to B only it was said B would  
not be bound by it. but now the rule is if B consents to it it  
binds him. — The holder has then 3<sup>rd</sup> ag<sup>t</sup>. down. except  
to & indorser. it is said all the bodies may be taken but he can  
have no first parties ag<sup>t</sup>. each. Hest. 519. — only one first  
can be taken at once & so in succession.

assumpsit. It is a promise to do some act or to abstain from doing it  
what will render it valid has been considered under the head of contracts  
the object <sup>of this lecture is</sup> to show in what <sup>cases</sup> an ass<sup>t</sup> is the proper action

App<sup>ts</sup> One of two kinds express as when the terms of the con<sup>tr</sup> are  
settled by the parties and here the rule of damages is the  
sum agreed upon by the parties either by parol or writing.

Sec<sup>d</sup> implied ass<sup>t</sup> is when there is no definite stipulation or  
or definite sum entered into between the parties but there  
have been such transactions between the parties that justice de-  
mands one party to pay a sum of money to the other.

There may not have been any contract at all but ass<sup>t</sup> will  
lie because justice requires it. Suppose purchase a horse  
long ago to pay \$100. the contract is ass<sup>t</sup> is assumpsit & if it be  
found the ass<sup>t</sup> lies.

But one goes into a store takes  
up goods without any <sup>as to price</sup> the action is tro<sup>ut</sup> stating  
the facts exactly as they were missing the promise the law  
raises the assumpsit.

But there are cases in which there is no contract at all  
upon one carries a bag of sugar or some such an assumpsit  
in settlement the law raises an ass<sup>t</sup> from the parties of the  
thing.

Perhaps & possibly an ass<sup>t</sup> can be raised in all cases  
where there is an express promise to pay money upon any business



Indubitableness is the ground of the action. & all that is it just  
necessary to show is that it is just.

After action is ended 3/5 the inspection may begin  
in immediate.

Exh. sup. off. may sometimes be broken when the  
action will be as when one engages to do some substantial act  
as to build a house by 1<sup>st</sup> Est. & does not do it. Contract  
is broken & remedy is by damages. The same can be only re-  
covered by the title. Remedy is in the form of

could be the time  
 or whether ~~or~~ if it is, would it go further and in a  
 ear?

The principle on which an ex. sp' is founded is, that the parties have agreed to it. An implied ex. sp' is founded on the parties of the case.

It is in the progress  
of inquiry apt to be spent after all. now there are some  
no doubt in which the law will <sup>presume</sup> affirm or go to the  
opposite, but there are cases in which it would  
be presuming apt evidence. as if a man stands  
and is by hand. or in a it would be strange  
to suppose him honest enough to <sup>promise</sup> "repay" it. &c.  
if a man turned his out doors. forbidding people to trust him. &c.

if a man turned his out doors, forbidding people to trust him, &c. The truth  
is that unless the principle of policy stops in time,  
the law is a promise from the justice of the case,  
as a law can never unjustly determine the way of  
an action.

Therefore because on a plain, where it is easy  
to find out it, yet the law will not enforce payment  
and is where the party claiming is equally guilty.





One cannot recover a gambling debt, <sup>since the law</sup> nor, a gift one who has laid it over, to recover it back. It leaves them in statu quo.


If however they are not  
equally in fault. if the innocent party may recover, then the stat  
of usury only punishes the lender. it declares the contract  
void. and has paid 12 per centum for being the lender  
party. can recover the unpaid interest: for in such  
Apr.<sup>2</sup> the party incurs back what justice & equity de-  
clares his due. This however makes the stat. the stand-  
ard of equity. & of conscience.

Again the law forbids a  
 a sign or petition to make another a bankrupt. for among  
 the law was a bankrupt he should sign without, if not he should  
 not sign with. a party applied to another and the  
 Court requires pay<sup>r</sup> the bankrupt to the let him have  
 the money. & he took the action. in court & I suppose there-  
 fore would have recovered had she not the action.

In all those cases where there is a particular sum of money <sup>agreed upon</sup> ~~agreed upon~~ or Indebt. App<sup>nt</sup> or debt lies. But however has gone out of use the word ~~exaggeration~~ exaggeration it was not abolished. but the app<sup>nt</sup> was established by the Stat of Westminster

There are certain cases in wh. debt is cannot be lost - as when there is no priority of contracts as by finding fraud amounts to





the you find in our any books that debt lies when indebt  
ap<sup>d</sup> lies. but it is not there, in debt ap<sup>d</sup> will lie in  
in any case where debt will not. If one goes into a  
store takes up goods debt will lie, it being implied by law to pay the market price

Whenever there is a resp<sup>d</sup> contract by which a  
sum certain is to be paid. Ex. ap<sup>d</sup> in debt. ap<sup>d</sup>  
& debt. either of them lies.

Where the promise is to  
do some collateral act w<sup>ch</sup> ap<sup>d</sup> only lies for there  
is no sum certain to be paid debt nor ap<sup>d</sup> to pay  
any money, & no damages are contained.

But one must use goods in a store  
ex. ap<sup>d</sup> does not lie for there is no precise ap<sup>d</sup> but  
debt will lie because the sum may be made a  
tota as will in debt ap<sup>d</sup>.

But one has got his neighbours wrong by a forged  
paper, or the consideration has totally failed, indebt  
ap<sup>d</sup> lies. & no other action but ap<sup>d</sup> lies.

In some of  
these cases another action lies as if one cheats another he may  
sue him for the fraud this action goes upon the ground  
of <sup>reclaiming damages</sup> affirming the contract, but ap<sup>d</sup> disaffirms the  
contract.

So if by force wrong is taken. ap<sup>d</sup> & battery  
lies, or wrong & debt & indebt. So if one takes from him.



When there is an ex. ap<sup>t</sup> & Def<sup>t</sup> does not fulfil it, you may treat  
that it as a contract & bring Ex. ap<sup>t</sup> to recover the  
damages. or disaffirm the contract by bringing Insub.  
ap<sup>t</sup> & recover the money paid.

tells him you may bring him on as if you think he  
made a good bargain.

If one pays another  
money to purchase for him some article. if he does not  
fulfil the contract. you may bring an action for money  
had & received ~~and~~ <sup>for</sup> performing the contract. for whenever  
one breaks the contract, the other treats it as broken or  
as if there never had been a contract. Or you may sue  
him on the ~~other~~ contract for not performing it and  
recover the damages.

Of these two actions you have  
your election as which is most for your advantage.

The action of indebit. ~~apud~~ <sup>est</sup> when concerned with Ex. est  
in some cases goes wholly to the same point in other it  
does not. As if one pays money to another to transfer to  
him bank notes. or if he runs in ~~up~~ <sup>up</sup> ~~apud~~ <sup>est</sup> he  
goes for damages. if however he had & received the  
money for the same kind.

Now in these cases it is immaterial whether there is  
a writing in the case or not.

It is a rule that the only  
action is Ex. ~~apud~~ <sup>est</sup> when the contract is to perform a  
collateral thing & when the money has been paid.

And  
again whenever one retains money ~~see~~ <sup>conscientiously</sup> you



\* unless some principle of policy intervenes.

may receive it in insub. etc. <sup>xx</sup> as where the vend<sup>r</sup> has failed. it is not necessary there should be fraud in the case as if one sells you property & you pay for it, which he really supposes to be his. you may receive in an act. for money had & rec<sup>d</sup>. or on the implied warranty. & whenever one cheats you, one act. of fraud lies on money had & rec<sup>d</sup>. or obtaining your property wrongfully you may sue in trover or for money had & rec<sup>d</sup>.

One set of cases are agreed to perform a collateral act. & the parties agree upon the sum to be paid. an act. on the whole promise or of debts or of insub. ap<sup>t</sup>. to recover the money either of them, lies in this case.

In declining ap<sup>t</sup>. the fact whether in writing or not need not be noticed. the action may be bro<sup>n</sup>. upon the writing with a protest or the writing may be adduced in evidence.

As to proof. an action was bro<sup>n</sup>. on a contract within the act of Francis & Byrnes as to pay the debt of another. it is not stated in Sect. whether in writing or not. & Plff brings up witnesses to prove it. Def<sup>t</sup>. stops him with the statute.

But ag<sup>t</sup>. a contract is written and a P<sup>r</sup>. is bro<sup>n</sup>. on it. no other proof is admitted but the writing itself. this stands on a diff<sup>t</sup>. ground than the other. in the case of the



2. 3. 10. 14

contract within the stat. no other than written evidence  
can be admitted. but in this case. as if it were a  
promise to pay \$100 for a horse. this contract might  
have been proved by parol had no writing been re-  
quired. but in all cases the best possible evidence  
must be adduced. which in this instance was written.

Whereas a con. either parol or written is afterwards reduced to a sealed writ  
the right of suing in ass't ceases, quite but not universally  
When the bond or writ embraces the same thing, you cannot bring  
ass't. Thus if one promises to do a thing & then gives a  
bond for damages

But if the bond is only to enforce it you may sue on  
bond or in ass't as s'd. agrees to go to Hartford & give  
a bond with a penalty. Whereas if the promise is  
so allowed up in the bond you can only sue on the bond  
as a bond of arbitration. which is given to enforce perform-  
ance. you may sue on either the bond or award. but if  
the bond is given afterwards for the award you can sue  
only on the bond.

As a promise may be wholly nega-  
tory, when there is a bond in existence. as to pay that bond.

Indeed ass't which extends over so many cases will neces-  
sarily be curs. I will state the principle. I mention it to  
the case of many kinds to illustrate the principle is jus-  
tice for the sake of justice



If one is absent seven years and administration is granted and his estate distributed. if he returns he may recover his property back

See Mansfield observes in 2 Burr. 160. The ground of this action which prevailed is not that the judg<sup>t</sup> was wrong. but that for a reason which the now Plff could not avoid himself against that judg<sup>t</sup>. The Ld<sup>t</sup> is of<sup>t</sup> as in justice to keep the money. The gist of this action for money had paid is that the Ld<sup>t</sup> upon the circumstances of the case is obliged by the law of natural justice & eq<sup>y</sup> to refund the money.

It is quite true that money paid on judgment (however wrong, even  
if it were by incompetent jurisdiction) cannot be recover-  
ed back <sup>except in the unusual</sup> but this rule is not universal.

you never can recover money back which was paid  
in consequence of judgment on the ground of im-  
peachment of the judgment of the court. & when you recover  
it does not at all impeach the judgment.

Thus a ship  
has been paid so that no one doubts her being lost. &  
the insurers are bound by a judgment to make good the  
loss. After these insurers make the insurers may recover  
it back. but it is on the ground of some new  
fact discovered. & not of impeaching the judgment. &  
numerous cases may happen, in which, circumstances that  
show the money ought not to be held in. may be made a good  
ground of recovery.

Ag<sup>st</sup> a ship is  
bound to pay the debt of the prisoner who escapes. Suppose  
ship brings an action ag<sup>st</sup> escape & recovery. then the  
ship recovers of the escape. the ship ought not  
to retain & it may be recovered of him. with his  
goods & losses & this does not impeach the former  
judgment. the recovery by the ship was no bar to the  
plaintiff's action & the escape. for ship was not bound  
to resort to the ship. 1. C. Rep. 281. 112

Another set of  
cases involve the action of debilitated ship. This is where the carrier  
has failed, the thing purchased is of no value the seller



18. 6p. 702

18. 6p. 702

18. 6p. 59

had no title. I said make no difference. You mean in  
such case never back the money paid.

By E. J. S. et

wherever one engages to pay another amount for some  
money lent. which amounts to more than I can believe  
but it continues only during the borrower's life. This  
is made by the lender. It is not annuity. It is a sale  
of annuity upon lives. This is an annuity bond. The Gen  
stat holds that such bonds shall be void un-  
less the money is laid down. an action is brought  
on a bond. where I said was laid in money & laid  
in gold. Sup<sup>d</sup> held the stat. & avoided it. but the  
Plff could recover the annuity in Ind. apt. there  
being no forfeiture <sup>made</sup> & the value is justly determined

Then the case of a sale without hand. where the  
seller had no title you may never the money paid  
or where the annuity actually failed. In the worst  
be always in good hands. as if stock were sold &  
it proved good for nothing. In this case however  
an act lies on the incline is an anteaffecting the  
contract on decreasing your damages.

Our Ind. stat. lies to recover money which has  
been paid under void contract. There are diff<sup>y</sup>  
opinions as to what is a void authority. I was a case of B.  
I forgive power & ability to receive this money & B. says  
it is still reason to author



Sept. 27.

12.3.42

Oct. 15

at noon did not ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> allowed to remain in the  
apartment as will was discovered & 28<sup>th</sup> was sent out  
the 28<sup>th</sup> morning of the man who he ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> but it  
was in error as I think.

I am sure that the court  
had misgivings over the subject matter to a point & did  
approve the 28<sup>th</sup> day to him & since the letter  
of the 28<sup>th</sup> must look the Administrator otherwise  
it would be some time & I am sure I no doubt  
would be safe in paying to letters of 28<sup>th</sup>.

3<sup>rd</sup> Sep. 125. when authority received from probate <sup>office</sup> ~~office~~  
to justify the letter in paying, altho the will was in fact forged.

So if money is taken from another by extortion of his person or  
by any undue advantage. I doubt if it lies. This action  
extends as far as a ~~part~~ <sup>part</sup> of 28<sup>th</sup>. If that court were  
willing up to a bargain <sup>made</sup> where such a sort of law  
would support an action to recover money that had  
been paid on such a bargain.

So when a person  
has plants & the person would not suffer it to be  
removed without some assistance & for the person  
paid it and allowed to remove it. altho he might  
have removed his plants in law. & this is the point  
on which money is received back i.e. the same plan.

It would be failing in circumstances as offered by his



25.22.563

allowing paid on an illegal contract when the law inflicts  
no penalty on the payer is a considerable back.

Bull. RP. 131  
Coul. 419.

If it were to do some coll. about 1000 to 1500, or even 500, it would be

creditor agrees for 50 in satisfaction of their debts. one creditor  
however refused to accept unless he was paid an ad-  
ditional sum. the debtor gave two notes of \$25 each  
he could not receive on these notes & if they were given him the money  
could be recovered back in *Indeb. ap't.*

So money obtained by cheating or in any other manner  
wrongfully. this action lies to recover

As to those contracts in which one party is criminal or  
both are criminal the rule is that the party who is  
not furnished by the law can never have his money  
back *2 Bl. R. 1072. 1. Ch. Bl. 65. Corp 790.*

Money received on an immoral judgment may be recovered back  
where that judgment is void. <sup>but if the judgment was void</sup> as if a justice should render  
judgment where he had no jurisdiction, but if not void it would  
only be recovered after reversal.


This is also the action for recovery of property under the  
bye laws of Corporations *Earth. 72.*

As for service

rendered then bring no express agreement as for goods sold  
& no price agreed on. money loaned no agreement to pay  
it back. *Indeb. ap't.* is the proper action in all these  
cases. if the agreement was express an action of *Ex. ap'tt.* also lies.

If then you can establish an express agreement between A & B.  
Express agreement lies, if it were to pay money *Indeb.*





Appl. law. To establish a right of the person must have an  
express contract to bring the debt to the person and  
from in debt. <sup>in some cases</sup> there is no debt as if  
money were loaned. Whenever it is established that  
Appl. should not retain he must be subject to the rule.  
Appl.

If one stands by a supplier or other to sell in perfect  
as the seller which really belongs to the former the  
former cannot recover it back. On same principle a mortgage  
who does not give notice of his incumbrance, is postponed, if known <sup>for information</sup> ~~advised~~  
you will find it laid down that where one pays money  
without the other consent the payer may recover it  
if <sup>in some cases</sup> ~~him~~ in other words.

As a man turns his wife and  
down. or his children. or we are seen as seen at the bar  
bound or father for furnishing them with necessities.

The person on which must be a person entitled to the  
protection of the person against whom the  
action is brought. & further the article furnished  
must be necessities. Each one is able to  
to support or protect a person whom it is his duty to  
support if he does not do it. & another person does  
he may recover in the house in an action for money lent or  
expended for his use.

When there is an express contract there is always an  
implied warranty of title. & if the title is lost



5 Burr. 2039

the buyer may sue on the implied warranty or bring an  
indeb. aft. - or even the money paid

When your bring

Indeb. aft. you recover damages, i.e. nothing more  
than the money paid & in some cases not so much.

The rule is that if def<sup>t</sup> has any equitable claim  
ag<sup>t</sup>. Shff. he may make an offset, as in the case  
noticed of the Shff & is cap<sup>r</sup>. the Shff may  
retain his cert. 2 Bl. Rep 1078.

This action for money had & received cannot be used in some  
cases in which no reason at first appears. As where  
a Landlord attempts to admit to common without pay<sup>t</sup>  
in addition or rent. this action would not lie for  
the money because as title to real estate cannot  
be tried in this action of Indeb. aft.<sup>r</sup>

When you are agreed

to take two horses & paid for them & if he did not like  
them to return them & take two others. he returns  
the horses & then bro<sup>t</sup>. Indeb. aft.<sup>r</sup> for the money  
it was not sustained because the bargain was not  
at an end, it was still open, he having no right to take  
other horses.

If a man bid a pair of horses with leave to return  
them if one year old. they proved to be over four years old the  
purchaser kept them too long. the court deciding that he did



2 4. 131. 14 5  
Long. 108 112

2 Bull. 4 P. 125  
2 A. Bl. 553  
e. 125. 181

not justify the implied contract to return them within a reasonable time, so that he could not recover in Implied Asp. Apt on the warranty by which the purchase affirmed the contract. He recovered the damages arising from the horse being five.

There was no form of action founded upon promiss; an action in the case was given in the room of debt by Stat of Westminster. before that no action could be brought upon a promise to do collateral act unless it was under seal.

The ground upon which is now Asp. by which is not meant that Asp. were promised, but that it is not binding upon him: Under the ground upon Asp. performance may be given in witness.

And Ex. Asp. lies only on a verbal ag. either written or parol. the only difference is if there is a written promise you cannot prove the parol one, and the written evidence must be the rule of damages.

The ground of recovery is the ag. which must be proved in Asp.

Implied Asp. is founded on the moral obligation to pay when there is an ex. prom. Ex. Asp. also lies.

It is not any express promise that founds the recovery in implied Asp. the rule is whenever one is bound in good conscience to pay Implied Asp. lies. there is no rule of damages. the measure is what is equitably due.



There are cases in which the party has reserved to himself the right of fail-  
ing in performance on condition of forfeiting the penalty, when  
the debt is for the penalty, and not for specific per-  
formance or damages. The proposition however is true  
that when the penalty is not intended as satisfaction  
for the disappointment the remedy is only by a writ  
of assumpsit.

When labour is performed the rule is the worth of the service or the value of goods when sold without ag<sup>t</sup>. as to price.

Usual mode of suing to recover a sum due by note in most states is on the imp<sup>t</sup> altho the id. ap<sup>t</sup>. lies, but in Cal. the practice is to sue in ex. ap<sup>t</sup>.

When one promises to do a collateral act, if he does not & you have not paid him, ex. ap<sup>t</sup>. only lies. if you have paid in deb. ap<sup>t</sup>. lies.

So when the parties agree upon a penalty for non performance, you may sue in in deb. ap<sup>t</sup>. in the penalty or in ex. ap<sup>t</sup>. to recover the damages.

But it is not true that in all such cases you can sue in ex. ap<sup>t</sup>. when you can only recover the penalty. 5 T. Rep. 603.

There is no such thing as debt now but for goods sold when no price ag<sup>d</sup>. on; the debt would lie in deb. ap<sup>t</sup>. is the action. 3 Bac. 163. Comp. 116. 796.

The proposition that the action of in deb. ap<sup>t</sup>. will lie only where debt exists is not true. 2 Barr. 1008. 1 C. Rep. 285.

When money has been obtained by fraud <sup>you may sue for the money</sup> & affirm the contract allowing him to keep the money or article or disaffirm the contract by an action for the money had & received.



Ed. Dig. 141  
Bull. ch. 129  
T. 12 p. 110

But if both are not equally guilty, the oppressed party may re-  
cover it back, as in case of usury.

It was long questioned whether a man might be subject for the reward promised in an advertisement. it was raised there was no promise. but it has been settled that it can be recovered by the man who entitles himself to it. the case is like that of a note payable to order or order. there is no need of a stamp to make it negotiable.

When one has given money you can recover it back if he has no right to hold it. unless the contract is still open as in the case of the contract for the horse before mentioned.

A man may be a tortfeasor as by taking your horse & selling him. trespass or trover. or in debt. 3 P. 4. 11. it amounts to this that you can treat the man as your agent. 2 Gray 1217. Comp. 419. Bull. at. 131. 1 P. 4. 387. 2 P. 4. 687. Dep. cannot say that he stole the horse & thus avoid the action.

Money paid an illegal consideration cannot be recovered back, where the parties are equally guilty. 1 W. 2. 266. 5 P. 4. 405. 7 W. 535. 1 F. 218.

So if vendor had no title this is the action to recover the money. 1 F. 206. 1 F. 363. 5 P. 4. 716. & if the property were of no value so that the contract entirely fails.

Money may be recovered when P. under void authority. but he must show proof of consent when it becomes unconscionable for D. to retain it. 2 Hen Bl. 409. 416. 1 Hen Bl. 665. 4 P. 4. 482. 2 P. 4. 669. 2 Burr. 135. 3 Burr. 1354.



The Dec: by C<sup>L</sup> does not state how the money was repaid. the  
Dec: that requires the gas made to be mentioned in the Dec:.

4<sup>th</sup> Rep. 1210  
4<sup>th</sup> Rep. 462  
5<sup>th</sup> Rep. 824  
June 2630  
cont. 565

There is a question which appears not settled. If a deliverer money  
to A to pay to B in A's favor. A does not deliver the  
money: can B maintain an action on the contract ag<sup>t</sup>  
A? I conceive the person who is entitled to the money has  
a right to sue on the contract, i.e. he may treat him as his  
ag<sup>t</sup>. 1 Bac 242 an analogous case. Esp. 576. 1 Kent. 318.  
3 P. W. 35. So decided in S<sup>c</sup> Carolina. There is no doubt  
but that in debt A's<sup>t</sup> lies.

The rule that Biff cannot sue in debt ag<sup>t</sup> when he has  
a remedy at a higher station must be understood with  
some qualification. nothing is clearer than that if a person  
gives for a debt a note or promissory note to the holder. But if the holder  
does not give to swallow up the personal debt but to en-  
force it you can sue upon either.

Whenever one can pay an-  
other to pay money or submit to go to in convenience, the man  
may pay it & then recover in an act. for money paid &  
rec<sup>d</sup>. the money being acquired by stipulation, so in all  
cases where one takes an undue advantage of another whether  
the latter was in fault or not. & gets money of him, it may  
be recovered back in this action. Comp. 177. Burr. 1784.

When money is paid by mistake into the wrong hand or too much  
paid: this action lies. <sup>by mistake</sup> paid, to an ag<sup>t</sup>. the action lies ag<sup>t</sup>  
him if not paid over.

This action lies in all cases both before  
& after payment ag<sup>t</sup> the principal, the agent's act is the receipt  
of the principal.



Co. 26. 266

Defences to this action of assumpsit.

Conventum is a defence not only to assumpsit, but every other action growing out of contract. Infancy and insanity must <sup>one</sup> plead infancy specially but it may be given in evidence under the genl. issue in assumpsit.

Infants are liable in some cases on contracts & this is the reason why the debt is not discharged if it appears in it that the debt is in minor.

There is one case in which infancy is no plea, that is in an action on a contract of warranty, brought by the heir of a covenantor.

Impossibility of performance is a good defence. by that is meant that which is impossible to perform in the nature of things. If the contract was spread upon the facts it would be dischargeable, yet if the thing were impossible to itself, namely as for a promise to pay \$1000. it is no plea.

If the condition of a contract is such that it becomes afterwards impossible, the contract remains good.

But if a condition which is annexed to an assumpsit contract becomes impossible by the act of God, or by the act of the party to be benefited, the obligor is discharged even the same if prevented by stat.

He who is paid for doing a thing which becomes impossible or unlawful the party paying may recover it back.

12-12-1892


Plant 54

It is true if an owner employs a person to do his business without declaring  
it, it is a fraud on the creditors, & the highest bidder cannot be  
compelled to complete the purchase made under such circum-  
stances. Est. Dig. 16. 6 H. Rep. 642.



If one promises to do an act impossible the promise is  
not binding but if an impossible condition is annexed  
to a bond the same is void. In the bond case But  
if the condition is inserted in the body of the bond or  
even the whole is void. And it would seem that the rule of the  
condition is not followed in principle. For I consider a bond with  
a condition

not a contract which is unenforceable it is not binding. If the thing  
to be done is the condition the contract is not enforceable the contract  
is not binding. As a contract not to appear at court to test  
life. And as to the money for an illegal act is void. The  
act having been done at the request of the other. I think  
material whether the act was in violation of prohibition or in law. As a con-  
tract having a tendency to encourage or breach of law as  
a promise to pay a sum of money to beat another. So a printer  
who requires an indemnity for publishing a libel. The  
indemnification is void. As a contract to pay wages to a  
servant who is a slave. For that is a contract not to cheat  
bona fide purchasers. And if the contract is reduced to writing  
or is in fact if all the facts are stated you may sue on  
the deed but if it were in a bond it must be proved  
that a promise is made to pay, 12 p. c. for a declaration is  
deemed stating it your demand. If it were in a bond you  
must prove it. I cannot say as if you had a written contract  
the proof of the money is by parol. Other the proof of the money is by parol.



a contract is void and if the wrong is  
proved then can be no recovery.

There are two kinds of  
wrong one of them involves all kinds of conditions to be  
satisfied &c. the other kind does not require anything  
but the broken subject himself to a penalty.

Reserving too much in a contract voids the contract but  
does not subject to the penalty.

But if too much is ta-  
ken in a contract, i.e. in law? the contract is not void  
but the receiver subjects himself to a penalty, and  
any person in community may recover it.

And if too much  
is reserved in making the contract & too much is taken, the  
contract is void the receiver is subjected to the penalty  
Don. 9. 223. 3 Wils. 250. 2 Bl. Rep. 772. Bro. Bl. 20. 1 Sand  
244. 2 Mod. 304.

On this subject there is an excellent  
note? A person is willing to borrow money, gives a pro-  
mise of \$100 & takes \$50 & then gives a note for \$100  
as the note reads. Now it seems to me that it is immaterial  
note of which kind to the money, & the contract is executed  
he promises you a note of \$100 for \$50 & the promisee the only  
mode the manner of not constitutes the money. A man borrows money,  
takes a note for the promisee & then takes a note  
on the note for the complete promise, not that only the cov.



\*1. 4th 301

See 3d. 42

Cont. 18

6 Co. 60

2. 1st 74

1. 1st 8

Hand. 518

1. 1st 164

3. 1st 312

right for the lender to be repaid? It is the loan under  
the whole name for the same as if it had been inserted  
in an oblig<sup>n</sup> the instrument being a bill  
bearing the same subject at the same time.

It was decided that it was curious to pay the int<sup>l</sup>  
at the time of the money loaned. But the custom  
of Banks has established the practice of the restriction  
the is a strong. But can we not now consider it curious  
from the inconvenience & the other that method. If  
one should wish to pay the int upon a note at any fixed  
weight payable at the end of a year it could not be so

If the object of a sale is a loan & the article is sold  
unwisely for more than it is worth the contract is void  
but if the contract were a mere bargain it is not un-  
lawful. Thus if you pay down the article shall be much  
cheaper than if you pay in 6 mo<sup>s</sup> as is the constant prac-  
tice of merchants.

\*<sup>182</sup> There are bargains in which more is to be received than  
the legal interest which are still not usurious. In other  
cases the principal & interest are both payable at the  
end must be bona fide. As in the case of bottomry  
bonds. By which money is received but to be returned  
with int<sup>l</sup> or not, as the interest is at all according as  
the ship returns safe or not. & this is the principle  
on which insurance loans are made not usurious

Mon 802

50. 49

as 12508.253

200. 501

600. 17

2100. 83

as 22. 501



the principle & interest were both has added. But if there are  
a man colour for using this an ass.

Chancery bonds with penalties are not usurious, as for \$100  
conditioned to pay \$50. because the man is not obli-  
ged to pay the penalty, but if that were part of the  
bargain that the penalty should be forfeited it would  
be usurious, for intention it is which destroys the contract  
so that a mistake cannot make a pay<sup>r</sup> usurious, as  
in casting the interest. - 14 Mod. 445. 248. 300. 597

An usurious contract may be brought, the common mode  
when too much is received is this a man gives an usurious  
note to B & B then <sup>induces him to be ignorant of the usury</sup> takes a new note of it for the full sum  
the usury is brought & cashable. But if the new note had  
been given to B or to his representative it would continue  
except forever. & so in the case supposed if C had received it  
back to B it would be void in his hands.

Two notes, one usurious the other good. He gave a new note <sup>he was indebted</sup> to the creditor  
and upon the <sup>new</sup> note & a receipt. But B. after much  
dissuasion was obliged to receive upon the sure-  
ty's good. And all assa<sup>r</sup>gans are just to the dis-  
advantage. If one falsely impleads his debtors & exacts  
a bond for the debt, altho the bond may be avoided  
for duress, still the debt on the original contract may be recovered

Long. 791

Tab. 38.

the count held the language in hope.


Ann 1077



B made a contract with C which was usurious & got A to be his security - he giving him a bond of indemnity, & when threatened with a suit paid the money. the court held that the court is sworn upon the bond. B said "why did you pay? I intended to avoid the bond & you would have been in damnum." The case of a contract made where it would not be usurious & a security given for it in a state where the state made it usurious. A of N.Y. gave a note in C. York & after many pay? A gives a new oblig<sup>n</sup> in Conn. & for seven per cent would it be usurious? the difficulty is entirely technical. the contract was a fair one originally. So is not of that class of cases contemplated by the statute. the creditor was fairly entitled to receive. it would be strange to suppose that the legislature intended to make the security on a good bona fide contract void. It has been decided in Mass that such an oblig<sup>n</sup> was not void on acct of usury. there have however been contrary decisions in other states.

Suppose a contract made where usurious but to be performed where not usurious. thus a contract in Eng to pay 7% on the Irish interest, payable in Ireland. In the case of R & Bland. Ch. Mansfield declared it not usurious for nothing is necessary to make it good but explain the water. & that has declared such a contract not usurious for the safety & accommodation of West India merchants.





Suppose a contract made when it would <sup>not</sup> be usurious, to be pre-  
ferred when it would be usurious. -


Suppose a man with B to borrow \$1000 gives him a  
note at seven  $\frac{1}{2}$  cent. the object being to make the note  
I suppose it would be usurious.

the recovery is to be of the same  
with such int. as the law of the place where the contract  
was made declares legal. the *lex loci* governs.

Whenever a contract is entered into by a man some right  
is claimed under the positive institutions of some  
country. that right may be refused in any other. and  
the only exception to this general rule is where the right  
arises out of some act which is malum in se. in good  
conscience.

Upon this ground it is that some pe-  
cuniary contracts may be void in Cal. as in Cal. & New York.

There are many cases in which  
contracts are void the act malum in se or malum in pro-  
hibitum. they bring against good policy, and they can no  
more be recovered in Cal. than in Cal. as in relation of  
marriage. as not to marry any but a Cal. Yet there are two  
classes of contracts which may be recovered on at law  
in Cal. Cal. will still as act of the constitution voids  
the contract, and the reason is a strong at law as Cal.  
two courts of law have adopted a sort of a compromise  
principle to the full extent, whereas the jurisdiction of Cal.  
having arisen when the courts of law were more liberally





Thus a court of law would run down a  
bond. and will very much ~~rather~~ <sup>rather</sup> than Mr. Mason  
appears to think to adopt the rule of Ex<sup>t</sup>. Heron timely about it.

arrangements brocage bonds entered into to secure the in-  
fluence of some persons in arranging a marriage  
on those bonds a court of law will suffer a recovery  
Lytt Chl will set them aside.

The other class is that  
I contract with him, by which the latter engages to  
carry them as <sup>in the</sup> instances. A court of Ch<sup>l</sup>  
void these contracts, and a court of law, altho they do  
not say that they are void, still they will enforce  
them. 2 P M 121. 2 Am. 346. 2 Alk 34. 1 Alk 354.

It has become settled in Eng<sup>l</sup> & at law that a contract to pay interest upon is not usurious. still it is re. fair & a good policy that no more can be recovered on it than the principal & legal int. since law.

Lechman

contract is clearly not usurious. If the interest is paid  
it clearly may be loaned & as well to the creditor as  
as to any one. It is clearly then legal & the only  
ground is policy. The creditor must call upon himself  
with his interest he may sue for the interest & then  
others who have a claim against upon that judgment  
even the principal. —

4 June 2-8  
1 July 2-90  
2 Aug. ~  
ed. 8. 121.  
2 Oct 8-1




A contract is given to pay simple interest & after 10 years  
at that time a new note is given including the interest  
it is not usurious. Comp. 112 770 793 47. 5 Burr 2082.  
Yelo. 7. 1 Bals. 17. Long. That is provided the debtor  
does it voluntarily & not when threatened with a suit if he  
does not.

I think it questionable whether the surplus money would be necessary  
and in all cases. Suppose the lender can use his money to  
make other tags, & is no ~~reluctant~~ not in the habit of  
lending money, suffers great inconvenience to oblige a neighbor.  
He ought to be subject to & obliged to refund? I think it  
should be determined from circumstances. the question is can he  
in conscience retain it? the state is a mere positive regulation,  
another defense is that there is no consideration the question  
is not material, tho it must be something. He thought one  
a contract is void. This does not apply to executed  
contracts as if one should give another \$50.

I may say contract then must be a consideration whatever be its  
form. & if a parole contract without consideration is declared  
as void <sup>or voidable</sup> consideration you may determine.

But if one sets his  
hand to a written instrument acknowledging a contract  
(where there is an acknowledgment in a deed <sup>on or written contract</sup>) nothing but another con-  
sideration can rebut it, & it will not do to determine.






But the ruling I am in favor of is a court  
you cannot go to show that is wrong but the amount  
may be shown & I am not a bit in a hurry to the  
quantities of costs cannot be shown the dam-  
ages will be merely nominal & account of Est. will more  
or less be specific & in favor of the

Shaffer however the court points out the costs & and  
on examination it appears that the motion is from  
him for there can be no recovery for the legal fees except  
the is completely rebutted by the instrument itself.

Shaffer a bond it is not a court to pay a sum of money  
could you enquire into the quantities of costs & the  
rule is that you recover the whole sum. when as in a  
case on cost you recover on before state, when  
no costs can be shown. damages can only  
nominal. the reason of the difference that the act  
for bond is state in which you are to recover the  
whole or none. so that to enquire into the quantities  
of costs would be entirely unavailing. Power in Ch. court

If no costs appear in a written agt you may  
state in the dect & prove it by a written  
agreement. for this stands well with the  
written inst. altho it cannot be introduced to contradict  
a written inst. As a note given without an insertion  
of value received you may state the sum in your  
dect as a loss & prove it by parol.





At your desire to see a copy of the statute  
of limitations for which see post. I have been  
shown that there is some difficulty from the  
apparentness that does not fall within the act  
there is some reason why & before the administration  
can be appointed that it runs into some of the  
obligations & liabilities of the deceased, but  
the courts will allow a reasonable time after  
the death of the intestate before the statute  
attaches. So in case of B's

Also if judgment  
is made & the body commences & now the court  
will give an indulgence of one year

Now as  
now taken out of the statute it must be given  
whole of it all within the time limited by the  
statute -

The next difference is a Quod which  
is an offer to pay a debt or to perform a duty & which  
when lawfully made shall give for the same, priv-  
ileges as the creditor as if the debt were paid or  
the duty performed.

So too if the person to whom you  
would tender designably represents of this as an agent  
to be forced nor any agent of his: then if you know  
that you were ready to be bound as to enforce the

54/189  
1/25. 5-6.



only as to pay the money; that you have the money  
sufficient for the purpose it is sufficient.

Altho' in this case a good defence. It is a good de-  
fence in all cases when the demand is certain  
or the damages are certain, or when you are  
bound by contract to do a certain piece of work  
by a certain day; then if tender be made fully, and  
it is a defence. If the demand is uncertain, or un-  
certain, as in tort, it is no defence.

Whatsoever can  
be made certain is considered certain. Thus if  
one works for you a day without agreeing on the  
price a tender of the usual price is good.

Under there is a good defence to an action on an  
express promise to pay money, or note, or negotiable  
instrument, quantum valeret, or contracts to do a cer-  
tain act &c. - (But is no defence to torts  
when damages are uncertain, nor on contracts  
when the damages are to be ascertained.  
e.g. young boy was beat an action on promise from  
his father, then the deft. pleads tender! & it would  
have been a good defence if the jury had not  
resolved that the tender was not sufficient! -

As to the duty of him who makes a tender




25 p. 21

if the contract be to pay money if the tenderer will not  
receive it a tenderer of goods must keep the money  
ready to be delivered to him when he calls for it. if  
the tenderer were sufficient he becomes bailor from that  
moment & as a depositary is bound only to good faith

That if the contract be to sell a collected set or to deliver  
a box of linen or a yoke of oxen if the tenderer will  
not receive them you may have them as if you  
please. With them till he calls for them & if you  
do not deliver them you are liable in  
trover. For when they are sold the refusal the property  
is in the tenderer the debt or duty is incurred  
by the origl. contract being discharged.


It has been a question whether in case of money the  
property is vested in the tenderer after refusal. I consider that the  
debtor the bailor of the tenderer & accountable till  
the other bailor & that a safe attorney in law  
not the absolute owner. From a party to & I think  
that if the property is then lost by accident the tenderer  
must lose it and that the contrary authorities cannot  
be correct. The tenderer is a bailor liable only  
as such. He has no interest until he offers or refers  
to give it up. This question arose once in Court but was  
overruled & the money was then lost by him as  
matter. It was decided that tenderer should be  
the safe





And altho there are many authorities against it, yet we  
shall find a most important parallel case in Davis  
Reports, an Irishman of good authority, but in shilling  
was made current by proclamation of Queen Elizabeth  
It then was some years ago, plaintiff that they were  
deficient in silver, & a letter was sent to the  
treasurer who refused them. On trial the shillings  
were found worthless only nine pence - after the  
verdict the writ was on the 10th the latter pleaded  
that he was still ready to deliver the money  
in such shillings which were good when he first  
tendered - that the money had ever since belonged  
to Diff that he had kept them for him as bail  
which money in shillings he was now ready to  
deliver - this plea was held good by the court  
& it was decided that the 10th occasioned by a  
redemption of the coin should  
fall on the tender. Davis Rep. 15. 27. 1 Geo 81.

Such was the result of the deliberate examination  
by the twelve Judges of England of the contrary  
authorities and only certain elementary propositions  
that the debt is still in the tender.  
Why then is it any wonder that the plaintiff should  
rightly object? Can you that thought of asking a  
man to give to him the value of the coin is only  
warranted to be taken of his property, and the tender is





only to carry the money into court & deposit it with  
the bank & the costs of suit are cast upon the  
Def.


If the debtor is sued after having made tender & there  
has been no other demand of the property he is  
only to place the tender before the court & recover his costs  
of the Def.

If however the property has been demanded  
before suit but the debtor refused to deliver it up he loses  
the benefit of the tender, with the exception  
that the interest is not to be computed from the  
time of time of tender made - From demand  
it draws interest.

The demand must be reasonable  
not made when the tender is bona fide & before  
he can not be supposed to have the property & the  
money by him - If a demand the property is not de-  
manded up. If any thing other than money the tender  
may maintain trover but if money, trover will not  
lie unless it be in a bag or something of the  
kind. debt is the action.

The law of tender is generally reasonable but there  
is one thing which seems to me unjust & unreasonable  
Thus when a contractor with A. to do work for  
£1000 on a day certain for £500. A. tendered per-  
formance. B. does not accept, perhaps for the best  
reasons yet A. will recover the whole sum






agreed on \$500 the same as if he had performed the work. But I am sure that Ch<sup>d</sup> would give only a single damage for the disappointment, and this is the law in Con. how far it prevails thro the U.S. I do not know.

What constitutes a tender. It is not enough for tender to come to tender with his interest. He must absolutely offer and tender say \$ he will not accept. Exp. Dig. 163. Litch 72. 2 New 209. 3d 164. Co. Lit 208

If he carry the money in a purse or bag it is not necessary that he should take it out & count it for tender. that is tender himself. His interest however must have ascertained the sum in the purse. Co. Lit. 208. L.<sup>d</sup> Ray 686.

If tender is made on two or several contracts he may direct in which of them <sup>the</sup> pay<sup>t</sup> is to be made or applied as he pleases on the one that draws interest. If he does not direct however, the tender may apply the money to the pay<sup>t</sup> of either of the contracts at his election.

If the same tender falls short in the last it is a bad tender. But it was once questioned whether a tender of more than one of. was a good tender now settled that it is good for some wages contract






in no manner & the other party sought to accept so much  
of it as is due to him 5 Co. Rept. 115. 4th 916

The money

tendered must be current by law. Money current  
with the people is not suff. yet if such money  
be tendered & tenderer make no objection on  
that account it is good whereas if he says "I  
do not take such money" or "I do not or will not  
receive bank bills" it is not a good tender. 5 Co. 114

It has been said that it is laid down states in 5 Co 115  
Harcroft v. Wade, that if counterfeit money is paid  
by tender to tenderer both parties being ignorant  
of its being counterfeit, there is no remedy for the  
debtor who received it. for when he accepts the  
money it is at his peril & after that allowance  
he shall not take exception to any part of it.  
Eq. Ca. Abgt. 399. 2 Sumnerd. Co. 208

But I think this questionable, for there should be  
remedy in a remedy on the footing of a mistake &  
it is a good rule that when a man parts with that  
which is valuable, he must receive that which is  
valuable in return. 3 J. Rep 554 1 Silverst. 173  
1 B & P 526. 1 Bay 62. 185. 2 Wash 282 1 Dall 406.





When a tender to be made. When the court act up  
honorably, but generally there is no place agreed on. The  
money is commonly made payable to the person with-  
out specifying the place where. The rule then is to pay it  
at his house in a room if he be there, if not to his agent  
if there be any. If there be no agent then send it to him  
if he has agreed. And if he is absent & has not removed  
to a distant place then get witnesses to testify that you  
were ready to tender but could not. You will derive the  
same benefit as if tender had been made. Exp. 159. 5 Co. 114.

It is said that the following case is a  
variation of the rule. A man who lived at Oxford  
in the summer & at London in the winter lent  
money to a person who lived in the latter place. The  
debtor went to his residence in London & told him  
he would pay the debt on a certain day he made  
no objection. On that day the debtor accordingly  
took witnesses with him & went to make tender  
but the creditor had removed to Oxford. The court  
decided to be a sufficient tender without going to  
Oxford on the ground that there was an implied promise  
on the part of the creditor to receive the money  
in London at the time appointed. 2 P. W. 378.

In case of Rent however the rule is different in  
Eng. By a law of that country the tenant may



Handwritten text, likely a letter or journal entry, written in cursive script. The text is extremely faded and illegible across the entire page.

trader at the Lord's mansion house to his store and  
if he is himself bound. If both are out of the  
way proof of a voyage to trader then he is sufficient.  
This law was made in favour of traders to exclude  
the receipts of their travelling about the country  
after their landings.

If the trader is to be of some col-  
lateral article as shown, with some i.e. and being or  
often of the article at the house of the trader is generally  
good but if it be especially convenient it must be deliv-  
ered & whenever the trader directs as if trader  
lived at a place 5 miles distant & had sold it  
to a man that lived 5 miles distant in another  
direction; at the request of the former it must  
be delivered to the latter. And it must be deliv-  
ered to trader at his dwelling or place of residence  
at the time of the contract made, or if he has  
removed to a place equally convenient for delivery  
than at the latter. As that if A has thus contracted  
to deliver to B who lives at the time 20 miles  
distant but has since removed to a place 10  
miles distant: & B having sold the article to C  
who lives 15 miles distant requires A to deliver  
to C almost comply, for it is more convenient to  
carry it 15 miles than 20 the original place of res-  
idence at the time of the contract made & A  
cannot plead his defence that he was unable to








delivered at the distance of 5 miles the present dis-  
tances of B. C. Act 260.

By 3 L then can be in a  
trailer under after sent is best seen in B. C. Act  
inal State have at least the 3 L. rule: the 3 L. rule  
at present is, however, is to ask leave of the court  
to trailer. C. C. Act 264.

But suppose the place is  
settled that the article is to be delivered on or before  
a certain day. Then this is the same as if it  
were to be paid on a certain day that is the last  
day. If however business should meet with  
trouble before the certain day, or the time of  
meeting would be good 2. The law will  
not suppose a man to be at home before the last  
day, so that a plea of trouble before that time  
that that trouble was absent is insufficient.  
But if he be absent on the last day he  
will then be good. C. C. Act 72. Flow 17. 12. Mod.  
L 21.

But the law must not only be on the last day,  
but on the most convenient hour of the day.  
The last part of the day is the time appointed by  
law, yet there must be light enough to count  
the money. In case of collection which the  
must be time enough to measure a weight of  
so that in this case the morning is as good as any time  
So Act. C. C. 12/4





But the circumstances of the case sometimes point out  
a different time as for example the transfer of stock  
which must be from 10 to 12. and other cases in  
which the transfer must be made in office hours.  
12 Mar. 530. the 777. 2 of 52. 157


When a day is appointed for the transfer of stock  
then a transfer at any movable time is sufficient on the  
next day. If a debtor does not meet his creditor with  
the article ready. he must give notice to him that  
he will transfer on such a day &c. Co. 114. 211.  
1 Dyer 354. 8 & 72.

I find no case allowing transfer in  
the morning when the day has been appointed.  
But it would be good in many cases.

If no day be  
appointed the place is fixed upon & the parties should  
appear to make the transfer there would be good.  
5 Co. 114. 211. 212.

There is a statute that has  
lately made some figures in England over  
country, a bond is not a principal but a note, so that  
no suit can be brought for it in the name of the  
assignor, it must be in the name of the assignee  
obligor. But the practice has now become some  
times to protect in a court of Chancery a bond of  
~~and for money~~ & transfer in exchange of a debt





~~it is agreed~~ ~~that if A gives a bond to B for the pay<sup>mt</sup> of money~~ It is well settled  
that if A gives a bond to B for the pay<sup>mt</sup> of money  
& B assigns it to C & C is notified of the assignment  
the law will not protect him in paying the money  
to B.

But the question arises from this. A gives B  
living in Goshen a bond conditioned to pay money  
on a certain day or to deliver a certain quantity  
of iron or rattle &c. B assigns the bond to C  
living in N. Haven the question is to whom is the  
money to be tendered or the goods delivered?  
Now according to a rule already laid down it is not  
to be held to any inconvenience by the assignment  
of the bond. Therefore if A is to pay money he must  
be at Goshen on the day or have an agent  
there else he will be put to the trouble of paying the  
money to B. So too with the heavy articles  
I must appoint some place, not now inconvenient  
for A than Goshen, else A may deliver them to B  
at Goshen.

It is laid down by elementary writers that  
delivery must be to assignee at his place of resi-  
dence, because obligor might be a bankrupt. But it  
is unreasonable that obligor should incur expense &  
trouble for nothing. I have seen no decision  
to support the position. If the assignee has an agent  
& usually convenient the delivery should doubtless

1 Lib. 13  
2 Nut 109.  
C. 8. 108.9



be to him.

The consequence of tender is that it discharges all his mortgages powers &c. not debt however. Tender in some cases not only discharges the original obligation, but vests the tender with a right to something which if not performed by the donee renders him liable. Thus in 30 Bz. 88. 7.

See 13 Exley. Dft<sup>r</sup> was possessed of a lease for years, the instrument by Dft<sup>r</sup> in consid<sup>n</sup> for promise to pay a sum of money Dft<sup>r</sup> also promised to surrender to Plff his lease on pay<sup>t</sup>. Dft<sup>r</sup> tendered Dft<sup>r</sup> did not surrender the lease. The court held abster that Plff by a pay<sup>t</sup> or a tender or refusal would have acquired a right to the lease which if Dft<sup>r</sup> did not surrender would make him liable. But as Plff here did not prove refusal as well as tender he failed. Cro. Pl. 245. 2 Kay. 688. Urc. to discuss principles 9 Co. 79. 2 Hall 523. Cro. Ely. 755. 1 How. 129. 2 Ch. Ca. 206. 1 Brownl. 71. Cro. Pl. 245. 2 Lound. 352. 2 Kay. 764.

The mode of pleading Tender. — You must shew that you tendered at the most convenient hour & day appointed. Cro. Pl. 123. 1 Salt 624. Also that tender was refused if the tender was present & if he were not present at the time, you must shew that you were ready to do the fact of his absence.





That you were always ready to take care to tender.  
1. L. 30. 2. Show. 143. The rule apply to tender of  
money.

But if the tender were of collateral articles  
you have only to prove that you tendered in  
the most convenient part of the day.

With regard


to one point in the tender of collateral articles  
there has been much dispute & disagreement.  
delivered one of two things to B who is to have his  
choice of them. A must tender them both for  
his then obligor is not compellable to choose.  
Such was the point. Doug. 14. But if A is to  
tender one of two things without giving B his  
election between them a tender of either is a good  
suffice.

Suppose B refused to tender for parcel &  
told A he refused. B off replies a refusal demand  
then the issue is taken on the demand & it will  
not avail tender unless he show that he has  
acted the part of a faithful bailor.

Henry Jones

and must be produced in court to substantiate the  
plea of tender; and a practice has obtained in England  
whether prevalent in this country. I cannot know  
of buying certain collateral articles into one's pocket  
retains it. It is however a very rare case.






steps further cost & proceedings in court ag<sup>t</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> Sept<sup>r</sup> 7<sup>th</sup>  
the mos<sup>t</sup> of pleas in the case. 2<sup>d</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> 137  
7 Co-10. 9 Co 77. 5<sup>th</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup> 4

The next defence is accord & satisfaction.  
Accord is an ag<sup>t</sup> to take up with something else by  
way of pay<sup>mt</sup> than that right agreed on by the parties.  
Satisfaction is the fulfillment of that ag<sup>t</sup>. But  
an accord without satisfaction is no<sup>t</sup> a discharge. i.e. the  
ag<sup>t</sup> must have been performed to avoid a plea.  
And the performance must be actual, for satisfaction  
will avail. 1 Mod 69.

I have known one instance  
known in which accord without satisfaction was  
a good defence. a farmer who had some property but  
could not sell it for money accorded with his creditor  
to give him lumber on time of the debt. He tendered  
the boards & the tender was refused. I informed the tenderer  
that it would be no defence. he however insisted  
to satisfy him. I plead the accord without the satisfaction.  
I approved the opposite counsel was the  
desire of course. & then I should lose it unless  
he only traversed the accord & then I obtained  
a verdict. But even then I ought not to have  
obtained judgment. this I did. My client has since  
since told me that he knew the law better than  
I did.






Yet altho the accord without satisfaction is not binding  
in bar yet the tender can move on the accord  
in some cases, damage for breach of, none is.

After  
of part performance & tender of tender will not suf-  
fice. There must be a satisfaction in full. Other-  
wise the accord is void & cannot be pleaded. Rep.  
Dig. 147. Sir I. Jones 6.

Accord & satisfaction is good  
plea in personal actions when damages only are moved  
in all actions which suppose a wrong or tort as in  
as in trespass detinue &c. Jacob Dic. Accord must  
not only please accord & tender but acceptance & ac-  
ceptance of the plea is void. Hob. 178. 5 Mod. 86

In Eng however  
there is an act of some receipt. as when a debt grows  
himself out of a specialty, thus a single bill for pay<sup>t</sup>  
money. So too a cov<sup>t</sup> with seal for pay<sup>t</sup> of money  
To an ac<sup>rd</sup> on these instruments accord & satisfac-  
tion cannot be a plea. Why? Because in Eng  
hard proof cannot be admitted to prove pay<sup>t</sup> or  
specially of this kind. This arises from the max-  
im *num quodque disolvitur eo lignum quo*  
signature. — This I take to be the reason because  
in a bond having a condition the condition is  
expressly, as is. Stat. may be, &c. In many  
states & particularly in this no regard is paid to the





the above rule. for it has been decided that parol  
evidence is admissible in such cases to show pay<sup>r</sup>  
therefore a.c.c. stat. also 1 Brownlee 134. Cro-  
Car 116. 9 Co 78 6 Co 44. Cro Jac. 108. 1 Roll 266

If then our man says that our a.c.c. stat.  
by our option is a bar for all. <sup>2d</sup> For a man can-  
not have both our satisfaction


But in real actions

a.c.c. stat is no plea the reason is that the receipt  
may be acknowledged to real property there is title a  
title cannot be conveyed receipt by deed. In  
such case however L.H. would grant relief. 2 Co 1  
9 Co 70. 79.

What are the qualities of a good receipt?

You will sometimes find it laid down in innume-  
rary writers that it must be in full satisfaction  
of the orig<sup>l</sup> debt. You would frame that infer  
that it was not a complete valid accord unless  
the satisfaction were as good & valuable as that debt.  
But this is a proposition that requires limita-  
tion. It is true that there must be a consideration  
for the accord or it is not a good plea. but  
the accord is good if there be any thing for it.  
be how small. that the law takes consideration  
But when it comes to 2000 L.H. is that B.H. ac-  
cused to receive \$10 in discharge of the debt as we





considered for such an appearance the plea is  
ill. But in a similar case where it shewed that  
B had agreed to receive a letter more than the original  
debts because he apprehended that A would soon  
become bankrupt when the debt would probably be  
greater the security of the debt was held as sufficient  
redemption. The defence was sufficient. I gave. I went  
into B's house & forcibly took away certain obligations  
in which he was bound to B. B therefore agreed  
with him that he would discharge the debt if A  
would give them up. A appeared in court on the return  
of B for the original debts & shewed the agreement & said - but  
the court held that the plea was bad for there was  
no consideration. Plow. 5. Yet where a man took  
other cattle than the latter told him that if he  
would drive them to a lot 3 miles distant he would  
not prove against him.  
~~except~~ <sup>except</sup> up than the original debts, the plea was sufficient  
for the driving was a consideration. 1 Roll 128. 4 Mod 86.  
Hra 426.

Yet it has been said that there must be some  
consideration as is valuable in the eye of the law and  
hence it has been held in 2 Wils 86. Preston is Christies  
that a release of an ass of value (there was no consideration  
for an assuage, i.e. not a satisfaction for the original  
obligation whereby B was bound to P) is now  
in the Eng law yet in our it is contrary. An ass.  
of redemption in my opinion does not give a consideration






for an action as any other right but when it is a  
suff<sup>t</sup> consid<sup>n</sup> for an accord.

again it appears to be such  
that the satisfaction must be worth something in a pecu-  
niary point of view. Thus B calls a thief before a  
company of gentlemen & then has a fight of action  
B agrees with him by way of accord. to ask his  
pardon before the company & does so. & then B  
for slander. B pleads acc. & stat. it will not hold  
for want of consid<sup>n</sup> too it seems yet a fight from  
would be a suff<sup>t</sup> consid<sup>n</sup> 1 Roll 128. In my opinion  
the former is the better satisfaction 1 Mod 128

again the satisfaction must be certain. many singular  
accords are stated in the books. In delivery of a quantity  
of wheat has been said to be void for uncertainty &  
correctly I think for the quantity was not specified  
in the accord. The contract must always be a certain  
no tender will be suff<sup>t</sup>. this question was tried  
sometime ago when the court held that the satis-  
faction must not only be the debt but actually  
paid or it will be no bar. 1 Roll 149. & Co. 77. Cro  
Elm. 173. 315. 1 Mod 169. Sta 513. 5.

The mode of pleading an accord & stat. was formerly  
thus The Plaintiff to be barred of maintaining his  
act because it was accorded & satisfaction. him &





Suff? that if certain articles were delivered, they should  
be in satisfaction of the debt &c. It then to see  
they were delivered & received. They now plead that  
he ought to be bound &c because certain articles  
were delivered to him in accordance to the debt &c.

If suit be brought before the time of delivery arrives the  
accor is no defence for the contract must be made  
then.


It is a defence also in case of contracts that there has  
been no demand. But this is not universally true  
there are several cases in which a plea of no demand  
would be unavailing.

Demand. (The demand) is  
the calling on a man for the pay<sup>t</sup> of a debt or the  
performance of a duty. 8 Rf 153. At this appears  
that there are two kinds of demand, the one  
express or implied as in a precise good & val. the other  
implied or implied as in case of entry & distress &c.  
Others have divided them into three also viz written  
verbal implied. 1. d. d. 630. 1. d. 432.

The stat of Lim. compels demand to be made within  
a given time.

Where a demand is necessary to support  
the Plffs action it must always be specially alleged  
in the Plea. the usual clause "the of ten" is not suff.





If a man promise that he will pay on demand, as by note, it does not follow that the creditor must make a demand. But if there is no debt or duty till demand, demand is unnecessary. 1 Will. 402.

The general rule on this subject is, that there is no necessity of a demand in any case where the opposite party can discharge himself by a tender. Thus A promises to pay B £100 on demand. A knows as well as B that he is to pay it & that he can discharge himself by a tender. There is no necessity therefore of B's demanding it. By the phrase "on demand" is meant "within a reasonable time".

The nature of the contract involved will often furnish the means of deciding this point. Thus if one contracts to transport merchandise for a merchant in consideration of the discharge of a debt, there can be no tender of service sufficient to discharge him. Otherwise he might tender when the merchant was not ready to receive the benefit without performing the duty. In this case therefore there must be a demand. Is a plea denying that fact would be good? Suppose a contract to build a house for B. It should come where B was not ready. The tender would be ineffectual & hence a demand is necessary in such a case.






Of the same nature are all due bills given by merchants. they cannot discharge themselves by trading goods, otherwise they might force upon the <sup>creditor</sup> some article that to him would be useless. Hence a demand is necessary in such cases & if Plaintiff institute an action before demand a plea of no demand will bar it.

The case of Corporations stands upon distinct grounds, a demand being indiscriminately necessary in all cases. The treasurer is supposed to be ignorant of the debts contracted, as he does not make the contracts & the rule requires a demand in this case to secure the necessary information. *See. Sic.*

Then an order in which notice must be given. It has the same effect as a demand, creating a debt liability. *Co. Lit. 300.* Thus if I employ a man at a distance to do some particular business for me in the progress of a year, he after performing it must give me notice & then if I do not pay within a reasonable time I am liable.

So also if one receives an order in satisfaction of a debt & it is not accepted, notice must be given to drawer before payer can sue him. An order may be a plea of no notice would if supported by proof bar the Plaintiff's action.






There are some cases which go on the ground of  
genl. notariety. Thus where a man bound himself  
to pay a sum of money to his nephew when he  
married? The nephew married & the money was  
not paid. Thereupon the uncle was sued, he pleaded  
want of notice. but the court held a marriage  
to be a matter of genl. notariety & that the uncle  
was bound at his peril to take notice of it. See  
Corte. 1 Cro. Cas. 345.

If one be bound by an ass't to do  
a thing for another, cred. must give notice when  
he is to perform: but if one promise that a third  
person shall do it, then the cred. is not bound to  
give the third party notice. for there is no privity  
of contract between them, but the party must  
procure notice at his peril. 2 Will. Abr. 239.

It is also a rule that where the fact is such as to be  
equally within the knowledge of both parties, no-  
tice is unnecessary, but where this is not the case  
cred. must give notice. 1 March. 156. Mod. 230. Sect. 1  
15.

Notice is not to be given so strictly upon a covenant  
as upon a bond. Cro. Jac. 391. - In case of a promise  
it has been adjudged that where a promise is to be  
recovered notice is requisite. see cases where damages  
are to be recovered. 1 Butst. 12.






It has been said that a Dept. having undertaken to do a thing undertakes to do all circumstances incident to the performance of it. That without notice provided he is not ignorant of the thing to be done. 23rd 143.

143. Want of notice on various occasions has  
been the cause of arrest of duty. <sup>and</sup> but hostile  
examiners on this subject are. Bohus Institutio Legalis  
& Jacoby dictionary under the head of notice & ~~the~~ and

Another defence to actions brought out, to effect is  
Foreign Attachment. If a man absconds or leaves  
the country in which he resides, & there are people in  
the same country who owe him or who have his  
property in their hands, it is the object of foreign  
attachment to draw the property & the hands of the  
debtor to pay the debts of the former. & when this is  
done it becomes a complete defence for the absconding  
debtor in an action ag<sup>t</sup> them for the money thus  
recovered. 1 Bac 680

<sup>2nd</sup> This mode of attaching the above  
ex goods in the hands of third persons originate from  
the custom of London. Formerly it appears to have  
been nothing more than the attachment of a foreign  
ex goods to satisfy his creditors. Cantb. 36. Jac. Dic. 17th.

Foreign Attachments are made in the manner  
of our B. & O. and abroad, i.e. leave the country






B can find nothing in which to live but C owes A  
B knowing this fact takes out this writ of attachment  
ag<sup>t</sup> A. he has a copy at the last place - remainder of  
A for the use of A's friends and our with C to at-  
tach the debt which B owes A - The case as  
between B & A is continued for a reasonable time  
till A has a chance to return - Then if the court  
give judg<sup>t</sup> in favour of A ag<sup>t</sup> A. B is bound to  
pay over the debt which he owes A - and this  
judg<sup>t</sup> will in any part of the country be given  
a bar to any action which A may bring ag<sup>t</sup>  
C - C is called garnisher. In most states he is  
allowed to make a defence for A. the proceedings  
being regulated by stat.

It is called garnisher because  
he has had "garnishment" or warning not to pay the  
money in his hands to A. but to appear & answer to  
the Plff. in court. &c. &c.

The practice in this  
subject is different in the different states but the  
principle is the same in all. e.g. In case for  
the garnisher still the recovered is divided e.g.  
among all the creditors of the absconder.

You observe that I have as yet treated only of a  
suit between A & B. the judg<sup>t</sup> for B & - what  
is pay<sup>d</sup> thereon by C. - Let us next suppose that  
C refuses to pay after the judg<sup>t</sup> deems that he owes






of B then obtains a sci. fa. on the judgment of  
commanding to show cause why the Plff should  
not have Ex<sup>n</sup> ag<sup>t</sup> him for the debt. B must do this  
the first and last trial by the next court or it  
may appear & give bail to the attachment before  
next time. this is the custom of London.

From some days in Eng<sup>t</sup> must pass before he can be  
compelled to show cause &c.

It is said as the factor  
against all<sup>d</sup> trustee or debtor &c of all the absconders  
which he may deny. If an is taken before the fact  
on which the parties go to trial. B's liability then depends  
on the witness. and here it is to be observed that the  
law gives B the Plff a right to call on the garnishee  
show to remain as to the fact of his indebtedness.  
It has been questioned however whether B can wage  
his law unless he call upon him to do so. But he  
can. In c. Dic. "Attacht<sup>d</sup>" By the Eng law or cus-  
tom Plff may murder his waging his law by pro-  
ducing two resp<sup>t</sup> witnesses to swear that garnishee had  
either money or goods of A in his hands at the time  
of the attachment of which affidavit is made  
& being filed is placed by way of a cap<sup>t</sup>. - C can  
give evidence of pay<sup>t</sup> &c before the attachment  
under the gen<sup>l</sup> issue.


C has no right to carry on the  
trial in defence of A in the suit between A & B.











the collateral article must be turned out as well  
held at the post to discharge B's debt. C is not bound  
to deliver them to B but B must pay for the articles

If a commences an action ag<sup>t</sup> B pending the action  
between B & C. the course of the court is to continue  
the latter


Foreign att. is no defence in case of dam-  
ages recoverable ag<sup>t</sup> a party. but only in debt. the  
writ cannot issue in debt except in the case of debt  
of course it is no defence for action for torts. as battery  
false imprisonment, slander &c. But there is a defence  
to Trower for ed's right is not attachable & C is liable  
only, not indebted to A by the hypothesis, in such  
case. 1 Bac. 687.

a further defence is Payment of money or performance  
of acts collateral. This is a fulfillment of the con-  
tract & consequently a discharge.

With respect to pay-  
ment it always is of a sum of money his honourable  
utter by parole or written evidence. I mention this  
it will be intended made from the lapses of the  
since the contract made or obligation incurred

The mode of proving performance is different  
in different cases. It nothing but a question of






fact arises, it is suff<sup>t</sup> to state in pleading simply the performance. But when a question of law is involved Def<sup>t</sup> must aver the *quo modo* with the fact & state how it was performed. as in case of an agreement to convey land. it will not be suff<sup>t</sup> for Def<sup>t</sup> to say *quod* that he conveyed, but the manner in which the contract was executed must be shown & proved by exhibition of the deed. & for this obvious reason that a question of law ought not to go to the jury but to the court. 7 T. Rep. 164. 184. 2 Bac. 43. 1 Mod 203. 408. 577. 1 Calk 124. 2 Kay 980.

Another defence to actions is a plea of Respondeo or that the merits of the cause has been tried before you & the rule on this subject is this, that when the evidence must be precisely the same in both actions a judgment in one case will be a bar to an action in the other. When then is the same evidence there must of course be the same matter cause or thing. Thus if A take the horse of B. take him & can be sued in Assault. & B<sup>t</sup> for the price. B<sup>t</sup> taking A & his agent or his man, run in town for damages. B<sup>t</sup> B<sup>t</sup> can be defeated in one action & A can plead the judgment in bar of the other, since every judgment carries with it a res judicata writ.

But if the evidence is not the same a defeat in one action will not be fatal to another






It is experienced every day in our courts, especially when a Deft misstates his remedy. e.g. he borrows a waggon of P<sup>r</sup> & refuses to return it. P<sup>r</sup> brings trespass & fails. He then brings trover & recovers. For the evidence in these two cases is not concurrent.

Many attempts have been made to make the decision of a former judge<sup>n</sup> - It is a singular fact that the st. of Lim. bars all actions of trespass brought 3 years after the right of action accrued yet does not bar trover at all which may be often bro<sup>n</sup> for the same cause in which trespass is barred? tho the evidence is concurrent in the two cases. Now then if the decision on this subject be correct which I doubt, is an instance in which a prior judgment for the same cause would not bar an action. See vid. St. Lim. Exp. Reg. 164 Bull. c. 1. P. 49. 102. 6 Co.<sup>r</sup>. Does the st. affect the action itself or only the form of the action? My own opinion is that the st. was meant to bar the right of action in every form whatever.

The next defence to be considered is insolvency. e.g. discharge under the insolvent debtors act is a good plea. Exp. Reg. 165. But in such case Dept. will then that he was a person within the benefit of the act & that the discharge was regular & pursuant to the





statute. in one. post. Sect 521.

It has of late become  
no unusual thing for persons in failing circum-  
stances to notify their creditors thereof state ad-  
vantage of the insolvent act. This is never done  
but when all the creditors agree to give up their  
full demands for so much in the pound. When  
the debtor has thus paid to each his proportion  
the remainder of his fortune is reserved to him-  
self sets him up again in the world as a new  
man. If after such a compromise he is sued  
by his creditors, he may plead in bar to the action  
the discharge thus given.

When an insolvent  
debtor has entered into such a compromise  
with all his creditors except one who privately  
stipulates with him to agree to the arrangement  
if the debtor will give him his note of hand for a  
sum above his average proportion thus taking  
advantage of debtor's situation: then upon action  
brought by that creditor on the note, debtor may avoid  
the contract as a fraud on third persons & the  
other creditors. It is also as respects himself void the  
no fraud & decision in T. Rep. shows that C. L. court  
can rescind such a contract, tho it is otherwise said  
that C. L. only can afford relief. See also Com. Dig. 438.  
It is agreed that C. L. will set aside such contracts, &  
I think the decision in T. Rep. correct.




The reason why a discharge will not happen after a night of  
action has occurred is the observation that there must be a  
consideration. In this case there is no consideration.

They often speak of a discharge & a release as the same thing, either of them is a good defence, both places as an executory issue. A discharge properly so called is made by parol & before a right of action has accrued for breach of the promise. A release on the other hand cannot be made by parol and is given only when a right of action has accrued. Thus A contracts with B. to deliver 100 Bush. Wheat in 3 mos. Within 2 mos B by parol & without ratification discharges A. But on the other hand suppose A has failed to fulfill the contract when the 3 mos. have elapsed. B's right of action has then accrued. B then may not by parol discharge him. he can release him "eo ligamine quo ligatus." Cro. Ca. 383. 384. 2 Mod 44. 1 N. 205 1 Sid. 177. 297. Esp. Dig. 167 also appears to confirm them. A man may release any claims that he has.

A release formerly could be given by a mere sealing without signing because the seal was had a particular seal & the impression by itself was equivalent to his signature. This has now become obsolete so that sealing is not now indispensable. yet if there is no seal to a release a consideration must be shown.

It has been made a question whether release of all actions & demands should operate as a release of a debt in prae. solv. in fut. or an oblig<sup>ty</sup> to pay to some






at a future day. Thus in Pro. Inc. 300. Tynan v. Briggs  
when suit was lost on an oblig<sup>n</sup> to abide an award  
of arbitrators who had given Deft \$2000<sup>00</sup> Deft<sup>s</sup>  
to be paid at clerk's 21 Sept<sup>r</sup>. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of Oct<sup>r</sup>  
proceeding, Deft obtained from Deft a release of all  
actions & demands & this release Deft put in  
in bar to the action. The obligation was a deb.  
in pers. solv. in fut. yet court held that the release  
was no bar to Deft's action. no judgment was given  
however. On this trial the following distinction  
was taken by J. Williams. A deb. in  
pers. is discharged by a release before the day of pay<sup>t</sup>.  
But it is not so in case of an annuity, rent or  
in an act<sup>n</sup> of debt for non performance of promise  
made for pay<sup>t</sup> of money at a day to come. I  
conceive that it should be a release of money due  
in presenti. Co Lit. 192.

And it is now pretty well es-  
tablished that a deb. in pers. solv. in fut. is also  
included in a release of all demands. Co Lit.  
623.

But that which becomes a debt by words alone  
present is not released tho the thing out of which  
it springs exists at the time. At least B a piece of  
land at \$100 rent to be paid quarterly. This would not  
be discharged by general words of release, tho it might be by  
those which are special. for it is not a present debt.






to be paid at a future period as it depends entirely on a subsequent event viz. enjoyment. On this point I agree with the decision in 10 Jac. 309. See vide Cro Elj. 606. Cro Jac. 487. 1 Cl. & F. 141. 1 Salk 578.

It has been a question whether interest is discharged by a release of the land on which it is payable. Thus a note on int. payable 1 year from date the note is released. I think the interest is an appurtenance of the note that it follows the same course. a release of the one is a release of the other.

That a covenant to do a collateral act to be performed in future is not discharged by general words of release. This stands on distinct ground from the case of money. Special words of release only will discharge this, as a release of all covenants whereas a release of all demands does not. See in case of money. 10 Jac 179. Cro Elj. 272.

That rent which is not due is not discharged by a release for it is incident to the reversion. it grows out of the enjoyment of the land. it is real but personal, & of property. But if due it may be discharged on a release for it is then personal property & grows to 3d. but to the heir. Kent not due is an incorporeal hereditament. Cro Elj. 606 Cro Jac. 487. 1 Cl. & F. 141. 1 Salk 578.






A contract of a higher nature if given for a lower  
one is a defence to a suit upon the lower contract.  
This depends on the principle. If the lower one is  
merged & swallowed up in the higher one it is a  
defence. But if the higher one be only given  
to enforce the lower, it is no defence to say  
that there exists a contract of a higher na-  
ture. *vid* "Contracts" Com. p. 129. Bull. et Pl. 157.  
Exp. Dig. 166 3 Bac. 134 2 S. Rep. 247. 1 Pow. 300.  
217. Burr. 9. 1 Bac. 17.

A release to one of a num-  
ber of joint obligors or of joint & several obligors  
is a release to all. So too a release to one of several  
joint transferees is to all. 2 "Rep. 671.

There are cases in which a court will let in parol proof  
to narrow the grounds of a release, not indeed  
to show that there was any parol agreement or  
conversation between the parties as to narrowing  
the express words used, but to show facts from  
which it must be inferred that such instru-  
ments were not contemplated by the parties  
at the time of giving the release. Thus, if  
A holds a bond of B to C, he conveys it to C. B paid  
interest on the bond to C. Afterward, A & B set  
the bond to C. C took a release from all claims & de-  
mands. A died & C sued B on the bond. B pleads






the release in law. The court admitted parol proof  
to show the facts & circumstances of the case from  
which it appears that the bond was not con-  
templated at the time of giving the release &  
of course the plea overruled. To exclude parol  
testimony would be to pursue an absurdity  
who had conspired to defraud B.

again refer  
from it over B \$1000. A case showing B a legacy of  
£5. to the Ex<sup>r</sup> of A & then the legacy states a  
receipt in full of all due and the court  
will admit parol proof to show that it was not  
B's intention to release the \$1000. 1 Bos. 277.  
392. 398. Smith. 173. 7 & 8. B. 577. 9. 2 Rep. 230  
336. 664. 2 Ld. 237.

Discharge under the 43rd Statute Law is a defense  
This discharge all debts due & owing at the time the  
certificate was obtained but such as became  
payable afterwards. 1 Will. 248. 7 J. Rep. 103. Long 97.  
4 J. Rep. 94

It has been a question whether this dis-  
charge is to be considered 'as a judgment of court'. If it  
is it is a bar to an action brought in a different  
state on a debt due & owing before the discharge  
for our constitution provides that a judgment in our  
state is a bar to an action of the same kind in





another state. It was formerly held in Iowa to be  
the same as a judgment of court. It has however  
been decided in NY to that a discharge under  
the Bankrupt laws of one state is no defense  
to an action in another & this decision I think  
correct. See also 1 New Bl. 123. 136. Where it is  
held that confiscation of property in this country  
is in Eng no defense to an action on a debt ori-  
ginating in this country prior to the confisca-  
tion.

The next defense is that of Duress. a contract or  
security obtained by duress is void. Duress is of  
2 kinds. by minas & imprisonment.

Duress of imprisonment is when a man is deprived  
of liberty or the power of locomotion by illegal  
restraint until he seals an obligation or the like  
1 Bl. 136. In such he may allege the duress & avoid  
the contract. And it is to be observed that  
it must either be unlawful or else an undue ad-  
vantage must be taken of that which is lawful  
to extort more than is due. But if a man can be  
lawfully imprisoned & then to procure his dis-  
charge or on any other fair account make a bond  
or deed this is not duress he cannot avoid it  
2 Inst. 422.

Duress per minas is either for fear of  
loss of life or else for fear of maiming or loss of limb



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
some other great bodily harm. 1 Bl. 191. That a contract was thus vitiated is a good defence in law. But if the threatened danger in any case fall short of death no relief can be had against a contract thus obtained but in Eq. Thus a fear of battery is no defence, nor of having ones horse burned or goods taken away & destroyed but fear of loss of life or limb of his wife or child is enough. the not of his parents. So that in this case G L will give relief ought to relieve in <sup>the</sup> other cases. G L will rescind all such contracts by an intrusion & proper application of those same principles that courts declare in a too limited manner. River D.R. 427. 1 P.M. 115. 339. 1 Bro Ch. 369. 2 Bow Con. 160. 5. 187. 264. 3 P.M. 278.

How far fraud is a defence.

Whenever there is fraud in the execution of a contract it renders the contract void. Thus a blind man intending to sign a bond for \$5. is made to sign one for \$500. in many great non est factum.


But if the fraud is in the consent it does not render the contract void at law, tho if it be a contract of slight importance to be cognizable in Ch. it will then be relieved against. This distinction





is recognized in law, so that fraud within in the con-  
tract or accident generally renders a contract void  
But such a bill, but does not take cognizance of  
many contracts where if there be fraud in the  
consideration or count of law will not relieve  
ag't. there. the injury must be without a doubt.  
In such case the party injured may in some  
recover in damages. yet such damages are reg-  
ulated in courts of law by the genl. value of the  
article not by the benefit that the party would  
have derived from it had there been no fraud  
in the case. Thus a gentleman has bought a  
horse for \$200 the seller having informed  
him that he is good carriage horse in which  
he has never used it. he knows however to be  
calculated only for the plough. to the buyer  
the horse proves of no value. He cannot file  
a bill in bill for this cognizance is not taken  
of such matters. He sues in bill courts. a jury  
pronounce the horse worth \$160. i.e. to the generality  
of mankind. thus the purchaser recovers but  
\$40. Many of your may are doing in courts of  
law going on a more liberal principle I hope  
the period is not far distant. Rivers. D. R. 433.





The defence of arbitration as awarded extends to all personal claims. it is a decision by men chosen by the parties a domestic tribunal. It is a quasi bar to all personal claims either of tort or contract.

Courts cannot pass title to real estate as if two persons submitted their dispute to arbitrators. The award is not binding so as to confer the title. They may however make an award about it & enforce it by means of a writ.

What with respect to real property it vests the title absolutely & enables him to maintain trespass or trover for it.

So if one claims his injury by battery, slander or breach of contract & even determines that at common law he cannot sue on the original contract. But <sup>original</sup> debt is a good remedy.

If it is a contract which is a collateral matter as where a party has a right in the party is distinguished in his rights.

They have a power that shall not receive them. In 6th if the Party does not comply they inflict a penalty. The 6th of Ch. 11 more expressly the title envelope the penalty is impracticable. In many states 6th of 6th have power to do it but seldom exercise it.



" That not of persons, interested not parties

Whom Arbitrators convey the title immediately

In 6<sup>th</sup> of law an interested person may testify by the consent of both parties.

In 6<sup>th</sup> if one offers to the conscience of another in most cases it will be taken for confessions. But arbitrators settle the truth according to the discussion

at court of law can now give a specific performance, but give damages in money. E.g. can give specific performance. E.g. 6<sup>th</sup> can not the title absolutely & immediately.

Whatever is provided in the submission the arbitrators must be governed by law or equity &c.

The arbitrator's award binds an arbitrator's claim. As to this it is immaterial whether in his favor or against him. And the object is that a man may rest to his claim now at an end. He must see in the award only

clear & honest & convey this in test conveyance title. but arbitrators oblige conveyance. now arbitrators can award of such recovery and he knows more about the place or not with the award.

Left to be set



when a man of many was named to be his successor by the people. He left  
home.

1107.8.1  
2d Reg 248  
960.1037.

YB 13<sup>th</sup> of 4. I deliver the deed to a L<sup>th</sup> and title paper  
by the delivery. For the title will not go to rest in the  
time of, whatever is carried away with the title  
in all states where a purchase may, perhaps, be  
made this conveyance would be good without  
more.

As to the award in the attraction if  
the person who delivers up a certain horse or if he  
does not at such time to pay \$100. if delivered  
by the time it satisfies the award if not \$100  
may be recovered. This cannot be done by L<sup>th</sup>.

When a bond is given to abide the  
award you may run on the bond or on the award  
For the bond does not swallow up the award, not  
given to satisfy that claim it was given before the  
award was made. The bond was given to enforce  
performance of the award. So whenever this is the  
case you may run on the bond or award or  
contract whichever it is.

The laws relating to an  
attraction are entirely different from what they were in  
the days of good Queen Elizabeth.

The rule that an award  
may be broken on the award has always remained  
the same. But if to sustain a specific collection  
act it contains no reference to subscription was  
of course inoperative. The first alteration was if



5 Mat. 35.

1 Lalk 74

then if there was any promise without consid<sup>n</sup> it was suff<sup>t</sup>  
still better however in some subscription as as suff<sup>t</sup> or  
consid<sup>n</sup> being deemed implied

there was a <sup>sub</sup>script to abide it could be enforced  
or if there was any consideration as of force it was  
enough. & now if there is a mere subscription  
it is sufficient to bind to the amount.


If the collateral  
acts are intended to be done respecting land, a  
court of Ch<sup>l</sup> will enforce it. But they do not  
interfer in disputes of personal property except  
in a few instances. & there are cases in which  
money does not replace the property, as in case  
of a family picture.

If disputes were about perform-  
ance of contracts as to build a house, or convey land  
they could enforce performance of collateral acts  
but it was said that a collateral act would not be an  
adequate satisfaction as for an abuse for chamber  
or bathing or sitting out to deliver up a bond or note or  
to cook fowls when no such contract existed. but  
now decided that it was sufficient unless guarded against  
in the subscription.

And it is said  
that the collateral act must be of some value so  
that kneeling & begging for alms was decided not  
good. I consider however that as it was trouble  
& degradation to the party, it was considered  
as sufficient a perfectly idle act or one which is no loss.

If the power is to them to decide a majority of them






cannot decide it. i. e. two cannot determine it. if  
all are present two can make the award & this  
is plainly the intention. two alone however may  
make a ~~valid~~ award if no regard is the sub-  
mission.

It is a common thing to obtain  
a rule of court to advise the award when the par-  
ties have agreed to submit. & then the court can  
enforce the award by punishing for contempt  
sometimes a bond is also taken. then the suit  
may be on the bond. the award on the part, that  
will not perform the award may be committed after  
contempt. This practice of courts began in the  
reign of H. 2<sup>d</sup> & a statute was soon after made  
in all the states of the same nature & effect.

Now, however the award is returned as a verdict  
by the jury & H. 2<sup>d</sup> immediately issues a  
writ that will enforce the award. But that is not  
done in other states I believe. the only practice is to is-  
sue an attachment & commit the party who refused  
to abide the award.

Suppose A & B are suiting for a  
joint bond. B has failed. A & B submit to a third  
party to determine the proportions each should pay in  
case the bond be paid.





an award is a decision of men selected by the parties to decide the dispute:— Arbitrators are to be governed by the discretion in the submission otherwise their powers are more extensive than that of Ct. of Ct. This award is a bar to a subsequent suit for the same thing, thus for slander; that is at an end after submission the action will lie on the award. It is the case with all personal disputes arising from contracts or torts, except in those cases where there is bond or <sup>for a sum of money</sup> sealed instrument, or judgment of court, in which cases an award is no bar. If art<sup>d</sup> award nothing else still the party may pursue the tort or bond: if he has given a bond it will be forfeited if he does, but it is no bar by the Eng. rule.

Now if the same reason does not exist here this should not be law here. It is a maxim of Eng. law that no evidence is suff<sup>t</sup> to discharge an obligation but that which is equally high with the debt: now an award is no more than a parcel testimony or at any rate writing without seal

When a right of recovery accrues from something subsequent to the bond or cert. itself it is always a bar, as when one gives a bond to another that it shall be void if he builds a house for him within one year it shall be void: parcel evidence is given in evidence.

Day<sup>r</sup>

could not be given in evidence some years <sup>ago</sup> to an action on



66. 23. 12. 292  
66. 23. 12. 2  
66. 23. 12. 99.  
12. 23. 12. 99.

on a bond. I now in any & almost every state a state  
is adopting allowing pay to be given in evidence so that  
this principle is done away & around should & probably  
would be considered a bar.

An award can have no effect  
upon real property because there can be no conveyance  
of realty except by deed. Why then do you not send  
before it and deliver the deed to it? The reason is that  
a freehold cannot be made to commence in factum.  
According to the old law maxims. The law now states this  
maxim is either expressly or impliedly abolished. When  
the maxim is in full force the law must remain


Among the authorities we find it said, 'that an award  
concerning real property is void: but not so for the bond  
is good.' Again we find it said again that it  
is good twice pass the land.

Another said it would  
would be good & pass the land if the subscription  
were by deed but the deed cannot affect this—

The first decision which takes might seem fit says  
that an award of that kind does not pass  
the land but the bond is binding. Kidwells  
39 & 40. See 1<sup>st</sup> Vol. 115.

There are certain things that cannot be arbitrated upon  
as all criminal matters and





duration and cause. these are decided by courts  
of justice. & a bond given will not be binding  
as to causes & questions of divorce.

The character of  
a person whether parent or prisoner, or otherwise, or  
he cannot be arbitrator upon. but whether one  
is a bastard or not might I suppose, it cannot be said.

If a sum of money is awarded its receipt is  
conclusive evidence, so long as it remains unre-  
paid. that at the time so much was due  
you can make no inquiry as to the cause of  
the debt. & this award will support an action, and  
if there is a bond you may sue on either the award  
or bond. the bond does not swallow up the award.

Arbitrators have power to give specific remedy, & will not the prop-  
erty, or give an award that the house be returned to the party  
or so much.

The first method to enforce an award is to sue on the  
award. another upon a writ. 3<sup>d</sup> is by suing on the bond  
which is the usual way. 4<sup>th</sup> method is by writ of habeas  
to be void if the award is kept. a 5<sup>th</sup> the arbitrator gives  
power of attorney before a magistrate & can sue upon the  
judgment is delivered to the arbitrator. & then the magistrate if  
bound the Ex<sup>or</sup> immediately. & for any reason by a party.



It is a very common thing especially among merchants to  
enter into a contract to submit to arbitration whatever disputes  
may arise between them that go to law. A question  
has arisen whether if one of the parties breaks the contract  
bringing one act before waiting to arbitrate the court can  
enforce the contract. It is however now settled  
that the courts cannot be ousted of their jurisdiction  
by any agreement whatever. Ryd. 98. 6 T. Rep. 137

the jury. It is clear now that this practice is a very  
bad one. for the man is with an E<sup>o</sup> upon his back  
with no day in court. If a bond or note had been  
given it could have come before some court & have  
been rectified if the amount had been given by mutual  
arbitration.

When a submission is made a party can  
revoke the power of arbitrators, but the bond will be  
forfeited, or if no bond you may recover your dam-  
ages & costs in a suit at law. It is absolutely an  
injury.

There has been a great improvement made of late. Thus  
the parties apply for a rule of court & then if the award is  
not performed the parties may be imprisoned as for contempt.  
There are certain qualities required in every award that it  
should be binding & to take advantage of these  
subjects you apply to courts of law.

An extrinsic  
cause as bribery & corruption in jury. In my states an  
application must be made to E<sup>o</sup>. In some however  
it is set aside by courts of law for extrinsic as well  
as intrinsic. Every stipulation to be done by arbitrators  
must be done if not whimsical.

It is a minor & becomes bound that it shall abide  
the award. It is this bond void. It is said the submission  
is void & the bond is of course. The business are not true  
tho if they were the conclusion might be. His contracts are but voidable.



86. 50

17. 1. 18. 68  
2. 1. 18. 69

2. 1. 18. 68  
3. 1. 18. 69  
4. 1. 18. 70

1. 1. 18. 68  
1. 1. 18. 69  
1. 1. 18. 70

2. 1. 18. 71

If submission is in writing, a revocation must be so also

Should it go on to state the award should <sup>not</sup> be given for the full amount? Our courts better believe determined that the principle of charging down bonds extended to this case altho the words in the stat. did not reach this case.

Another question is what should be his damages. Clearly all that is equitably due. All that he has lost - is determined in law that he recovers all, even lawyer fees.

Suppose intent of making the bond the party does not appear nor said with effect. Thus revoking an award. Is determination long to be equivalent to a revocation.

The consequence of his submitting to arbitration any claim, against the party who will finally see that they could submit at their peril if left more narrow than could have been recovered at law it is as good as more the test it. But now it is questioned that he should have the same rights. That he is not to be out of pocket by mistake merely.

Questioned if one party should submit to arbitration is the other party bound so that he cannot claim anything of the other party? One party has as much power to sue the other as to submit to arbitration.



Page 216

Page 217

Page 218


When one binds himself by attorney, he is ~~sure~~ bound  
the c. 11th provides, the c. 11th has power so to do. But the  
Att. in ~~such~~ ~~an~~ cannot submit to a judgment  
without rule of court. If he does & binds himself  
as c. 11th, the c. 11th would be bound & binds the client  
for an att. in ~~an~~ ~~an~~ cannot bind his client with  
authority for the purpose.

Leffron a case of several  
claimants as owners of a brig. I am or two be-  
come bound when all agreed to submit to the  
arbitrators. question is on the other bound by that  
bond is as well the other sign as a attorney - the  
persons were consid. as acting for all the rest. Nov 25.

Two Insures, 50 pounds submitted to arbitration & gave separate bonds. the interest was joint. as the person who received the amount entitled to the full amount on his side on one bond. or must be one both and receive half on each. Decided that we can receive the whole when either the 2 are here only one satisfaction each is liable to the extent of the amount by submission

in power of a husband  
to subvert its respectability, the wife, however, if it were such  
property as he acquires a right to dispose of at the same  
time that includes all her own estate. It is unfortunate  
such property. She is bound by his engagements & if in  
divorce she has no award for maintenance she is bound as a chimney





But that property over which he has not control  
will not be bound by such award as per property  
to her estate now. So our minority. altho the  
money when paid in belongs to him.

Our case says that  
if the wife joined with him she would be bound  
but this is not so for she is supposed to be under  
the coercion of her husband. the conveyance  
of lands is an exception to the rule. 1 Hall 267.

You will find it laid down in the books that if there  
was an award of debt who dies before receiving for the  
award - no action of debt ~~might~~ would be brought  
the 5th but it is not so now. It is supposed  
that in debt right an officer, debt right wage  
his law to discharge himself when his law could  
not. but all done away 2 Vent. 267. 3 W. Bl. 600.  
12th Reg. 248. & an action will lie in a q<sup>n</sup> & t<sup>h</sup>

Who may be arbitrator? Almost any person may that the  
parties choose. but in some cases cannot. infants  
deaf & dumb. & also those that are under the con-  
trol of others as slaves, minors when the law pre-  
serves a trust. & all actions of treason but denied.  
It is said that a man may be arbitrator in his own  
case if the party chooses him. - 10 Mod. 218. 4 Mod. 226.  
Foster 6. 43.



2 Nov 485

An umpire is a person to decide when the arbitrators disagree. The parties may choose the umpire or the arbitrators may choose one. Arbitrators must use sound discretion but choose by chance, as by throwing up a paper, to avoid the award.

It is just awards now sought if possible afterwards all were established that would be established & then commenced <sup>some</sup> regular the matter so that we have three sets of cases.

2 Burr 100. Kidgley.

If arbit. make no award within the time limited but show the business of the umpire may make an award within the same time. 2 Keb 263 332. 2 Sess 168.

I will notice now the cases in which arbitrators may appoint an umpire. They may appoint an umpire any time. Kidg. 51. So also when further time is given. 20 Ch 263. 12 R. 205. 1 Salk 71. 1 L. R. 67. 2 S. 625.

After settled that arbitrators might appoint one, question arose could they nominate a second the first having refused. now settled they can. 1 Salk 70. 2 Kent. 113. 1 D. R. 222.

It is the business of parties to have the award made & for the arbitrator to appoint time & place of hearing & then notice is given to the other party under the



If the parties making the bond ~~not~~ after the bond the  
bond is void & the award only is the ground of action.  
i.e. an award made after the time set in the bond cannot  
be enforced by a writ on the bond. such a suit must be dis-  
continued from the bond. the award not being made  
the bond is of no force. See 3 W. Rep 592. note. b.

Barrett's 5

hand of the arbitrator. The arbitrator may adjourn from time to time. & the parties may prolong the time for the award as the court will sometimes reserve the submission is by rule of court.

16a. E.g. 2. 1834

it is said that if one party does not answer the other may go on & the arbitrator make a binding award. This is the only case of the kind in question.

Suppose arbitrator decide point case they call us in writing to settle the rest. 57. 58. 64. 1 Galt. 70. It is decided that they cannot do so it is done contractually then case when it is decided that they cannot it must be where there is to be a good balance.

If the Dispute


is to be settled by 3 or any two of them. if one was absent would vote then. formerly held that no award could be made but now held that two may make the award under such submission.

It is decided that under the word "delivered" implied writing or speech is so of "ready to be delivered". 37. 45. 6 Mod. 160.

It appears to be a rule among arbitrators if one dis- hants one submitted the award is still to be made in one day.

a arbitrator can never the power of doing a ministerial act after the award made but not a judicial act. so they could not judge the matter over as upon new evidence after the time limited. But the reservation of









2. Out 309

1814

commenced, no other being specified, not cause of action  
but words more inclusive as well demands cause of  
action disputes be matters of doubt with no other more  
or with suits as cause of action

It has been disputed whether arbitration could be given to  
a court of law, i. e. give anything but a money, but  
decided thus case. 2 L. Rep. 1857. 6 W. 201. Lord  
was given up. then giving satisfaction in a collateral action  
and the question then is at rest. 1 W. 12. Kid. 99

Formerly every thing  
was supposed out of the submission that was not in issue  
at the time of the submission. so no costs could be  
awarded, but now done away & costs can be  
any appendage, as costs. So they can award that  
it shall give to a bond payable to the house. any foolish  
appendage does not affect the award.

Whether the submission  
does not usually include the question disputable, yet if the  
us. decide the question it is not a dispute as to whether  
tithes were payable on certain property. the question sub-  
mitted was what tithes were due. they decided the  
matter was not tithable & that award will bar  
any future action of that kind of all tithes.

If parties dispute as to their claims each shall  
leave to arbit. they may award a disposition  
according to the decision & a similar award



3 JAp 626  
2 JAp 1118.  
2 JAp 645

between Master & App. reason not obvious, but the rules  
settled.


Subscription of all matters of  
difference between the parties in the cause, including  
disputes. but it was said if it were, all matters  
of difference in the cause between the parties, referred  
only to that particular matter. yet I am sure the inten-  
tion the same, in both cases.

By the above reasoning it  
the power of reference could not be avoided, but now  
it can 'Kio 49. when last given since sub-  
scription was ordered to give it.

Formerly but if  
an award or a release to be given in a particular  
to be of all matters previous to subscription it  
would be void. otherwise it would cut off  
all claims originating since the subscription  
but it is not so now. unless the parties show  
that there have been such dealings or the court  
will not void the award. The courts have  
gone further & say that if an award is made  
the award is good. It is exemplified with it  
includes all matters previous to the subscription

It was said that an award must not extend to any  
concern of a stranger. but surely one that grows  
it is not now void. if a good reason for it is given  
it will do. then, & it is not void. it is not void.






that B should convey to A his wife who owned the  
for. 5 Co. 71

It was said that B should pay  
a sum of money to the wife of A. 1 L. 23.  
It is then held that it is good to award the debt to  
one A. 104. So where A. 105 submit their dispute  
all to the award to be B. to a stranger by a rule. 105  
Cro. Car. 521. 1 Mod. 7. So as to the prohibition that  
children should pay toward the support of parents  
L. 10. 071: 74

But suppose the award is that something  
shall be done by strangers. It is said that A. 105  
give B a bond it is good: but suppose that it  
were that A. 105 with B give B the bond, this  
is void ~~it is~~ that part of it certainly, unless  
A has it in his power by contract perhaps, to  
compel B to execute the award. As if A were  
obliged to sign a bond or written contract to convey  
L. 10. 13. 1 L. 23. 105. 5 T. 71

When the award was <sup>to make</sup> a release of all claims what  
effect that has upon a thing held in right of another  
or as trustee for having the legal title. A. 105. 106.  
It will release the best perhaps, but not divided  
that in such case best will be protected, but it does  
not appear to be a bond in itself for the face of it.  
Now can parol proof be adduced to show the





trustee had no beneficial interest in the bond. Now  
it always was true that a trust might be proved  
by parol. then say? to its contrary is proved by  
parol. but you can prove facts which go to estab-  
lish the facts needed for a payoff of interest be attached upon a bond  
might be shown as well as in anything else & it is submitted as specific &  
charges as concerning a battery. they have other con-  
troversies not submitted. It is ordered to pay some-  
body to release all demands. Now it is to be shown  
of void. the burden of proof to show it void  
in consequence upon of other demands, being a burden  
asking to set it aside.

The 2<sup>d</sup> branch the award must be of all facts  
submitted. as if it were of all personal & real  
actions & the award is of only of personal  
actions. might it be bad but not so now  
Chs. 98. there might have been a real action  
but before there is a real action. Suppose of all real  
& real decide only on one real. it is good  
unless shown to have been more. <sup>not forward</sup> Geo. Eli. 358.

Controversies are after specifically named & only facts  
is brought forward & decided as well as a for battery  
standing on a bond. but appears not to be decided  
but the battery. it is good provided nothing else is  
forwarded. but if there is an issue good, provided the



Of only one matter is decided it is no bar to the other big ones  
when

the award is made in the premises when all the claims must be noticed: being specifically named.

Suppose the subscription ~~note~~ does not specify but says  
subscription <sup>of all contributions</sup> to an ~~award~~ <sup>award</sup>. - how can the  
dispute be known? it is decided that the award  
is good of one cause if no other is lost before  
time. 8. Co. 73. Geo. Jac. 200. 205. 1. Burr. 274. Geo  
216. Hardw. 577. Com. Sup. 547. Nid. 114. 117. 121.

Feb 22. The quantity ~~may~~ may be proved by parol. +  
the presumption of law is that only one ~~contribution~~  
1. Burr. 735. If ~~not~~ declare they will decide on one  
of the ~~contributions~~ and the award cannot be good.

Suppose ~~specific contributions~~ ~~have~~ ~~an~~ ~~award~~ the award  
includes all specified & some others also. is the award  
void in toto. it depends for the manner of making it  
if they separate the claims to be heard on the basis  
for the claimant & for the better & then proceed  
one ~~claim~~ <sup>in distribution</sup> not included. the award is good as  
to all but the loss. But if a ~~specific~~ ~~particular~~ ~~claim~~  
is struck by ~~affairs~~ the award is void in toto.  
now it is void if it affects the other things in the award it  
is void otherwise not.



11

29

120-12

21-243

120-126

21-243

120-136

Requisites of an steward.

1<sup>st</sup> requisite is that the award must be legal. It is void else - in this that will render a contract void will render an award void. You are not to understand that if an award is made upon something fixed which nothing could be recovered at law. it is of course void if one changes another with lying to the law to wit<sup>h</sup> who awarded for the award is void. although not b<sup>y</sup> could be recovered at law.

2<sup>d</sup> Requirement is that the award be possible in the nature of things. - Suppose a mortgagee & B. B. are w<sup>g</sup>s to C. & C. wishes to bring his title for conveyance but will not do a conveyance & pay a fee atty. if he does not. So too if one desires to convey land & there be a better price for convey it to an other who will not do a conveyance the act of C. would not. he must acquiesce in the title if possible if not pay the fee atty. - So that an impossibility if broken by the party is no excuse. -

3<sup>d</sup> ~~the~~ and may be void because it is unreasonable or  
to make a bond by one & another not under the ill,  
however. so to procure suits to ~~the~~ is to forfeit it is  
void. So to avoid sin shall revive the other by work  
in his power. not in duty of being collateral but be-  
cause it deprived him of person & liberty



2. and 292

2. 10/16

Lib. 59.  
Ro. 123

It was true. B has beneficial int. B's submitted  
to Art. who assigned it in favor of C. C. would be  
inferred a legal title. This dispute B. was in C.  
of B's would conveyance of legal title & if necessary  
to contrary of point to the court. so award was granted  
according to the result of the app. 2<sup>nd</sup> Mar 34

2<sup>nd</sup>

An award must be certain. This controversy was what  
I should pay for B's services. Art. said he should not  
say how much. He awarded a bond  
but not the amount of it. So an award to deliver  
a trunk several boxes. This was declared too  
uncertain.

Of course you can from the cir-  
cumstances infer the intention certainly it is  
uncertain. I claimed title to B's and I claimed  
it also. I built scaffolding. Award belongs to B. &  
the scaffolding to be pulled down. said to be good  
as the intention was uncertain. Cost of a suit un-  
certain.

Nor is an award uncertain because  
conditional.

As that I shall have photo 3<sup>rd</sup>  
if he pays with otherwise note. A lot uncertain  
because in the alternative. 2 Feb 35. 12 Mar 36

If a time is fixed it is like a contract payable  
instantly or within a reasonable time. If it is  
uncertain you must set out the details.

Uncertainty may be held out by agreement



Palmer 110

as to bills of cost meant it price. but when you  
have standard to resort to determine the observance,  
the award is void.

5<sup>th</sup> The award must be final as  
to the controversy 6 Md. 232. Rob 142. By 6<sup>th</sup>  
an award that a sufferer was not finally but  
interim was final. An award that all  
rights shall remain 6<sup>th</sup> sent meant forever  
6 Md. 33. 2 Ray. 4614 2 Stra 1024 refers however  
only to the controversy.

6<sup>th</sup> The award must be final as to the controversy. An award that  
a sufferer was not finally but interim was final. An award that all  
rights shall remain 6<sup>th</sup> sent meant forever 6 Md. 33. 2 Ray. 4614 2 Stra 1024 refers however  
only to the controversy.

It is final when awarded to pay at future day  
2<sup>nd</sup> Stra 1082.

7<sup>th</sup> The award must be neutral. or advantageous to both  
The idea once was that something must be awarded  
on each side. but if you can understand the award to  
be in satisfaction it is sufficient to remove the rule.

As to awards good in part & in part void. In which  
a void part voids the whole.

The old idea universally  
was that if part was void the whole was void but  
this rule being very inconvenient the 6<sup>th</sup> went clear  
over & established all but that which was void  
but neither is now the rule.



The first thing I noticed when I stepped  
out of the car was the cold. It was a  
sharp contrast to the warm blanket of  
the car. I pulled my coat tighter around  
me and walked towards the entrance of the  
building. The door was open, and I  
stepped inside. The interior was dimly  
lit, and the air was still. I walked  
towards the counter, where a man in a  
white coat was standing. He looked at  
me and smiled. "Welcome," he said.  
I nodded and walked towards the back of  
the room. The walls were covered in  
pictures of people. I looked at them  
for a moment and then turned back  
towards the counter. The man was still  
there, and he was looking at me.  
I walked back towards the entrance of  
the building. The door was open, and I  
stepped outside. The cold was still there,  
but it was not as sharp as before. I  
walked towards the car and got in. The  
engine started, and I drove away.

The car was still there when I got back.  
I walked towards the entrance of the  
building. The door was open, and I  
stepped inside. The interior was dimly  
lit, and the air was still. I walked  
towards the counter, where a man in a  
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the building. The door was open, and I  
stepped outside. The cold was still there,  
but it was not as sharp as before. I  
walked towards the car and got in. The  
engine started, and I drove away.

Chaffon & B have claimed. This awarded to pay no do  
collateral acts. all this is proper respecting them after  
submittals. but as to go on & decide something  
beyond this proven as not submitted or illegal  
or impossible this part only is void.


The subscription  
is for under the award is of a sum of money & also  
something else I give a written note owed by him. & his  
Plff. if he will accept of the good part to wit<sup>t</sup> to pay  
\$1000. B is bound by it. To to procure a surety if  
it will accept without surety.

Chaffon & B is willing  
to perform the void part is Plff. bound to accept  
the award is good & Plff. cannot complain. he must  
accept.

Chaffon the award be of matters within and  
without the sub. ipm. clearly void as to that  
part without the subscription but the good part  
stands if not connected with the void part  
so as not to be separated as by striking balance  
when the party cannot get that intended to be given  
that is when the contract is destroyed. it is all void  
unless the contract can be restored.

It is ordered  
to pay \$1000 for a piece of land that B convey the  
land to A & B's wife as to the wife void formerly but  
B promises his wife to give the said land & the award is good





In all cases then in which the party will perform the  
void part which is intended as an equivalent  
the materiality is not so much as would otherwise  
be good?

again also intended to pay B \$400 in full of all  
travels & B to give a release of all his property. it is  
said that at the time of making the award the  
part relating to release was void. because the  
award when satisfied had every effect of a  
release from B. — Authorities as to awards  
void in part. 2 Roll Rep. 46. 2 Lev. 6. 3 Bro Jac 584  
639. 1 glo. 98. 3 Saund. 293. Bro Jac 352. 1 Ld Ray 114

Firmly made merely in the form of the award from it  
with a inclination to annul awards, but now  
no precise form is necessary it need only be in-  
telligible Barm. & City. 56

Primarily it must have  
been performed literally. but now it is suff<sup>2</sup> if it  
be substantiated by performance. 1 Ld. 36. 6 Mod 34  
an acceptance of performance in a manner diff<sup>2</sup>  
from that announced binds the party from  
saying there has been no performance. 1 Ld Ray 167

If no time is set for performance or day it is  
due & payable immediately. the award with the  
very essence of action. he might sue on it at any



Chen 903.

distance of time however this is the case as  
the law will be good at any distance of time  
the party could not resort to his right cause  
of action. It is awarded in a debt.

And it was that  
it made a law to pay the int. the law was  
made to pay the int. this court came  
in line of the subscription bond & the state  
of things were thus changed. the award was  
fulfilled no rent would lie on the subscriber  
bond if M. did not pay the int. at the time  
so an award to give a bond payable 6 mos  
later. by giving the bond thus payable the  
award is kept & no action lies on the bond  
of subscription if pay<sup>t</sup> is not made on that  
bond at the end of 6 months.

Remedies are an award. If no other rem-  
edy than the subscription in writing or by parole  
no promise or bond except the implied promise  
debt or indebtedness lies upon the award in  
the state there was a controversy. then  
the subscription to a debt <sup>actually chosen</sup> that they took  
it upon them to decide <sup>had chosen</sup> & then that they  
did decide that you should receive this  
money & that this award has not been  
performed state that it then raises the promise.



1 Kib. 414

2 Kib. 158

If there was a promise to abide state it in the same manner or state that he refused to promise.

If the award was to perform or collect and your action is to state these facts knowing that the award has not been performed. If the award were that ed his wife should come say state that you ~~accepted~~ offered to accept a ~~10~~ <sup>alleging breach of promise</sup> and above. I am that he refused to for the award as it related to the wife of ed was void & void he certainly & to avoid breach it was void prevent recovery.

If the suit is on a bond. Plff does not notice the award, the Def<sup>t</sup> prays over & pleads no award. Plff cannot issue "an award" because Def<sup>t</sup> may mean only that the award was not legal, which must not be referred to the jury. Plff then must set forth the award & assign a breach, then Def<sup>t</sup> demands judgment is held. If no award however the Def<sup>t</sup> instead of demanding judgment "no award" which is not equivocal as it was in the plea. — If a time was set in the bond the Def<sup>t</sup> agrees no award within the time set. If instead of this agrees should agree performance it would be a departure & good ground of disclaimer.



K. 210.250  
178. 5 May 12

246. 153

When Jeff replies I will, with the proviso he  
must state all the provisions in the sub. in fine  
Geo. Sec. 278 & Mod 77.

It does not follow of course  
that Piffshoids in all cases own performance  
of his part of the award. If however the Piff  
is to do something, first it is a condition pre-  
cedent to any rights of action agt. Piff. Then  
must own performance. & he must also  
state performance of his part when parts  
of it is voided as for a deed to be made  
by him & his wife.

If the action is on the award  
left may, if he relies on an advance between the  
award & Dec<sup>r</sup>, set forth the award & demand  
saying "Plff. Dec<sup>r</sup> is insuff<sup>t</sup> as the true award is  
made part of Dec<sup>r</sup>." <sup>Small variations can not be noticed</sup> or if the award ap-  
pears, when produced in evidence, to be different  
any issue as well as debt. now a p<sup>t</sup> will give  
you a chance to take advantage of it. If  
you did not execute the bond, I did not issue &  
there is no anything which goes to substantiate  
it as no submission &c.

act on bond. Diff<sup>n</sup> says you spread the cond<sup>n</sup> of the  
no-award. Diff<sup>n</sup> replies to spread the award upon the  
award. Diff<sup>n</sup> replies on the points no-award. I





finds one award yet Plff cannot have judgment  
for the assigned no breach. a finding a breach  
indispensable. K.D. 192.

If the award is in the alternative one part ill & one part good. Plff must  
reply a breach by showing some performance  
of either.

In order to entitle to a remedy sometimes it is  
necessary to give notice. & it depends upon the  
nature of the award & we must see our  
discipline.

If the award is to pay a sum  
of money no need of a demand. But if the  
act was collateral the demand is an instant  
to be made.

If the award is to build a house  
it is not binding to build until he had notice.  
because he could not discharge himself by trade  
the nature of the case determines it. at first it  
be perhaps with his timber &c. So if a black  
smith contracts with a d to do all the work in  
his line of business show how he notice must  
be given.

Suppose the contract of the  
kind a contract between a wheel & a farmer  
the latter is awarded to transport \$20 worth the  
farmer cannot discharge himself by trade  
so the farmer must have notice.

If the award  
is in alternative a breach must be assigned in both.



6. 830

6. 838.

Suppose an<sup>d</sup> in hand. Def<sup>t</sup> prays open & spreads the  
condition in the record & places performance  
Diff<sup>t</sup> must not then assign a breach because  
Def<sup>t</sup> acknowledges the award & that he is liable  
if he has not performed it. — If the perform-  
ance involves a question of law Def<sup>t</sup> must plead  
the ~~pro modo~~ mode of performance as in error  
law. —

I know of no state that has a stat<sup>e</sup> of  
limitations ag<sup>t</sup> recovery on an award, promissory.

Suppose Def<sup>t</sup> means to rely on the fact that the  
award did not include all the disputes sub-  
mitted. Def<sup>t</sup> after open &c. pleads no award  
in the issue. The subscription mentioned is  
elusive about. Perhaps shames & a bond yet  
the award mentioned only a bond. — Def<sup>t</sup> has  
cannot dismiss, but must set out in reply  
that the two other matters came before  
the arbitrators & they refused to make an award  
~~there~~ unless there was an ita quod. Diff<sup>t</sup> must then  
is joined. If Def<sup>t</sup> relies on no legal award he  
at once spreads the whole as the record & award in other  
matters. Diff<sup>t</sup> then dismisses.



1 Sta. 695.

3 P.M. 189

1 Atk. 74

Suppose an act on bond & 10<sup>th</sup> after day. Placed no  
award. Pl<sup>ff</sup> wishes (the other party) there is no  
award. But says that before the trial opening  
the award. Pl<sup>ff</sup> rejected the submission 8<sup>th</sup> 1881

When the submission is made a rule of court  
an act will lie on the bond? on the award  
and get an acknowledgment from the court. But  
Pl<sup>ff</sup> says I am not one in saying. 10<sup>th</sup> 1881.

When a right is submitted to a stream of water  
& the act on award the right belongs to act. if bonds  
are given that right must be interrupted before  
a suit would lie on the bond. nor an at-  
tachments. There is an act on award in  
making such submission a rule of court  
no action will lie on the award but it goes  
to the court & is pursued like a writ.

But if  
you have not this advantage & fearful that  
the witnesses will die. Pl<sup>ff</sup> will in position  
of death or in personal circumstances compel  
a conveyance of the right of water. Pl<sup>ff</sup> will not  
usually interfere in enforcing awards of personalty  
in specie. unless involved the submission was made  
of them as a court action or performance will be  
in force of a voluntary submission a rule of the court.



Chy will inform an award on the in-kind 24/21 36 ha Ref  
I think

2 Km 24

3 Km 187

2 Km 315

2 Km 14

3 Km 581

2 Km 21

You will remember that an attachment will not be issued unless applied for within a certain time. Lett sometimes interfere when the court will not because this time has elapsed.

An award was made. Having acquiesced in, the defective Lett would not let it be disturbed. 1 Ch. Rep. 46

When an award is illegal the remedy against it is in a court of law. But there are cases in which the only remedy is in Lett only in Eq. As if the defect was downright bribery the award is still good at law. The Eq. practice is preserved in most states. the app. being always to set aside the award for intrinsic defects.

When the submission is by rule of court you no need to go to Lett. a court of law will set it aside. 2 Ed. 376. When there is any undue partiality Lett will set it aside (3 Ven. 515<sup>50</sup> private conference with one party. decided by crops & pile. 2 Ven. 485) The diff. arbitrators wanted to award diff. sums heard not again. as they had power they appointed an umpire. 2 Ven. 481. the umpire's award told before parties however would be given. the umpire decided so which was much more than the



Sept 25

highest arb<sup>r</sup> the case was strange & left out the un-  
favourable side - Another case 3<sup>d</sup> Nov 31<sup>st</sup> 63

2 Reg 316. 2 Reg 216. On paid all the fees before  
the award was made. 2<sup>d</sup> Baradiston 463 the 6<sup>th</sup>  
not it aside from policy. The award was in favour  
of one who was a debtor of the arb<sup>r</sup>. It is likely  
would have been lost if decided against the debtor  
after the cargo was taken by the arb<sup>r</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> Nov  
151. this was not aside for mere policy.

A paper was suppressed which would not of itself  
not arise the award. 1<sup>st</sup> 11th 79/ yet one arb<sup>r</sup>  
swore the award would have been otherwise

Ch<sup>l</sup> will not interfere for defects intrinsic but for you  
to come of law.

When the arb<sup>r</sup> have made a mistake of  
principle on the face of the award it may be rectified  
if it were a mistake in fact then more every  
doubt as a miscalculation. &c. & they will do  
not mistakes of law made upon their own princi-  
ples. Ch<sup>l</sup> does not interfere deciding merely between  
contract to law. but if they have made a mistake in  
error to their own principles. as when the arb<sup>r</sup> deter-  
mined to divide property in certain proportions and then  
took the wrong basis or data to make the division  
this is a mistake upon their own principles & which  
they have adopted 3<sup>d</sup> 11th 47. 2<sup>d</sup> Nov. 157.



Coll. 268

But if ~~the~~ should be awarded for changing another  
with ~~the~~ the court will not correct to the law  
law -

The award is probable in law of action  
for the only cause of action is also arbitrable  
matter. Void is the only exception for  
it may be plead in bar of a suit.

In pleading you must only state the nature of the award  
if you are to do something first state its in your  
idea is when it is a condition precedent. & when the award is void  
you must aver performance of your part.

There are cases in which a stranger to the  
award may present a bar. An action is brought  
for a debt of 43 sh. Avers B. & then left it to a jury.  
which awarded a £100. If he afterwards brings  
to bring a parallel award in bar on the ground that  
a & has had satisfaction & he can have but  
one satisfaction but if he is bound to pay the whole

B purchases cattle for B they break in a & cause B  
pay a & an award is made as simply an award  
if then a & and B. he may plead the satisfaction in  
law. Com Rep. 328.

. & B submit to arbitration  
themselves to submit. Before anything done shows  
B for the same thing. It has been said that B




Rio 255

can place the subscription as a temporary one.  
but now it is a defence, and however has for-  
feited his bond the note is <sup>it is</sup> clearly  
a revocation & has the effect of a revoca-  
tion.

You cannot resort to any other action after an-  
swering the it was that you could formerly





# Action of Debt July 1817

Criz's debt is ~~uncertain~~ as a sum of money due by some ~~express~~ contract. bond note a special law &c. no matter what form it was in whether parcel or written or made oral. if the sum was contained in contracts express. but now it is enough if there has been a contract concerning it & there is a standard by which it may be ascertained. as if you buy 10<sup>00</sup> of cloth at 2<sup>00</sup> p<sup>00</sup> yard. Now it is if you purchase without express agt. as to price. For you can apply to the market price. Ex Big. 1/2. 313 Long. 6 / Dec 29/ 55

Criz's when the contract is in kind & the sum not ascertained by express contract debt would not lie. Now there is no indebtedness without privity of contract. as if money were found. agt. will lie for it. but debt will not. so that ~~debt~~ agt. will lie when debt will not. So <sup>when</sup> money has <sup>been acquired</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>unlawfully</sup> by mistake. ~~debt~~ debt does not lie. but in det agt. will. For debt then must be a contract.



3 BL. 155  
E 43.

2 BL. 1221

Geo. H. 177.  
140. 172  
51/2. 173

This action of debt is never now used upon a bare promise as notes &c. the wagon of law has done its duty. Aft<sup>r</sup> was given to do away this wagon of law in debt - debt is charged with fraud & cheating which was to prevent the wagon which was equivalent to a verdict. Debt is now bro<sup>d</sup> an official for sure there is no wagon of law -

In act<sup>n</sup> of debt the rule always was ~~that~~ that the whole sum must be recovered if anything. it is not so now - but may be recovered if the sum and more. this rule given from this that a parole proof could be admitted from pay<sup>r</sup> or a bond. Long. b. 7 p. 3. note 1 New Pl. 249. 550. But now facts may be proved to alter the amounts to be recovered. See rule. 1 Dyer 219.

Owing to this rule debt on parole contract would not lie ag<sup>t</sup> Ex<sup>r</sup> because he could not wage his law. debt lies for services rendered.

It is not in all cases where a sum certain is to be recovered that debt lies is the proper action thus A promises to pay a debt due from B to C. he is never considered the debtor. A is a collateral promisee. Suppose B tells an act<sup>n</sup> of debt. B attaches to the promise to pay A's debt to him if he will release his hold. debt is not the proper action ag<sup>t</sup> A. he is not the debtor. credit was not given him.



20 Aug. 1842

31st Dec. 1842

It is not clear when a mortgage is to be made 1<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1842  
as it will not be in a contract to do a voluntary act  
as to build a house, but when they have been or are intended  
prop<sup>r</sup> debt will be

If A promises B to pay him a debt due from C. debt is not his because A never was the right debtor credit was given to B. But if B takes good of A at the time says let B have the good will pay you. B having no power to let B have them on his own credit. here C's original debtor credit was given to him & went to B. so that debt his & not A's.

A draws a bill in favour of B upon C. it is indorsed over to D. C. has not & B dishonours it. D may sue either the drawer or any indorser. he cannot however sue A in debt but as there is privity of contract between himself & D. D may sue him in debt. but he can sue no other in debt because he had no privity of contract with him. 1 Chalk 23.

The drawer is said to be liable in debt but to no one but B with whom he holds privity. — There are cases in which debt lies where no privity. as in a personal statute. the lawyers say however that by accepting the benefits of society he is impliedly contracted to obey the laws the truth is however that it is an exception to the general rule requiring contracts to form debt. so that this action can be set not jointly is against joint issues as well as sole debt but it is no other than a debt. the joint issue to right part of debt.



debt on plaintiff will not lie if def<sup>t</sup> is committed on  
to a vessel he is in jail. Imprisonment is a sat-  
isfaction only for the time that def<sup>t</sup> is in jail.  
It has been said that if Plff lets him go voluntarily  
the debt is discharged. (By Lee Mire. this is not  
so) If you take a man into house it is good. but the debt  
is gone if no security is taken. The rule was that a  
Plff should not be supposed to cover after a voluntary  
escape. it was a punishment on the Plff. afterwards it  
became transferred to Plff wrongfully. every voluntary  
escape is said to be a discharge. therefore if Plff  
lets him go it is a voluntary escape of course a dis-  
charge. A release without satisfaction is good for nothing  
except if you discharge one joint debtor from prison  
the other is discharged. say the lawyers. there is no satis-  
faction except in money. the authorities are that a re-  
lease is a discharge of the debt. & a discharge of one  
is a release of both. 1 L.R. 557 6 2 L.R. 525. 7 L.R. 420  
8 L.R. 120 3 M.R. 12 5 T.R. 2482. If prisoner  
dis in jail a man away the debt remains right to  
or himself.





Long 1  
2d 4th. B. 410

Further says A. Sum. I think it should be treated as a domestic  
judg<sup>t</sup> in consideration of the nature & object of our personal  
union & compact from the respect due to each other courts  
without reference to the constitution which I think to be  
decision on this point. -

I doubt the policy of the rule which considers a foreign judg<sup>t</sup>  
only as a prima facie evidence of a debt. because  
it would be more correctly decided when the judg<sup>t</sup>  
was rendered

as it you may prove it ought not to have been  
rendered. Now ought a judgment rendered in N York  
to be considered in bond as a foreign judgment  
or as a judgment rendered in bond. I should think  
the constitution settles the question that it is the  
same as a domestic judgment. In 5 States out of 8 it  
has been so determined in Conn for one of the five  
I speak of proceeding in quite as to any C.L. judgment. The  
question ought to be settled by the U.S. courts.

So if the  
majority decision is correct when debt is broken in  
that manner you cannot inquire into the origi-  
nal cause of action.

A foreign judgment is prima facie  
evidence of debt and that act on it must be  
case. I had 1090 but not so now. You need not  
show the orig. consideration. — as foreign judgment you may  
bring. Indeb. Ass<sup>n</sup> is concerned with debt. 2 H.  
Bl. 410. Long. 45.

There are one set of cases where  
a judgment may be attacked without with of fraud  
or error bias. It goes upon the ground of fraud  
for fraud blows out all contracts. So if one comes  
with a false token from your friend, you deliver  
money to him. It is as much theft as if he took  
it out of your drawer, notwithstanding the delivery  
in the case of the silk stockings. Goes back with the



"In the first case as to build a house or pay for a sum  
greater than the cost of the house cost broken lies as asset  
or debt. but in the other case where the price of the  
damages agreed on is the price of reconstruction. cost  
broken does not lie. but debt does. -

2 d<sup>rs</sup> bills of exchange. Clear pounds. To pound  
each blot out town. can of cooper from  
jails. or pigged escape to prevent diff from  
having money with jailor for this support.

where profit is obtained by fraud it may be ext.  
as is directly when debt is based upon it. The profit  
is more it is no profit Geo B 514. 2 11/16/27  
3. 11/4. 341. 11/16/27. 11/16/27. 11/16/27. 11/16/27.

For money due  
by bond or single bill debt is the only action  
§ 43a, 13. Suppose the bond conditioned for  
the performance of a collateral act. if you sue  
on final part it is debt. But if you plead  
you may that it is an agt. to do the collateral act  
to bring a bill in Ch. for specific performance.  
The test if the bond was to convey land, main-  
tain ship, &c. &c.

So when a sum is due on acc<sup>t</sup>  
bring a sum certain you may bring debt or co<sup>o</sup> book  
·y W. 2p 124. If a privately is annexed to the per-  
formance of acc<sup>t</sup> you may sue in debt for the pri-  
vately, or in co<sup>o</sup> book for damages —


the papist is to compel or enforce performance & others  
in which it is merely offered & shown up between the  
parties leaving it optional with the obligor to perform  
or forfitte 2<sup>d</sup> 3<sup>d</sup> 4<sup>th</sup>.



2 Mac. 12

Let the agent or officer for money collected in Sep<sup>r</sup>  
Nov. Rep. 20th. 2 (See Vol 553. this seems to be provided as  
the in place contract to pay over the money





## Action of Detinue.

Detinue has now gone out of use since trover lies where 3d. would & in many cases where it would not.


It is the only action at law in which you get specific relief, thus having the effect of a bill in

Eq. Thus it is from where one gets possession of some thing which money will not buy as family pictures. Trover would only give damages but the property in him. & damages are ascertained by the market value of the article. 3 Bl. 152 & no 22. 3 Bl.

When judgment rendered it is that the property be delivered up, or a certain sum be paid which is a penalty.

It lies for any personal thing that can be identified.

It is no remedy where 3d. took the property tortiously the principle on which this was founded, & now away for it was once said that a tortious poss<sup>n</sup> gives title to the owner. of the property it is not so now. 3 Rees Hist. 67. 2 Bac. 11.





## Action of Account

When the accounts of Ch<sup>l</sup> this action is out of use  
except in cases in which this action is brought

This action is  
always founded upon some contract express or im-  
plied. at 6 L it lay against some except Guard  
in Loays & Bailiff & Prisoner. There used to  
be a diff. between Bailiff & Rec<sup>r</sup>. but now treated  
as synonymous — This act has been extended  
to tenants in common. Partners in trade  
by statute. See E. & T. art. an answer in  
this m<sup>r</sup> 1 Bac. 16. 1 Inst. 172. 89. 1 Com Dig. 85 85  
orig<sup>l</sup> not so for there was no privity with them  
These extensions were in E. & T. 1<sup>st</sup> & 3<sup>d</sup> except as to ten-  
ants & tenants in common which were passed in the  
time of a Henry.

Every man is supposed to be a partner  
in other. the Def<sup>t</sup> declares that he delivered property  
to Def<sup>t</sup> for which he has not accounted. & for him to recover  
this was an able act & to recover damages both.  
If Def<sup>t</sup> is known to be the recipient of goods by defendant  
damages are not awarded but profit is good computation.

The sunsets warm every thing even the faintest throes  
below.



If Def<sup>t</sup> pleads never B & R<sup>t</sup> is the gen<sup>l</sup> issue. The jury find that he was bailiff & R<sup>t</sup> the judge is good computat. auditors are appointed who report & their report operates like a verdict. & judge is understood on it.

After judge<sup>n</sup> of good computat. Def<sup>t</sup> cannot plead that he was never B & R<sup>t</sup> before the aud<sup>rs</sup> but he may show that there is nothing in arrears. the true fully accounted is technical. All evidence that he has fully accounted, or never B & R<sup>t</sup> must be shown in the first instance as a release &c. And was thing that goes to show that he is able to acc<sup>t</sup> goes to the auditors.

Before court by jury Def<sup>t</sup> may plead anything that goes to show that he is not bound to acc<sup>t</sup> as release and account of arb<sup>rs</sup> never Bailiff or R<sup>t</sup> that this business has been settled, i.e. that he has fully accounted. but it is not agreed plea before court by jury that there is nothing in arrears. a plea of fully accounted is diff<sup>t</sup> from nothing in arrears. And to make a good plea in bar it must appear that there is no room for settlement. every thing else is to be pleaded before the auditors. whatever can be pleaded in bar must be pleaded first before the auditors. 1 Roll. 128. 1 Co. 82. 1 Com. Dig. 71. 74. Cro Eliz. 830 300. 115. 1 Bac. 20. 6 Co. 7.

Before the auditors anything that shows that Def<sup>t</sup> ought not to be liable is good accounting



But in Chl. it is all settled in one action.

1 Com. 28

1 Roll 120

From or detinue lying? the bailor, and the party against  
the disseisor for in this case it is in the nature of an  
action of account for the rents & profits. 1 Com 278.9


as that property was destroyed by inevitable accident or  
by fire shipwreck &c. 1 Roll 124. 1 Com Dig. 93. Co Lit. 89.  
Stra 680.

Any reasonable disposition of the property is good  
accounting provided his commission did not fail & it was  
the goods were missing. In accounting Deft is allowed all  
losses by inevitable accident or robbery. 2 Mod 100

If Deft is found  
in default judgment goes for Plff to the amount.

These rules  
apply to proceedings in Ch. But in the case that follows  
the principle is diff. in law & Eq. It is said that if \$100 is delivered  
to trade with you are not to bring suit for it - but recover  
it by two actions in debt for sum certain \$100. & acct. for  
the profits (c) Suppose C sends money to B by A. the question  
was whether B could bring the action. strictly the contract  
was with C & A. But I think I blifon demonstrates  
that B could maintain the action for A makes an un-  
revocable contract with the money that he never saw him

If one receives goods as bailor merely he will not be  
bound - he does not receive them to improve. neither  
does it lie after tortious taking. nor for the words "I am  
your depositor" receipt included in the case of receivers who  
may treat as depositors or as guardians & call him to account  
the reason in these cases is that there is no contract  
which is the foundation of the action of account.





## Of Injuries affecting the character.


To do injury to a man's person his character or reputation, is his highest property.

1<sup>st</sup> As to injuries to reputation this is accomplished by 3 distinct injuries for which 3 distinct actions are given. 1<sup>st</sup> Slander, the act of defamation. 2<sup>d</sup> Libel only differing from being written. 3<sup>d</sup> Malice is proved in order to compensate an innocent man.

Now as a contract you must recall. in point to set a contract you may sue all or none. In tort you may sue all or one or any number at once another difference is that in tort if you sue & recover judgment of 3 wrong doers you cannot sue the third the first judgment is a bar. now in contracts you may sue all till you get your money.

Slander is of two kinds. one is called actionable in itself is if you may recover it if you prove the charge whether you prove damage or not. the other is founded on the offensive tendency or rather words actionable by reason of special damages in which you must state actual damage & prove it.

all words that are true would subject the man to punishment as actionable in themselves as charges are with stealing but not with charging one with lying.





I should think it good policy to make causing with the lie actionable.

2<sup>d</sup> When a man is charged with that which goes directly to discharge a man of all his business, as a lawyer with being a knave, but to call a physician a knave will not be actionable for altho it goes perhaps to impair his reputation it does not go directly to destroy his means of living. tho to charge him with being a quack would.


3<sup>d</sup> Another set of cases is charging an officer in official capacity with corruption or any thing that goes to impair him in the view of the public it is actionable in itself whether relating to his integrity or abilities.

4<sup>th</sup> Last is charging a man with a disease which would banish him from society as leprosy.

As to words not actionable in themselves but become so by reason of special damage. they are all words which eventuate in damage to P<sup>l</sup>ff and this damage must be laid in the decl<sup>n</sup> no matter how scandalous the charge is if not actionable in itself nor productive of special damage.

In Eng to charge of prostitution is not actionable except in the city of London where prostitution is punishable.





In some cases when the punishment is merely a fine the words are actionable & some not. in all cases of corporal punishment the words are actionable. -

The distinction appears to be this. If the charge is with an act that affects his reputation ~~the~~ it is punishable only with fine. is actionable. As to charge one in court with stealing property of his value ~~than \$100~~ ~~Board in Eng.~~ charge of keeping a brothel is actionable the punishment only by fine. but to charge one with having carried a pistol in anything but warlike is not actionable.

The charge must be both False & Malicious. truth is complete justification. - But if not true circumstances may be such as to prevent the Plaintiff from recovering. as to this we must explain the word malicious. this is better expressed by the Latin term malitia according to the legal signification. - it means wicked motive that need not be enmity. want of benevolence is enough. If the charge is false, the malice is presumed and incensed is considered as proved if the words are proved. the onus lies on Plaintiff to prove the truth of the charge, or that he spoke them without malice. Speaking the words is prima facie evidence of malice. -

As Diff's character is in issue it has been questioned whether he  
could prove his character perfectly fair. I decided that  
he could & it goes to enhance damages



Words actionable in themselves may be so coupled with other words as not to amount to an actionable charge, as that it is a thief for he intended upon my land to cut down my trees. this is a mere trespass. - A lady said of a lover with chft. for she had stolen his heart.

It is said often that <sup>certain</sup> words spoken in heat of passion are not actionable, passion is no justification, true that great provocation may mitigate damages. but never justifies the offender. the law regards the feelings of men, but not their vices. anger without cause should enhance damages. the maxim there is without foundation. -

In any action of slander the Defs character is put in issue. the Plff puts it in issue & exposes it to examination, if one charges it with being a thief for he has stolen his horse. if he proves the theft of the horse the charge is justified & Deft has proof. if he proves Pl's gentl. character to be that of a thief. Plff has verdict but mere nominal damages.

Altho the words are false if Deft knows want of malice the Plff cannot recover, as that the words were spoken in such a manner & under such circumstances as to preclude all suspicion of malice. As when one comes to a former master to know the character of a dismissed servant Bull. c. 1. p. 8.

So when one sees his neighbour about to trust a servant

460 14  
Geo. Eli. 830

47 Bac. 5.0



be known to be in failing circumstances, or supposed to be so, told his neighbor what he thought to be correct to prevent his loss. Agt. when a charge is made in a course of legal proceedings, & it turns out to be false, may malicious, no act of abandom will lie. Policy here prevails. the remedy is an act for malicious prosecution, where probability will occur.

Agt. witnesses are not to be subjected in this action even tho' the indictment was prejudicial. He may be subjected for perjury & here if they spoke what they supposed to be true they can be subjected in no action. otherwise no evidence could be had. perhaps the charge could be proved by well sworn witnesses.

It has been questioned whether the reporter of a story which he read from another & believed to be true, could be subjected in this action. the decision is that he can, but perhaps he would come forward & give his author & the author is a man of property so that he could have his remedy agt. him. said once a formerly decided that he should be excused, but it is not so now.

Counsel in his argument may attempt to support his client & charge the diff. with the offense which he is to justify. the law allows him to do it. But the court must not take this opportunity to maltrait the party & charge with other crimes.



Pitt mentioned the great expense of his family. He said  
he could not afford such expenses, for he did not know  
how to counteract. Held to be actionable. —

Falk 697.

"Have you heard I. S. state T. A. horse? observe I do not say  
"he did. the last said is correct unmodified."

2 Lw. 150

1 Lw. 276

Whatever language is used if it conveys the idea it is actionable. Palm. 68. "as you deserve to be hanged" "for what" "any man deserves to be hanged that steals" Jones here you may sue for charging with theft. Cro. Jac. 247. 2 Wils. 300.

The charge may be made by way of question. 12 Co. 134. So by way of conjecture. "as" "even I to guess. I should guess it takes state stills here". West 157. So by way of report. as that "he heard a bird sing that our state stole the money". 1 Roll. 64. 1 Lev. 277.

So by way of an allusion as "I know what I am & I know what Knave is, and I know state shop."

Charge of trespass framed as that A. is a thievish fellow not actionable though no fact being charged. But a charge of a thieving vaguer is actionable. 1 Sid. 37. Palm. 64. 1 Roll. 47. 51.

The charge may appear vaguer as that one of your brothers "stole" if from circumstances it could be shown which is meant you may set out your charge.

Character is not bro't into the question where the charge is of a punishable crime. Cro. Eliz. 638. as treason...

The word murder is used in a slight sense there, from its legal signification. as when one charged a man with having murdered his wife when she was by a lion.

1 Rol. 65

Shā. 142  
Cro. Jan 114



There is a decision that if one charges another with murder and it proves that no one was killed, the words are not actionable. because it is said the P<sup>l</sup>ff could not be subjected to the punishment. I believe the decision to be in error. For persons are sometimes punished <sup>who</sup> are not guilty.

Unlawful, perjury, to be guilty of that one must have taken a false oath in a court of justice. & it must be proved to support the charge. it is not supported by proving neglect of duty in an officer who has taken an oath of office. swearing false before a J<sup>st</sup> has lately been determined perjury. the oath must have been taken by a person proper to take it. not by a J<sup>st</sup> as such namely. formerly tho<sup>t</sup> not. because it was supposed & that the false swearing must have been in a court of record. but perjury might always be committed before a J<sup>st</sup> of E<sup>g</sup> & the late decisions are doubtless correct. 4 Co. 15. 3 Hen. 166. 1 Roll 39. 69. 70. Bro. bar 268. Bro. Jac. 158.

As to forgery there is nothing particular to be said. it must appear from the whole case that it was intended to charge with the crime. forgery is in legal signification to do a thing for prevention of justice. Oblige attend the bond from L to S. it was not forgery (but from a maxim of policy no recovery could be had upon the bond.) so that the charge of having <sup>done</sup> this when he did it for the furtherance of justice & E<sup>g</sup>. - If there is no qualification after charge of forgery the party is supposed to use it to his advantage.

Co Is 39.674  
Act. 331. 2<sup>d</sup> div. 51

1 Vint. 213

2<sup>d</sup> Reg. 959

as one was charged with being a pick pocket by one  
to whom he often came for money. -

4 Co. 17.  
1 Rolt 39. 51. 65. 71  
1 Lev. 156.  
6 Co. Dec. 622.  
Stra 142.  
6 Co. 869. 268.

(d) now I confess I do not see the reason of this distinction  
words which are not actionable for the purpose of showing  
the quo animo with which the other were spoken. It is  
said that *prof.* is to be avoided in the first case because the Ct. cannot  
discern upon which charge the damages were applied, or whether  
upon both. Now can it be discovered in one case better than  
in the other?




There can be no doubt of that which cannot be stolen, as  
to steal ~~treasure~~. — If charge of theft is ~~guilt~~ & connected  
as it comes out in evidence, with such acts as were not  
criminal, & show it to have been the party's intention to  
charge with a crime the words are not actionable.

Formerly it was actionable to charge one with witchcraft  
We have many ~~acts~~ founded on such charges. but as  
the law is repealed which made witchcraft penal. such a charge  
is now not actionable.

To charge a man with a crime after he  
has been pardoned for it was formerly actionable. the ground  
being that he was no more honest. But now it is understood  
that the person is not pardoned for not being guilty. & it is  
not actionable (scilicet) thus to charge one. Hob. 81. Stra. 304.  
the charge may be justified by the record.

Suppose the ~~Def<sup>t</sup>~~ includes words actionable & those which are  
not. as "liar & thief" & verdict is found for Plff in  
\$100. the ~~def<sup>t</sup>~~ having plead the ~~guilt~~ issue. he should have de-  
murred to 1<sup>st</sup> & ~~guilt~~ issue as to the ~~1<sup>st</sup>~~, on this verdict  
of \$100 it is ~~sd.~~ ~~judgment~~ cannot be rendered. & this even if  
no evidence were adduced as to the charge of lying. for the court  
are not to know upon what the verdict was founded. here  
the words are ~~in~~ in two counts. i. e. the words actionable & ~~not~~ ac-  
tionable. But if one count contains words that are not  
actionable as well as some that are. ~~judgment~~ is not to be  
arrested when the verdict is ~~guilt~~ because it is said (that  
the court will see that the jury know the law. — ~~pl~~)





Words actionable in themselves may be proved on the trial  
tho not laid in Debt. This seems to be a hard rule, but  
I do not know but it must remain a rule. The ground  
is to show with what temper of mind the words laid in the  
Debt were spoken. no damages however are to be re-  
covered for the words not laid. it is said. I am opposed  
to it because it influences the minds of the jury & thus  
is the man punished twice for one act.

As to the slander of an officer, it is to be remembered that  
the words must have been spoken of him in his official  
capacity. merely depriving the man in the eye of the world  
is not enough. but a charge upon his ability or integ-  
rity <sup>and honor</sup> is actionable. 1 Rob. 57. 1 Ld. 280. Cro. Car. 223.  
Cro. Jac. 240. 8 Mod. 270. La Ray. 1369. 1 Salk 695.

To charge a  
man with principles inconsistent with his office or inability  
to perform it in a colloquium concerning his office is ac-  
tionable & it is not material whether it be an office  
of honour trust or profit. this is the language of La  
Hancher. You observe it must be spoken of the officer  
in his official capacity. & must be so laid in the Debt.

A charge of corruption or want of integrity are not action-  
able words spoken & applied to one in his official capacity.  
It has been said that to say of a man in an office of profit  
that he wanted ability is actionable but if the officer

1 Dec 327  
3 May 59  
1 Dec 277

6 Oct. 253.

6 Oct. Dec. 144  
430. 1 Roll  
243.



were of honour merely such a charge would not be action-  
able. but I see no room for the distinction & it is  
contrary to Lord Hardwicke's opinion. the only true dis-  
tinction is as to the relation the words have to the char-  
acter whether individual or official

Words spoken of one in his profession which tend to de-  
stroy his means of living. are actionable. as of a lawyer  
that he will overthrow his clients cause. Cant read  
a declaration of a physician that he is a quack. Cro. Eliz  
589 Cro. Jac. 222. 1 Lev. 115. Cro. 64585. 1 Roll. 54. 62. 2 Ld. Ray. 1417

So to charge a clergyman with "being a liar." preaching  
heresy. is actionable. 3 Lev. 17. So of breaking some sal-  
utary regulations of society of which the punishment  
was by fine. As to the question whether the clergyman  
preached orthodoxy. We are to find out whether he preached  
what that denomination considered as orthodox.

Charging one with an infectious disease is actionable. the  
charge must be in the present tense. on the ground of  
recovery is that it causes persons to avoid Plff. & perhaps  
include the intention even to give the idea that the  
party is still affected with it.

There can be but one Plff. in this action. the words  
of one man are not the words of another.

a man is presumed to have fair character until contrary appears, so  
that this allegation may not be necessary except  
from long usage. —

Yelv. 159

4 Bar 514



When the words are actionable only because of special damage. the damage must be laid in the declaration or you cannot prove it.

Words actionable in themselves may be proved the not laid in the declaration they go to show the quo animo. but no damages can be recovered for them. and it is said they may be proved true. but I doubt it as it would not remove the presumption of malice.

Declaration. It is usual to state that Plff is a man of fair character especially in that respect in which he has been slandered. & this may be necessary from long usage. If words were spoken of me in his office the statement must contain his office & at kind: & that they were spoken in a colloquium concerning his office. See. 6th. 282.

It is usual to state that these words were false & maliciously spoken. it has been determined that if the word malicious is left out, the declaration is good after verdict. & the ground of the judge goes to show that the declaration would be good in itself it being that falsity implied malice. — Malice is the gist of the action. and if that is implied it is sufficient. 1 term Reg. 195. It can be implied no more after verdict than before. Judge in New York said this adjudication was questionable. 1 Keb. 273. Bull at P. 8. Dears Esq. 516 & says further that if in a declaration implied by law after stating the facts on which the promise arises it is indispensable to raise the promise in the declaration the words then used are technical. — Now I think this is general.



As dar 499  
2. Lohm, 118

9. 10. 1866  
2 Mil. 114  
bro. Bow. 443  
bro. Ed. 416  
1 Roll. 84

tionable. in his Mre. you are not obliged to raise it & there are then decided cases of it. the statement does not mean that he promised but that he is liable on the premises stated in Dec<sup>r</sup> La Ray.

The words are usually stated to have been spoken in the presence or hearing of some particular person or several persons. & there may be some danger in not inserting both. for all the cases sustaining a verdict in which one only was inserted were after verdicts.

Must be avoided to have been spoken about the Plff by way of innuendo unless the conversation was directly with Plff.

When the words are not actionable in themselves, the special damage must be stated & so particularly that Def<sup>t</sup> can meet the proof. so that "whereby Plff lost his marriage" is not suff<sup>t</sup>, it should have been stated with whom decided by Judge Hunt.

The innuendo does not enlarge the def<sup>t</sup> it merely ascertains the charge. If the words spoken apply to, person by way of description you must state your relation, as landlord. but there if merely add<sup>d</sup> as Def<sup>t</sup> it will not be avoided that Def<sup>t</sup> was captain if it was indeed in a colloquium concerning his office. If the charge was "Every sheep stolen in Litchfield for a week. Def<sup>t</sup> stole" but you must add that there were sheep stolen, this is correct but if the charge were the greatest thief in Eng it would be hard to require one to state the rule does not require it.

(2) The truth of words must always be pleaded, if true it is dam-  
num absque injuria. Under the gen. issue the truth will not  
be held to be proved in evidence. - 2 Stra 1200. Espley 518.  
But if Diff after proving the words laid goes into evidence of other  
words to show the gen. issue. Def. is allowed to show the  
truth of those words. Bull. N.P.



you may defend yourself by proving the charge true. You must by 64. plead this specially & speed upon the record. & the truth cannot be given in evidence under the gen. issue (see)

It is allowed in some states by stat. to plead justification in evidence under the gen. issue. but there is an inconsistency in this practice. & our court has made a rule that the Def<sup>t</sup> to do this shall give some days notice & after that you cannot deny the words.

Def<sup>t</sup> pleads,

justification thus admitting the words. shall these words before to have been spoken it is admitted. Plff wants to do it to show malice. & again Def<sup>t</sup> wants to show the palliating circumstances. this is a great question. In Eng the prevailing opinion is that there is no occasion at all to prove them. in some states the decision is otherwise. Deyo 2 of 518 41 Cal. 16. 560 125. Ala. 1200. Doug 323 In N York Foster & Tracy 1 John 46. the court were divided. 2 My own opinion is that it ought to be proved. not to show that the words were spoken. but to show the circumstances of the case. B. & P. G. yelv. 159. 1 Sw. 250. 280. 6 Co Elg. 486. 6 Co Jac. 39. Cro bar. 190.

It is laid down in the books that if the charge was of having committed the person should be allowed to be denied on the ground of the principle that slander will not lie unless the person is dead. it might be otherwise if it were so.

Slander is no offence

C. L. tho it is by stat. in 64. & this is a ground of giving vindictive damages. that argument as used in other cases is a false argument

Co. 66. 239

Handy to by pediment sign

2 Miles 202.0  
5 mod. 166  
Clap. 418  
560 125



In *expt. Bat.* it is said you must give great vindictive  
damages to prevent repetition. true great damages might  
be given but no more than is suff<sup>t</sup> to pay the dam-  
ages done to P<sup>ff</sup>. for the public has taken care of itself  
in punishment. By fine &c. the public prosecutor is bound  
to bring his action *expt. the Def<sup>t</sup>* for breach of peace. & the  
fine should not be thrown into the pocket of the P<sup>ff</sup>.  
This you observe is not the case with the slave driver.  
1 Roll. 82. Wils Sta. 666.

The gen<sup>l</sup>. allegation that by  
that P<sup>ff</sup> has lost his friend is immaterial & amounts to nothing  
but if he has lost any thing by loss of particular friend it doubtless  
may do good. — he may be proved.

Justification admits the malice. but it may  
be proved that the words were true to mitigate damages or P<sup>ff</sup> may offset his char.  
If the charge is a theft you may prove any theft. but if it  
were of a particular one theft you can prove no other than  
the one spoken & charged.

## Libel

Libel is a civil offence & public wrong. any thing  
which tends to blot out a character, or offset a man's repu-  
tation if reduced to writing would be libellous. as a lion  
or a scoundrel &c. So that a libel includes all standards which  
is reduced to writing and binds that all other words that tend  
to make a man ridiculous in the eyes of the world. So that then



W. Sta. 898

L. Hawk 194

W. Sta. 898

is no inquiry as to whether the words were uttered in their  
alleged. — Another difficulty is that but one can be  
sued at once for slander the many suits may be had  
yet in libel many may be joined all that can be  
proved to have had a hand in printing or publishing the  
libel.

The principle of not allowing proof of the charge  
in case of a libel <sup>does not</sup> apply to prosecution for the civil injury  
& damage to the individual only. i.e. Defm<sup>y</sup> in this case  
prove the truth. But where the public prosecutes for  
the crime of publishing the libel, the truth cannot be proved  
because the whole ground of public prosecution is entirely  
distinct from that upon which an individual pro-  
secutes. the individual prosecutes for damages for the injury  
the public for disturbance of public peace. & the public is much  
more easily misled & more endangered by truth than falsehood  
so that the principle is perfectly correct according to my  
opinion. —

As to libels upon the government. I can easily  
see that the measures of government may be discredited & the  
disruption may be conducted in a libellous manner & then  
the truth could not be proved.

For libel an action is against one  
or more as against one. as for slander an action against two cannot.  
2 Johns. 74 Tillot v. Chutcheon.

A libel must be published to vitiate  
it for government. Haid up is not a libel. what is a publication?

1. Lchns. 280



This is a question of some difficulty. by the books "giving currency" is publishing. if one reads a slander to any body he meets for the purpose of disseminating it is publishing. but merely reading it to one's family is not. there must be an abuse. A parent however is liable tho he knows nothing of its true character.

Question of witness. could a former libel by Piff be given in evidence to show provocation. the Ct. admitted such witness on the ground that one libel was an answer to the other. Now the principle is that immediate provocation may be given in evidence in some cases of torts or assaults & battery. but not a provocation that took place long before the act sued for. for the law is tender of the feelings but not of the wild passions of man.

Grading a road

Letter is clearly indictable. If it contains personal abuse to one's family. but could one sue for damages? is it published? 1 Cases. 583. Decided then in favor. that an action for damages would not lie. for want of proof.

B. & V. 1st anal. pros.

Nov. 206  
Gen. 2<sup>d</sup> 132  
1<sup>st</sup> Gen. 228  
1<sup>st</sup> Vent. 12  
2<sup>d</sup> Gen. 14

Malicious prosecution & Vexatious law suits.

In libel reputation is damaged. in malicious prosecution affects also his property & the law also reputation is the great thing. in Vexatious law suits expense alone is complained of but trouble not reputation.

In vexatious law suits. the suit must have been ~~bad~~ <sup>bad</sup> ~~sciss~~ <sup>sciss</sup>. there was no right of recovery. & the suit must have been ~~bad~~ <sup>bad</sup> to vex. or for wrong. & when this disposition is discovered in the proceedings an action lies. It does not follow that all Diffs that fail are liable. It is enough (as decided) that Diffs who had no right to recover without the design to vex.

There are three classes of cases of vexatious suits. 1<sup>st</sup> If Diff was sued before a court without jurisdiction he can recover all expense & damages for trouble. In all cases there must have been an end to the vexatious suit.

It was formerly that that no suit could be ~~bad~~ <sup>bad</sup> after retraxit or judgment & decree to bad but because the court knew not but the man was liable. the rule now is that the suit must be at an end. no need of acquittal.

2 When an action is ~~bad~~ <sup>known to</sup> to recover a money to which party is not entitled is clearly actionable. I think that if the suit were to establish reputation the Diff is not liable. But decided in law that a girl who brought an action of defamation of her chastity & withdrew it when she saw proof coming to justify what had been said. was liable to an action for malicious. I was arg. last. decided 3 to 2.



Not. 266

1 Jan. 114

3 Clap of ears is when one has a right of recovery but conducts it in a vexatious manner, or suing for a great sum when but a small one is due. which prevents the suit from getting heard or in getting a verdict or bond after all achieved in vain. So the conducting a suit in any way that shows malice & determination to wrong, as where a man sues a wealthy man in the streets of New York which would trouble by alarming his creditors although suitor for no more than the sum due. the money could have been obtained at any time. In such in. Court heavy damages should have been given. Now matter now whether the suit ended in abate or non suit or retrial or any way. And the damages are to the amount of cost & damages as all per se. the court will not be particular as to the amount. In common, we give triple damages & fine the rascal besides.

In acts for malicious prosecution the jury give more liberal damages than in any other for it endangers a man's dearest interests. - Any one who promotes the prosecution by relating stories such as to induce the public prosecutor to take it up, or any one who maliciously pursues private action. - The essence of offence is calculated in the damages but the chief thing is reputation, no action of slander lies for ~~perjury~~ was at law. - It must have been both

malicious & probable cause of prosecution. & this probability covers the malice. So there must be probable cause & malice

1 July 1818

But A.P. 16.

x<sup>o</sup> If it regards a felony. & there could be no probable cause without more  
malicious pro<sup>o</sup> with. but neither of these positions are in  
fact true. Case of a horse lost. & a man found riding  
him who fled immediately to the wood. &c. Both case  
of the lawyer & sea Capt<sup>m</sup> who find him in singular  
kind of coin. & charge of theft upon a serv<sup>t</sup> for stealing  
it &c. -



Probable cause. is a conglomeration of circumstances, such as would induce a candid man unimpressed by passion, & intent on public good, to believe that conviction was probable.

It is laid down in the books that there must have been a felony committed. the reason of the rule is not apparent. and I do not consider it as well settled and I do not consider it a good one.


Now if there were no felony committed would it not follow that there was no probable cause.

To be entitled to recovery for malice, proof of malice must be joined i.e. wicked motive. & want of proper cause. they are both indispensable. Acting unreasonably is malice.

Suppose a man brought before grand jury & acquitted but appears that there was no probable cause the answer is, an effort to show want of malice. but if one is bound over by justice of peace or a bill by the grand jury it then devolves upon Defendant to show malice. that defendant improperly & without probable cause. The burden is & finding the law prima facie rebuts the presumption of malice.

The only ground that Plaintiff has for complaint, is malice in this case. — Defendant in this action must establish the malice & the want of probable cause. this is indispensable. Want of probable cause implies malice. tho' this presumption may be rebutted.

All these actions mentioned for slander libel. malicious prosecution & various lawsuits, are actions on the cause



Trespas or Tarmis

## Assault & Battery

An assault is an attempt with force or violence to do a corporal hurt. it is an attempt to do a thing which when done would be a battery.

The party is put in fear & his feelings are insulted & there are grounds of damages feelings are regarded. Notice taken of the time & place.


I see no reason why a man should not have care for fear & anxiety by words. But an assault cannot be committed by mere words.

The assault must be made within reach. Shaking fist at one 40 rods off & bounding that you will knock his teeth down his throat is not an assault. A threatening posture he may not be assault in consequence of the words spoken. as drawing sword & saying were the event not in reprimand. the act was not an assault.

I should differ from J. Blackstone so far as this as to call that an assault which actually frightens the Diff. that it depends upon the relative situation of the parties & perhaps their peculiar situation.

In all these actions of assault & battery all abettors & encouragers are principals. there can be no accessory, no matter how little was done if any thing. any or all may be sent at once.





an assault is an actual infliction of violence upon the person of another. - corporal hurt is not indispensable for spitting upon one intentionally is an assault. pulling a chain away from under one is an assault. crowding one into the corner. -


A man is injured by another who is doing an unlawful act, he would not for the world have injured the D<sup>f</sup> still the action lies. because he is in pursuit of an unlawful act. - And if his in pursuit of lawful business with ordinary care or such as is ordinary near me. no action lies. but if this case were not made. if he were careless. the action would lie.

Thus a soldier had scoured that up his gun soon after found it in the same place, & took it up to snap it. it had been loaded by some one else with small shot & went off & injured some one slightly. he was held not liable. -

There is

about unlawful business no matter how much care he takes: but in lawful business care may excuse

In trespass the injury must be immediate. in case the injury is consequential. See the case in Bl. Rep. When one struck B's arm & he was thrown by it. it was held that the striker was liable in trespass & the injury immediate. - After a rather touches in fencing or shooting are not actionable unless there is foul play. because the recreation is lawful.





Intention of the actor is not regarded. the business about which  
one is engaged & the manner of doing it determine whether one  
is liable. - Bull. N. P. 16.

Two persons go out with agreement  
to box both are hurt. Who brings the action. the court D.  
the ag<sup>t</sup> was void & of course the Def<sup>t</sup> liable. I should say  
this very reason ought to prevent a recovery. we do so in all  
contracts. If two or more are engaged in breaking the  
salutary regulations of society let them take the consequence  
of it. policy requires this rule. the rule is established in Eng  
lands to encourage such combats. And of this opinion  
are many of the great lawyers in Eng. 2 Lev. 174. Bull. P. 16  
As to justification for ap<sup>t</sup> & bat. see "False imprisonment"

## False Imprisonment.

Every Battery includes an ap<sup>t</sup> & every false imprisonment  
includes both. This action is often brought. Restraining the  
power of locomotion is imprisonment. if done without  
authority it is false imprisonment. So it is, if done  
under authority, and unlawfully exercised. Every restraint  
is false imprisonment. -

This action lies ag<sup>t</sup> any person  
who undertakes to exercise unlawful authority. If a  
judge act erroneously they are not liable. 'I have not speaking  
of judges of your jurisdiction acting maliciously, acting judi-  
cially & in your jurisdiction. But if they act beyond their jurisdic-  
tion or committing to prison without authority. or committing by panel

But if the Est<sup>ts</sup> were ~~opened~~ without authority the justice & Diffance  
lost to liability.

17<sup>th</sup> May 1829.

W. H. 1134



where the state requires a written warrant. This action is  
most usually brought by the sheriff. A sheriff is not liable for illegal  
arrest.

There are cases where the arrest is illegal & officer liable & others  
where the arrest is illegal officer not liable. The question is  
whether it appears upon the face of the warrant that the  
officer had no authority to execute or the court to inform  
it. The officer is liable. Now the officer is bound to know  
the laws of the land. Suppose the sheriff is on the ground  
to commit a man to the state for burglary. now this court  
has not cognizance of this crime. if the sheriff commits  
the man to prison i.e. at the state. this is merely a  
breach of the peace. Suppose it does not appear upon the  
face of the process as one for \$30. it might be that  
the justice who issued the writ had no authority of the  
subject matter, but this the sheriff is not to neglect & he  
is not liable for executing it. 10 Cal. 10. is a wrong deci-  
sion. it was an arrest without the 12 miles of jurisdiction of the  
marshfield court. & decided to be illegal. the issue of author-  
ity did not appear upon the face of the warrant. & the case in  
L<sup>d</sup> Ray decided directly against it. said the cases cited to support  
the case in L<sup>d</sup> Ray did not support it. If the officer cannot sell anything  
illegal on the face of the process he is bound to execute  
it.

A bill of attainder against B before the state. to be removed from  
B had obtained a protection to come before the legislature  
to attend upon his petition before the great assembly of the



1 mod. 95  
1 del. 98<sup>5</sup>  
Sta. 702  
96.54  
20.54 227  
Ber. 280

he was going up under the protection of a writ of habeas corpus, the  
Affiant had him up by habeas corpus & then released him  
& lost his action against the Sheriff for releasing him. - It was  
said that the Sheriff had no power to grant an insolvent  
debtor's discharge <sup>under these circumstances</sup> & determined that they had, & even acknowledging  
that they had not the Sheriff was not liable.

It was decided in the courts that a Sheriff has a right to exe-  
cute all process that appears legal on the face of it.  
(2 Med. 195.) In this case, the protective remedy states that  
Bhead came before the legislature, now if the Affiant  
had authority, a court in any case the Sheriff  
was not liable. ~~It is not authority in any case~~  
they have such authority. So that the Sheriff was  
not liable as he could not receive from the face  
of the warrant that it was illegal. - & indeed  
if the Sheriff knew that the warrant was illegal  
yet if it did not appear upon the face of the pro-  
cess the Sheriff is not liable. - 2 Bl. Rep. 1057.

§ 1. all judicial acts on Sunday are void but this  
rule does not extend to ministerial acts. they were  
made void by statute. it first extended to persons  
going to public worship. but the stat afterwards extended  
it to all courts on the sabbath. & this is considered  
as b. l. in U.S. & such arrest is false imprisonment  
unless in case of escape, & criminal cases  
of felony. or a person once bail running away the bail takes

<sup>x1</sup> Letis is the ground on which a bail is allowed to arrest  
his principal in another state with his bail piece if it  
even a warrant the authority of it would extend no further  
than the jurisdiction of the court.



with that man and his bail piece is only evidence that  
he was bound. When one gives bail for another  
that other is his person. He may commit him  
to jail at any time.

An arrest on Sunday is void.  
but the man keeps him until Monday & then loses  
his execution. 5 Co. 92 ~~demerican~~. From that case it  
appears that this arrest is good. but 1<sup>st</sup> case in book  
is directly ag<sup>t</sup> it. There are some analogies. only  
the law is that the outer door of a domicile shall  
not be broken for civil process. & it is trespass to do it.  
A house was broken & a bag made. in ~~demerican~~ case  
it was held the sheriff ought to be liable for the trespass  
Lyt the bag good. The whole question in ~~book~~ <sup>book</sup> ~~case~~ <sup>case</sup> ~~1~~ <sup>1</sup>  
Garnold like was whether the door was an outer or in-  
ner door. & if the courts that the case in both good  
authority. that question would have been immaterial

I believe it cannot be said that no man shall re-  
ceive any the least benefit from the breach of the  
regulations of society. On this ground I think the  
arrest on Monday would be ill. 5 Mod. 95. ~~book~~ <sup>book</sup> ~~1~~ <sup>1</sup> ~~153~~ <sup>153</sup>. 2 W. Rep. 823. 2 W. Rep. 1048. 6 Mod. 95. 154. 2 Bac. 256. 5 W. Rep. 170

There are cases in which a man is allowed to take advantage  
of a wrong act as if A took B's horse without liberty. B demanded  
him refusal. B rushed at off took the horse. att<sup>r</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Wright~~ <sup>Wright</sup>

1 Hawk 135



might be liable in aff. & battery still a court could not  
order a restitution of the horse

### Of Justification for battery & false imprisonment.

A battery or false imprisonment may in legal language be justified i.e. the act is not considered as batt<sup>y</sup> or false imprisonment. Thus if one is about to break the peace, or commits a crime another may restrain him without warrant. Even when the man was not actually about to break the peace, yet if it appear to the trier that Def<sup>t</sup> had good reason to suspect the commission of it he may restrain with force. This will not justify fighting in behalf of a weak man who is attacked but all force necessary to restrain from breach of peace.

An off<sup>r</sup> is justified in arresting if his warrant is not defective on the face of it. Some times even beating violently & imprisoning. If Plff complains of batt<sup>y</sup> & imprisonment. Off<sup>r</sup> need only to plead his warrant setting it forth that its legality may appear to the court. If however the Plff goes further & says that the off<sup>r</sup> beat & wounded him, the Off<sup>r</sup> is then not only to plead that he had such warrant but also the resistance made by the party. for the off<sup>r</sup> is bound to take him, at all events but with as little wounding as possible. -



1 Lib. 246  
1 Gal. 642

either defence is son against father. & for this  
it is not necessary that Duff first strike. if he held  
a stick over your head you need not wait for him  
to strike. the justification is good. The plea is that  
Duff first ~~sees~~ <sup>strikes</sup> the man

The ground is that a man may defend himself  
so far as to prevent another immediate  
attack. but the party can never justify in this  
way the effects of a malicious revenge this line  
is extremely difficult to be drawn. the man ought  
not to be compelled to let the attack go the mo-  
ment he gets him down, nor <sup>indeed</sup> to give him one more  
ful blow. - If the second man comes up before  
would be necessary to incapacitate the attacker. -

Words will not justify any thing tho they will miti-  
gate damages. but will never diminish down to nothing.  
Words spoken at one time & place may go much farther  
in mitigation than if spoken in other circumstances.

Another defence is relationship of parent & child. hus-  
band & wife. by which one may justify an attack in  
defence of the other. one would not be justified in inter-  
fering into the quarrel. but the result of the ruling this  
that the parent may do precisely what the child  
would be justified in doing. -

1 Sid. 62

1 Salk 64



a shorter defence is *molitio in causa* in fact it now  
one may knock down one who attempts to get away  
his property & his defence now is to be "*molitio de*"  
if anyone may break the peace to protect & preserve  
his property: but after a wrong done has passed himself  
of another property, the owner may retake it if he can  
without breach of peace, but not with breach of peace.  
this plea is used when the property is attempted to be taken  
without an assault upon the person. if there is such  
assault the plea now is the proper one.

When the  
words & circumstances are very provoking the jury always  
give very small damages. *Provocatio* is no justification  
but the provocation which excites it may diminish the  
damages to almost nothing.

It is after justification that  
if a man a father or master, or schoolmaster, the rule is  
as laid down, that he might moderately chastise what  
is moderate chastisement is very difficult to explain. A German  
would be shocked at a Scotch licking. On this subject  
I consider that the party acts in a judicial capacity  
that a master or a parent or schoolmaster is  
not to be subjected for an error in judgment but if he  
corrects male animus, from a spirit of revenge he ought  
to be subjected. the animus is collectable from the manner  
in which it was done, the temper shown at the  
time and the instrument made use of.

Co Lib. 22678  
B. 1. 10

146611



A suit was brought in N. York by a child by his mother and  
against his father who threw him down stairs & stamped  
on him. the parent was apprehensive. & as it was ap-  
prehended that the child would be a cripple the  
jury gave a handsome verdict in trusting to take  
enough of his father's estate to support him through  
life.

But when the party beats as much as  
much as he in conscience believes his duty to do. he ought not  
to be liable.

an action of aggravated battery is maintainable which  
is depriving one of a member useful in defence.

Now there is a rule of law in Eng which may be  
in force in some states of which I never could dis-  
cover the history. it is this that after the jury  
have given damages the court may superadd  
expenses enhance the damages. & this is the only case of the  
kind in the law: tho the court in cases are allowed to table the damages.

If a recovery has been once had for a battery you can  
never recover again for the same injury. & that even  
altho damages may afterwards increase in consequence  
of the battery altho at the time of the recovery no  
such future damage was anticipated. & that this is  
the rule in slander. but it does not apply to actions  
on the case as for a nuisance. in that you recover  
for the injury you received up to the time of bring-  
ing the suit.



In this action Def<sup>s</sup> must plead separately tho they plead the  
same plea.—

The first verdict ascertain the amount of damage D<sup>ff</sup> suffered  
and Ex<sup>r</sup> for that sum goes ag<sup>t</sup> as many as are found to  
have been engaged in the trespass. 6 Co. Jac. 350. 11 Co. 6. 7  
Dall. ch. 20. 1222. The jury can never see the dam-  
ages.

(d) viz when Def<sup>s</sup> all plead gen<sup>l</sup>. issue. or one pleads gen<sup>l</sup>. issue  
& another demurs.

If several are sued. the jury has no right to sever  
the damages as for ex to pay \$100. B, \$200. C. \$300 he  
because the Plff is entitled to the whole amount of  
damages from each & every of the defts. they must  
all be found guilty jointly that are found jointly  
besides one might be a bankrupt. & find if only B  
were sued & recovery had agt him. C may plead that  
good in bar of a subsequent suit against himself  
but he could not if B had been acquitted.

But these  
three may plead diff't pleas. thus ex. son of C drunken.  
B a warrant. C. guilty ipse. Then there must be three  
separate trials thus being then distinct as for ex.  
Suppose the jury that tried ex gives Plff an sum as \$100  
the jury that tried the two others gives \$200 agt one & \$300  
agt the other.

Suppose agt B & C. sued B pleads guilty ipse  
& C drunken. the jury finds \$2000 agt B. the court give  
judgt agt C. for \$2000. that being ascertained by the verdict agt B.  
thus Ex joins agt B & C jointly for 2000. <sup>viz (d)</sup> Now in all such cases each is bound to  
pay all ex's damage & he ought to be able to collect it all of one  
tho he may have separate sum agt each if he so chooses to  
conduct it. In the above case the jury supposed Plff ought  
to recover \$600. but they have no right to do. the law does  
not apportion it. Now Plff is injured if he cannot have  
it agt all for \$600 but this he cannot have. he can  
take out Ex & agt all three for the highest sum as \$300

1160.5




if he pleases. but this he need not do unless he chooses but  
may object to the verdict & have a new one. The law  
will not allow him but an execution & satisfaction.

According to old law. diff<sup>r</sup> batteries might be joined in one suit  
in such case jury must appraise the damages but  
this practice has gone out of use. as by Bowmoyer's  
on Tuesday &c.

Many attempts were made to introduce the  
verdict found in a former criminal case, as evidence  
for the civil injury. but it is now settled that it cannot  
be given in evidence. because Deft is <sup>not</sup> the same person  
upon testimony convicted the Deft. and the verdict is ~~for~~  
in the alive.

But shall a verdict in favour of Deft be given  
in evidence to convict Deft in public prosecution.  
it cannot be so given being between different parties.



## Injuries to Personal Property.

The three remedies for injuries done by force to personal property are Trespass vi et armis, properly so called, Trover & Replevin.

Trespass in an injury done by one to another property by direct act. & it must be by a misfeasance not by nonfeasance or neglect. This is not the only action for direct injuries. Trover also lies. If one takes the property of another & carries it off, trespass or trover lies. But if there is no removal no carrying off as when property is destroyed trespass is the only action. The time is immaterial but any removal gives you a right to sue in either. But when the taking is lawful & you know of conversion trover lies without demand. But if you know not of the conversion you must make demand & sue. In this case trespass also lies.

Plff must have prop<sup>y</sup> to be entitled to this action. If the party had such prop<sup>y</sup> as not to be accountable to the owner, he cannot have this action. A victualler some one who holds by no unlawful act or felony as in some sporting. But an unlawful prop<sup>y</sup> will support the action when the party holds claiming title.

When a license is given by law if it is abused, the original license will not shelter the trespass. But if the license was a private one, it will. Thus every man is licensed



2 Roll. 561

to go into a tavern. if he breaks things he is liable in trespass  
as if he broke glasses the act must be a misfeasance  
& the party is a trespasser ab initio.

This is said to be an  
error & error at the 11th arrests B. the Plff in the action tells  
it not to return the writ. B. runs it in trespass  
it is said that the act was only misfeasance because  
he did not enter the writ & it must be subjected  
in trespass for more more force. But the truth  
is it cannot produce the warrant in evidence  
for no warrant is evidence until returned. & the  
11th stands in the same plight as if he really had  
no warrant. although 20 persons saw the warrant. no  
other proof but the warrant itself can be evidence.  
If the issue could have been proved otherwise than by the  
writ itself 11th would have been acquitted.

If a license is given by an individual trespass does  
not lie, for a subject abuse of the license, except in-  
deed in the case of Pound. Thus are best forged letters  
of recommendation & procured credit for a large quantity  
of hats. it was determined that this delivery was not  
a contract. trespass would lie. Other cases in book  
b. 4. that go to prove such acts felony prove it a trespass.  
As where two shopkeepers in company with an innocent woman they intended  
to defraud. pretended to have found a jewel as all were in company they were  
to divide. they went to a jeweller who set into the stone. pronounced it a  
diamond of the first water. the shopkeepers sold out to the innocent woman  
made off with the money. they were arrested & executed for the theft.

4 Mod 391  
2 Roll 555



A Judgment obtained fraudulently is void. but as it is not apparently void the off<sup>r</sup> is not liable. but as the Plff knows the judgment to be void from fraud he is liable in trespass in it carried. such a judgment is as if it were not.

Suppose judgment wrong, no one is liable for the levy for this judgment was good as any other judgment until reversed. 1 Ch. 90.

But a fraud judgment is a mere nullity. the law however protects the off<sup>r</sup> in obeying an order apparently legal.

If an authority is given by some statute. that authority must be strictly pursued. Thus st. giving license to impound cattle damage from ant. & fence then provides that the party give notice to the owner. If he does not he is trespasser ab initio & this altho the owner knows of the taking & the party knew that he knew.

I am inclined to think that notwithstanding the cases in Bacc. are not law in. those which go to subject a person for chattels intruding with another's property, as to get one's neighbors cow out of the mine to prevent her drowning. there are no cases to support me.

There is a case where a man says I trespass does not altho the taking was tortious. & stole B's horse & sold it to C. C honestly came in poss<sup>n</sup> but assigned no title to Brown. each poss<sup>r</sup> is liable to an action at the suit of B.

Nov 6th 1966

For Haff's right to commit ended at once on the offering bail.

(21)

In the water spout case, the Def<sup>t</sup> had a right to enter the Def<sup>t</sup> house the reaction of the spout ~~the spout~~ was held a consequential injury & not an immediate one in itself & that case not perhaps was the proper action. 2 Q. B. 1442. 11th. 634.







2 Rols. 557

2 ib. 556

46c. 38.

Pop. 191

Col. 254

18y. 25. P. 608

A tenant at will may dig away in bluntings but if he should  
abuse this licence he would be liable in trespass. Pro 2147. the  
licence is given by law.

Latel 214

Pop. 5

1 Lid. 38

2 Rols. 589

no such laws. forfeiture of goods & chattels or promising  
with death for stealing. otherwise the trap is not complete.

If cattle do damage by breaking  
in, they may be impounded. But they may be driven out &  
chased with a dog that will not damage them by  
harrying them. traps is it carries his training cattle with  
a big dog. But a man must not let them out into  
the road unless he knows they come from that way. for  
if they were lost he would be liable, unless they found their own  
way out without his letting down fence.

Pop<sup>r</sup> is the foundation of this action. in contemplation of law  
ownership draws the pop<sup>r</sup> if anyone else was in pop<sup>r</sup>  
claiming title it is a diff<sup>r</sup> thing. The rule is diff<sup>r</sup> as to  
real prop<sup>t</sup> in Eng. where title must be real or actual  
pop<sup>r</sup> taken. But in Can. the rule is the same as  
to real & personal prop<sup>t</sup>.

Suppose B hires A's oxen. & while  
in 136 pop<sup>r</sup> B commits trespass upon them. there is no ques-  
tion but B the special prop<sup>r</sup> man can recover the  
whole damage that A could viz. the whole value of  
the oxen & besides that his special damage. & after  
that A can bring no act<sup>n</sup> ag<sup>t</sup> B. B can never recover  
then an case in which B is liable in such case. If  
A sues B first he can never get him the value of the  
oxen & then B may sue B to recover his special damage.  
If it could be ascertained absolutely that bailie would not  
be liable there would be no room for his action ag<sup>t</sup> the

1 May. 55

The meeting upon the land to be then in trespass.

2. Robt. S. S.



trespasser. — If A brings his action ag<sup>t</sup> B. he waives his action ag<sup>t</sup> the bailor.

A man intruding upon the property of another, without claim of title of any kind, when caught, will not trespass. If however he had possession as to furnish evidence that the owner had licensed him to keep possession he can maintain trespass.

An off<sup>r</sup> is liable for taking property by mistake as much as if he did it knowingly. Now the sheriff is not obliged to verify he is in doubt as to the ownership of the property until the Plff directs him to. if then the Plff directs a stranger goods to be taken he is liable even to the sheriff. this liability is not founded on a criminal act. there was no criminal intent.

Suppose  
one should forge a warrant, arrest a man under a tavern keeper to imprison the man, he did so & was sued in trespass & subjected a promise of indemnity was implied in the request to imprison & the off<sup>r</sup> or forger is liable even to the tavernkeeper who had no criminal intention.

Killing beasts from nature is not trespass unless they have the animus revertendi. Yet so nice were our ancestors that it would be trespass to kill them before they were able to get away.

Suppose goods delivered to one to be delivered back. then a sheriff delivers goods to B. after he

*"i.e. when Diff cannot prove it.*



had attached them as ads at the suit of B. they paid  
as the goods belonged to A. & he came & claimed them  
of C. He is bound to keep them & in addition to keep  
so if prop<sup>y</sup> is delivered while one goes a journey, or a  
horse to a tavern keeper. tho if the bailer chooses to  
run the risk being satisfied that the person claiming  
is the owner he may if he chooses deliver them over  
to him.

### Trover.

Trover is an act<sup>n</sup>. much used. It proceeds upon the ground that the  
property was found but it is now used in all cases in which property  
is taken without reference to manner of taking.

The first case is where Def<sup>t</sup>. came wrongfully by the goods  
here it is concurrent with trespass & the same evidence  
supports both actions.

2<sup>d</sup> class of cases is where Def<sup>t</sup>.  
came lawfully into prop<sup>y</sup> but exercised an act of ownership  
which he had no right to exercise. trespass does not lie.

3<sup>d</sup> class is where this  
flagrant act of ownership is not apparent. but the owner  
does not know what Def<sup>t</sup>. did with the article. here  
demand is necessary & refusal to deliver is evidence  
of conversion. in the former cases there is no necessity  
of demand. In this 3<sup>d</sup> case Demand & refusal is not  
always decisive evidence of conversion. thus sup on  
one finds a watch. & the owner does not exhibit evidence



Portion, set in plus conversion.

of ownership to the satisfaction of finder. So if the prop<sup>y</sup> cannot be given up without great damage such as  
rafts drifted upon valuable land in middle town. No  
proof of intention to convert. These facts would justify the holder in  
not delivering the goods.


This action is confined solely to personal prop<sup>y</sup>  
so that corn standing cannot be trovered. but if gathered  
it might be. - Trespass will lie. So if one takes apples  
from a tree it is only trespass. but if the apples lay on the  
ground it is felony to take them. So cutting & carrying  
off trees is trespass but if the tree was already cut to  
take them would be felony.

Plff must state that he had  
lost 9. Prop<sup>y</sup>. That the Def<sup>t</sup> came in prop<sup>y</sup> by finding which  
means in every manner of getting prop<sup>y</sup> & then the  
conversion must appear. Demand & refusal need not appear  
upon the debt for that is only evidence of conversion it  
is not always conclusive evidence.

An actual prop<sup>y</sup>  
is not necessary to the averment of it is not indispensable. if  
proof is proved it is enough for it proves actual or implied  
prop<sup>y</sup>.

The effect of judgment is to vest the property in Def<sup>t</sup>  
the damages are a satisfaction to Plff: so if two brown an  
article. a judgment will vest the prop<sup>y</sup> in him.

But if here  
an other brown article is returned before judgment the






prop<sup>t</sup> is not visited in <sup>def<sup>t</sup></sup> the return goes in mitigation  
of damages. Bull. ch. p. Esp. D. 5 Bae.

If prop<sup>t</sup> run bailed the rule is the same as laid down under  
bribe. The bailer is not allowed to sue for the horse  
because of the certainty of his liability to bailor  
but because of the nature of the bailment which is such that  
he may be subjected.

If ch bails over to B. <sup>A</sup> comes & takes  
them away. I do not know why <sup>A</sup> in this case is not a  
trespasser & <sup>A</sup> <sup>l</sup> <sup>o</sup> <sup>p</sup> <sup>r</sup> <sup>a</sup> may be a trespasser. the law is however  
that neither trespass nor trover will lie ag<sup>t</sup> bailor.

Suppose B by fraud obtains possession of ch's prop<sup>t</sup>. C is a bona fide  
purchaser - now if B stole it there is no doubt but <sup>A</sup> might  
sue B. but if <sup>A</sup> were depaunched he could not recover  
of B. for he has suff<sup>r</sup> himself to be gulled. the maxim  
of qui prior est in tempore potior est in jure applies only when  
the case is equal.

Callatinal articles if stolen as horses he will not  
p<sup>r</sup>o<sup>p</sup> by sale if they have been stolen but money if stolen  
will p<sup>r</sup>o<sup>p</sup>. because it is a currency & this is the only  
reason. if otherwise common would be at a stand. an  
action then will not lie for money unless indeed it could  
be identified. Rex v. Miller in Barr. Bank bills are  
negotiable notes. specie he stands upon the same footing.





In all torts *ag. def.* is a complete satisfaction, altho no *res.* is taken out. In contracts on the other hand. if there or four are liable you may *ag. def.* until you get satisfaction - If it were so in torts litigation would be encouraged.

It is quite laid down in books that there can be no other plea made in torts except *release* and *g. i. p.* This is not true in practice & I see not why other pleas might not be made. Under *g. i. p.* anything may be proved that destroys the right of action.

There are cases in which the courts have allowed such, to be brought into court. as pictures. jewels &c.

If property is owned jointly one cannot bring *tres. ag. the other*. there is no conversion each has a right to him. There is one exception if one *tres.* in common has destroyed in which case *tres. ag. the other* may be brought.

We have stat. enabling one *tres. in common* to have *res. ag. the other*. whether the property is real or *pers.*

If an injury is done to partnership property if one partner sues the *def.* cannot take advantage of the *nonjoinder* under the *g. i. p.* he must plead it in *abatement*. *Prin. & Lister v. Burns.*

And it seems to me that *nonjoinder* ought not to abate the suit, because it is no damage to *def.* the *pl.* will be at issue to a *subseq.* action for the same thing as when the same evidence is required.





If one draws off 10 Gals wine & takes it away leaving the rest one should not have of town for the whole pipe but if after drawing the 10 Gals. fills it up with water the whole pipe is recovered. Now I should reason that town lay for the 10 Gals. & township for the remainder. But it seems settled that such an alteration in the property is conversion.

It was determined that if property were taken which belonged to one sole & converted after marriage. The husband would not join the wife. The transfer took place before the conversion. The true reason is says judge R. that when the wife's property is the meritorious cause of action the husband may join his wife if he pleases.

Proof is prima facie evidence of proof & may be rebutted. -

The unit changes the  $d^2$  with  $tr, rds.$  -



## Replevin


A replevin may be an adversary writ. as it may be only  
an order to recover back your property which has been at-  
tached or distrained by substituting a bond or man  
distraining as a legal instrument in the hands of  
Landlords to recover rent. We have no such power in  
this country except perhaps in large towns where the  
landlord has a term before the goods & is to be paid  
before other creditors. the object of it is that distressed  
persons may find shelter.

The process is to take the cattle  
for other articles with a warrant & keeps them until the rent  
due is paid. Here the tenant gets a bond man to answer the debt  
upon the writ of replevin in money or to return the cattle.

The 2<sup>d</sup>

Kind is when the cattle are taken & unpurchased. being taken down  
eg. peasant. Bond is given to answer all damages & the  
owner recovers his cattle. If the landlord says there has  
been no damage done &c. the cattle being unlawfully  
imprisoned. Replevin becomes an action of trespass & it  
arises.

By 6<sup>th</sup> Ed all prop<sup>y</sup> upon the estate was pledged for the rent. not so  
but that he could sell it. but it was a pledge as long as it re-  
mained. - the Lord did not see the necessity of a writ  
with a warrant to distress. to prevent oppression an statute  
that allowing the tenant to replevin. this writ directs the sheriff






to take the cattle & deliver them to the suit. This writ is, precisely  
like a writ for trespass, or bondman, binding himself to answer  
the writ or return the cattle. For this writ is tried & claims  
for rent, if rent is due, judgment is rendered for the Lord (the Plaintiff)  
against the Defendant in relation to the tenant. If no rent is due, judgment  
goes for the Defendant in relation precisely as in case of trespass. So if  
the cattle were impounded if the price was good, a cattle did  
not get in. Plaintiff in relation moves as in trespass. The writ  
charges defendant with having taken the cattle with force & arms and  
confining them. However the double purpose of remedying self  
privately like Andros sword, to dig parvity, & move a man  
thus gently. -

2<sup>d</sup> case when this writ is used is common throughout  
the N.E. where a farmer finds cattle in his lots, may either sue in  
trespass or impound & when impounded the cattle  
are considered in the custody of the law. Then the cattle  
are released by compromise, or an affidavit, where Plaintiff returns  
bond & summons the distrainer to appear & answer to the  
trespass. If found against cattle owner judgment goes against him  
which if not paid, a writ on the bond secures it.

There are certain entries not commensurable & others that are  
by B. L. Commensurable entries are waste cattle, sheep,  
if these get into a lot where running in the street & where  
the price was good, they are liable to be impounded. But  
hogs & dogs are not commensurable, no right to be in the  
highway, & if they get in, they are liable whether a stick  
of fence or not.





We have by laws allowing dogs to be in highway if yoked & rung. By C.L. there was an off<sup>r</sup> appointed to take them up if found in highway. & all the privilege allowed is that they shall not be arrested. & if they get out of highway over a fence over so bad the owner is liable. so decree in *bonum*. sup<sup>r</sup> 6<sup>th</sup>


As to land not joining highway it depends upon this. whose fence did the cattle get over. C.L. states just as extreme as *rigat* fencing. The height & quality of fence is to be determined by the jury if no *statute*.

There is no law relating to gear & trucking the way is commonly to give notice & if not removed. kill them. that is they cannot be impounded. - An action lies for the trespass they do. but not this summary method. I imagine the killer would not be liable if he sent them home.

In bounding is a temporary suspension of other remedies. if the cattle escape the poundkeeper is liable. (the law is like that of Goshes & Goshes.) or the party may distrain again. -

This privilege is of great use. when prop<sup>y</sup> is allowed to be attached for debts.

*Quia vocata*. A attaches for \$1000. & gets only \$500 worth property & B gives bond. & when judgment is recovered for \$1000 B delivers up the property to the amt of \$500. On a bail bond at the time the bond is properly to be forfeited if the off<sup>r</sup> does not appear yet if he is delivered up to Ex<sup>r</sup> the bond is answered & I should think if \$500 worth of prop<sup>y</sup> are delivered up the bondman should be discharged. -





for the parties are in the same situation as after attainment  
the object of the law is attained. for diff is placed exactly  
as he pleads himself.

## Trespass on the case.

This action lies in three classes of cases.

1<sup>st</sup> For wrongs not ac-  
companied with force. 2<sup>d</sup> for consequential injuries  
occasionally acts accompanied with force 3 for in-  
juries arising from unlawful detentions.

The 1<sup>st</sup> wrongs not  
accompanied with force were considered when we con-  
sidered slander, malicious prosecution, &c. which  
are actions on the case. in these the force is varied.

As to 2<sup>d</sup> Kind we have an example in our country, a  
servant. the m<sup>st</sup>. has trespass in he kept the beater. the  
master has cause for griev. 6 up D. 598. 3 Bl. 153. 2 Ray  
1397. 2 D. Rep. 167.

3<sup>d</sup> Class is where one is bound to do a certain thing  
& does not do it. as a justice is bound to sign a writ unless  
in a discretionary case so if a clerk of town refuses to record  
a deed or in case one is bound to keep a ditch open. case lies  
in these cases.

This action was instituted by West. 2<sup>d</sup>. It has  
been said that an a<sup>c</sup>. for escape lay at C. L. but there is no

3 Bl. 208  
1 F.R. 467  
3 il. 251.648  
Stn. 634  
2 Bl. 1155

say nothing of it. I presume it was not known. In case  
you give discretionary damages.

where there was a remedy by common law & another remedy  
was given by statute the rule of damages must be the same un-  
der the C.L. statute. Now if the remedy existed before the statute  
19 Ed. 1 the rule of damages is different from it would otherwise  
be, provided the statute did not as contain the damages.

All the difficulty is having what is immediate & not con-  
sequential. This is explained in the right case. And to lose  
a man as the court held trespass vi. vias. They held the man  
to use the wild bull as an instrument. 2 Will. 174. 10  
638. Esp. Dig. 698.

A man rode a horse in to Lincoln's inn  
fields & the horse was away & did damage. He was held liable  
in case. Leon. Dig. 208

1 Vent. 295. 2 Lev. 72.

When the person is literally the agent it matters  
not whether the will concerns or not if done with force.  
vi et armis viz. it is commanding a servant to do a wrongful  
act if the servant were about his master's business & does an in-  
jury against his master will case him.

J. Totten says that if S.  
throws a ball which by bounding & rebounding breaks a window  
S. is liable. but a rational agent coming in would take away  
S.'s liability.

If a master orders his servant to do some act he does it by him  
or man the master is liable in trespass. but if no order from the



1 East. 106

6 J.R. 125

2 H. B. 442

Comp. 206

2 B.C. 832

E.H. B. 603.

2 J.R. 154

8 J.R. 183

master would in some cases be liable in others not. As the old law stood. If a serv<sup>t</sup> was about his master's business or driving his carriage & does an injury <sup>wilfully</sup> the master is liable. But if the serv<sup>t</sup> left his master's business to do a trespass. the master was not liable. 1 Salk 441. 5 T R 648 Burr. 562

But in the case in East it is held that a master is not liable for the wilful torts of his serv<sup>t</sup>. The court did not mean to impeach the old principle. They considered a wilful tort, not necessarily done according to master's orders, to be an advancement of master's business. But I am now to distinguish this case from that of *Giff* & *Deft* *Giff* which is well decided, the abandonment is as complete in one case as the other. See this question discussed in *Quers. Dom. Rel.* & *Goulds Dom. Rel.* "May & Lunt."

I take it the old law is established in this country that case brings the master for the wilful torts of the serv<sup>t</sup> if the act is w<sup>il</sup>ful the serv<sup>t</sup> trespass is the remedy. 1 T R 279. *Straw* 1083. Burr. 2093

So if an injury is done by the dog case is ~~the~~ action. it is s<sup>d</sup>. that if the owner is knowing that the dog is wont to bite. trespass that only lies however when the master sets on the dog.

There are serv<sup>t</sup> diff<sup>t</sup> classes of cases in which case lies. It is the proper remedy where damage is incurred by a crime.

Should not be liable in suits if he did not know.

Com. 8. 166.

9 60.52

1 Bell. 90.5

3 Bl. 166



in an omission of some act imposed by law (not that im-  
posed by contract) as if one finds any thing & does not  
take ordinary care of it. so if an officer neglects  
his duty as by not surveying writs. *Ch. Ray. 917.* (contra. *see*  
*212* law) 1 *Comm. Dig. 206.* 1 *Roll. 93.* 1 *Bac. 366.* 1 *Sol. 328*  
*Long. 42.*

A rule almost universal that where undertakers, &c.  
are out professionally he is liable for any neglect in case,  
but if not of his profession, he is not liable except on the  
special case. There is no remedy if not in the profession  
& this is founded in policy. *Ch. Ray. 214.* 2 *Will. 359.* *Exp. Dig. 601*  
3 *Yel. 122.* 1 *Comm. Dig. 165*

It has been questioned whether this action  
lay agt any one who injured the her cattle of another, say  
the act <sup>another's</sup> ~~of~~ his own business. As of wine, if the seller did  
not know it to have been adulterated there is no criminal  
liability, tho he is liable on the warranty implied in the  
sale. as to the warranty the rule is no when laid down ex-  
cept in Blackstone. the maxim of caveat emptor is in  
some cases too much extended. I should say that when  
an only moonshine or caution lies, there must be  
a *quid pro quo*. tho there may be no wrong, no fraud.

As to *vis. in ear.* for injuries done by cattle if the creature  
more did wrong before the master would not be liable  
but having once bitten he is liable for subsequent  
damages. as when the dog bit when trod on, having bitten once

Leam. 208  
4 Co. 18  
1 Role. 4

3 M. 165  
2 Bar. 245  
1 Ghov. 175  
6 Co. 33. 12. 625  
2 J. R. 126  
2 Pa. 873  
2 Bl. 1048

6 Co. left 141. 196  
2 Trin. 319.  
2 Mad. 31  
8 Co. 146

If left were actually committed to the walls on myers process the value  
is the same as if committed on final process. Exp. 110. 4 J. R. 789



before in the same circumstances. But if a beast is in its nature from nature, the owner is liable in the first instance. 2d Ray. 606. 6 Co. 112. 254. scienter proved under yoke if not.

Then action lies for disturbing right of way or right of water. 9 Co. 112. 1 Vent. 275. or Vent. 186. 5. 638.

This is the action before the plaintiff for an escape whether on mesne or final process. if on mesne process it must be seen. if on final, action lies for the sum is in that case ascertained. It has been said that case would lie for escape before 2d West. but I do not believe it. the fact was an officer was made liable at first at 1 trial.

An unknown, party is good found<sup>r</sup>. to subject the plaintiff because a party cannot be attacked in this collateral manner. it is good until reversed. the plaintiff could not impeach the verdict.

When a person is named on mesne process the court can maintain the action against him unless he neglects his duty. because he is not supposed then to have proper consultation. The plaintiff has trespass, but his liability does not include the damages.

But in final process the officer is liable for the money received for the price of arrest and also for the amount of the debt. the plaintiff is always sufficient to keep a prisoner arrested on final process. the court may see the return, if he does he waives his right of action against the plaintiff.



Exp. says that for escape on rescue procs. the question of Ship's liability depends on the fact whether Plff were thereby delayed in his suit. -

Same confusion here as to the party is determined not good & it is action after the rescue.

Watts cannot mean the whole that it is actually. If a man is obliged to pay twice he may recover it back.

If a rescuer issues process <sup>and</sup> may sue the rescuer. <sup>but not the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>plaintiff</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~guilty~~ <sup>of</sup> breach of duty if no collusion. & he may return a nunc & that is good evidence.

If a right

Plff. sues rescuer the jury may give such damages as they please the rescuer may commit to court to show that the person rescued is a man of property &c. & they will be subjected for amount money which will not be paid the whole of it may be recovered of the debtor or Plff. But if no such proof was had & the body was not be had again the jury will give damages to the amount of the debt in satisfaction of it. for if the whole sum is given it goes in satisfaction of the debt. but if a less sum is recovered it is damages for debtors the plffs satisfaction. The Plff. then must show that debtor is insolvent or out of reach of process.

Suppose Plff sues his action is trespass vi carnis. the cred. can recover the whole sum. & the cred. is not obliged to sue the Plff. No man can have but one satisfaction. Plff is not compelled to wait until the cred. sue him the point being settled that man liability gives right of action in tort. Cro. Eliz. 53. Esp. Dig. 614. 12. 15

Exp. says that if both Plff & cred. bring out a nunc. rescuer the action of Plff is suspended because the Plff has received his right of the Plff. but this I doubt because nunc. brings action does not discharge Plff. Plff must be satisfied.

Exp-613



The shipper by his act of escape becomes liable  
as if it were an escape proper but the rule of dam-  
ages would be diff<sup>r</sup>. this action is easier s<sup>u</sup>p<sup>o</sup>rt<sup>ed</sup> the re-  
ason it is this paper.

In case of vol<sup>t</sup> escape the off<sup>r</sup> can-  
not sue the escapee it is a rule of policy. he cannot  
pursue for he came after negligent escape when a re-  
taking will secure him if he does it before action bro<sup>u</sup>ght.

suppose the under shipper vol<sup>t</sup> escape even the shipper  
sues the escapee? he is clearly liable as well as escapee to  
the end. by the former case it was said that he could not  
but modern case say that he may sue within this  
under shipper as escapee. 100. 24. 399.

By 10. 2. the really  
ancient, that there were two kinds of escape. vol<sup>t</sup>. freight  
vol<sup>t</sup> escape is by the current or neglect of shipper & negli-  
gent escape are all other escapes those are assumed by  
the act of God or of public enemies. The shipper liable  
in both cases. the difference is that if shipper releases, be-  
fore action bro<sup>u</sup>ght he is not liable. but not so if vol<sup>t</sup>.  
& shipper should retake after vol<sup>t</sup>. escape he is liable for  
false imprisonment. What is vol. escape? Prisoner escaped  
by paying out money. was retaken & put in same place  
& not releasing, the prisoner escaped w<sup>o</sup>ld be voluntary.  
A bond taken to keep prisoner within the gaol is held a  
good bond. so the escape from it is not vol<sup>t</sup>. if prisoner

Exp. D. 617  
1 May. 325  
1 Sept. 86  
4 Burn

Went on 125  
3 May. 377



run over the ship must shut him up or the master's  
escape is void. If his ship runs out & back again before  
action the ship is not liable so that on the bond  
only nominal damages are recovered. 2 T.R. 126. 4.  
strict contract by broker.

Cred. hired the man to escape. as he was lost soon after the  
prison returned. Cred. recovered nothing by the suit.  
Ship sued on the bond but recovered only nominal  
damages.

'This suit is the proper one to be brought against agents  
alld. etc. For want of skill or want of skill the  
lawyer is not liable. but for a breach of trust or negli-  
gence he would be. want of skill goes subject, but  
negligence discharges lawyer. must be expected to misstate.  
The alld. may be liable to his clients adversary as  
for fraud he has induced the broker into difficulty  
& that at the end it was all for benefit of his client. If he  
has put it over to his client he will not be able to re-  
cover it back. his tort process.

There is a diff. in sustaining this action  
against Physicians. 3 Wils held liable for error of an ex-  
amination.

1 Geo. 328 Justices Magistrates are liable for neglect  
of duty or refusing to sign a writ in a case not dis-  
containing. refusing to take bail or an acknowledged grant.  
The act must be ministerial act. for if judicial the  
act does not lie, if the officer has jurisdiction, given  
by statute in some ministerial acts there may be a mistake.



~~11~~ 110 Exp. 603. Nott. 120 Shff not liable for taking ins-off bail  
as the act was judicial. the Shff could not set any bail off.  
on the ground of insufficiency thus securing his usual practice

3 Lalk 303.44  
1 T R. 651  
Exp 2.643

86.32  
3.233  
124.66

leaving none constituted against. & the Insurer may keep the in-  
surer's goods as a pledge for his bill. 1 Lalk 388.

A sheriff must judge of the sufficiency of the bail offered at his peril. The court jury must judge whether sufficient or not tho they will not be wiser. 1 Hawk. 16. 90.

This act. lies for breach of trust in bailors. & delictio as well as ex contractu. 4 Co. 83. 1 Salk. 26. Esp. 9. 618. When a cargo is lost by negligence of master &c. you may sue any one or all of the owners. for it is a tort. it was once held to be contract but decided to be a tort.

When an officer employs others under him, he is liable for their acts. There is an exception in the case of the post master. there is no contract between the sender & the post master. if he neglect his legal duty he is liable. Salk 17. 1 Camp. 754 Esp. 624. 3 Wils. 243.

This is the act. tort & delictio in innkeepers when property is lost out an inn. The innkeeper is secured by the act of God & public enemies he is however liable for losses by thieves & robbers & in cases where common bailors would not be. Petrie is to prevent collusion between innkeeper & robbers. But if goods are deposited & the guest does not stay well then the innkeeper is liable <sup>only</sup> as another man would be: 1 Lums 135.

The person entitled to this remedy must be a guest. transient. traveller. not a neighbour who calls to stay all night. nor a boarder for a length of time. (he must pay as travellers do.) More. 78. 8 Co. 3. 9. 5 S. Rep. 273. not a friend staying there

12. Dec 188

bu. 188  
Eph 1228

bu. 188

Full 1880  
1 Dy. 158  
96. 87.  
3 78. 166.  
2 1880 327



The innkeeper must also receive some profit from the guest  
as his goods as a horse. for this he would be liable. but not  
for a trunk receiving no profit for keeping it. 1. Galt 388.  
tho he might be subjected as bailor. as to the horse se-  
curing other goods the author disagrees. The guest is a  
pledge for his keeping. the horse for his keeping. & I should say  
the horse for both as the person of the guest is.

Suppose one lodges his goods & goes off the goods are lost. the lia-  
bility depends upon the facts whether the person came there  
as a guest. It is not every temporary absence  
that destroys Innkeeper's liability. -

Insecurity or sickness  
is no excuse for an innkeeper. if he receives guests.

He is not liable for injuries to the person as battery  
8 Co. 33

Like a gascon & coachman he is liable in all weathers  
and like them too he has a time before the person he  
carries refuses any guest if the money is tendered. even if his  
house is full. (that his family is sick. when he must take all  
if any)

The Innkeeper may  
take the person without a warrant & confine him. but  
I conceive that this could not be done if there were a  
law because the object will be accomplished without in-  
fringing personal liberty. - Innkeeper may get his friends to  
assist in securing him.

1 Rals. 99  
Yllo. 20  
Loo. 11  
Lalt. 211

2<sup>nd</sup> 9. 118.

it. are  
3 36. 155



This act<sup>n</sup> is the remedy for fraud or deceit in the sale of prop<sup>y</sup>.

In the place for false warranty, there is no necessity of case founded in ab<sup>st</sup> or delects the party may sue on the contract. But if the party knew it false this act<sup>n</sup> lies. If seller did not know it does not lie. for there is no fraud to found it upon. / Com. 166.

False affirmation. if known to be false when made the action lies. But act<sup>n</sup> of fraud will not lie if the party did not know it to be false. There are exceptions however, in case that, ordinary men would not be deceived. If the defect requires close examination there is no excuse. Scien<sup>s</sup> is material. 3 Bl. 165. If purchaser incapacitated to discover the defect there would be fraud. -

A man will be liable now when he would not formerly have been.

A mere matter of opinion will not amount to false affirmation. as that my horse is worth \$200. Or you can get \$200 out of him. But if the statement were matters of facts it may found fraud. Thus I sold yesterday a horse for \$100 for this horse or \$200 out last year. This may be foundation of fraud. So if one says that winds & cold don't hurt him I used him all summer & it did not impair his strength &c. it would be fraud.



Rule is that what a man is bound in good conscience to  
disclose he must not secrete

Exp 632

Decided by Roman courts to be a void contract. -

Both parties ignorant. Court set it aside on ground of  
fraud. But U.S. Ct. set it aside on ground of fraud upon  
big counting



Or. Law. 474  
1 Ghent. 63.68  
1 Galt. 210  
1 Foub. 109.37  
Laird 290  
Laird 590

Parliament contended that the party could not receive until  
after they had determined his right. but the court sustained



In all cases there is, in sale of free<sup>h</sup> prop<sup>y</sup>, ~~an~~ implied warranty of title. It is said he would not be liable unless the seller knew title to be bad: if so there could be no implied warranty.

This act<sup>n</sup> for fraud lies for making a false affirmation (3 T.R. 51) concerning property in which the affirmer has not the least interest. So concerning the credit of another. *Bantholme v 16 Lark. Dags Rep*

So for opening the name of another, to get credit, or for any other trick of this kind 1 Com. 167. Esp 633. Co. Ely. 90 Bull. et. P. 32. 1 Geo 24<sup>th</sup>

So cheating a person by false cards is actionable, if playing is not a p<sup>r</sup> law. Co. Ely. 90.

Altho you may sue for fraud affirming the contract, <sup>you may also</sup> sue in trespass disaffirming the contract As if A takes B's horse. you can sue in trespass or trover or if the horse is sold, in a p<sup>t</sup>. So if counterfeiting money is p<sup>r</sup> for a horse, you may take the horse when you find it, or sue in case for the fraud if he takes of the money by counterfeiting.

This is the action when an individual has been injured by the impairment of a public right. in this case ~~that~~ special damage must be alleged. As where an inspector of elections should refuse to receive a vote, the voter or the candidate may have an action. once disputed but it is now settled. 5 Co. 72. 1 Salk. 19. 3 Salk. 17. Esp. P. 627. 528. 1 Salk 502. 6 Mod. 48. 49. 1 Wils. 122. K. J. P. 62

L. Bur. 303

An obstruction by a stranger to a precept lays foundation of  
an action as to shoot up geese. In the offing Geo E. 908  
break down. 560. 93. 93



On 7<sup>th</sup> Nov. a note passed that in a false return is made  
by who should have been returned shall never double dam-  
ages be paid.

Case will lie against an off<sup>r</sup> for per<sup>se</sup> inferior  
court <sup>or officer</sup> for making a false return to a mandamus

Case lies for violating an author's right. The question  
was whether an author has any right at C.D. When  
had published their works before published them. It was felt  
to be an injury but supposed to be without remedy. And  
authors commonly applied to Ch<sup>l</sup> to grant injunctions  
to those who attempted to republish. A great question  
was whether there was any C.D. remedy & if there was, was  
it taken away by the Stat. granting exclusive privilege  
for 14 yrs. The 12 Judges decided there was a C.D. remedy  
but that it was cut off by Stat. 7 to 5. I conceived that  
was no C.D. remedy. but if there were I conceived the  
legislation could not take it away.

It has been made a  
great question whether an abridg<sup>ment</sup> is a violation of his right  
(2d a Roy. 739.) It is decided (2d 441) that if it appears  
to the court by any that it is intended to take advantage  
of the work it is a violation. True as to a translation?

There is no form for abridg-  
ing in this action except to show & perhaps slander you  
state the case at large.



Chalk 429

1 Vine. 146

3 Bac. 860

Bur. 1267

4 Mad. 281-2.

Of Mandamus. The object in this writ is a  
specific remedy very like an application to Ch<sup>l</sup>.  
but it does lie where a bill in Ch<sup>l</sup>. does.

It is issued  
from B. R. here from the supreme court. the object  
of it is to invest the party with some right which is  
taken from him or withheld. It relates to some public  
act. as recording doc<sup>s</sup>. If you make a bargain with  
man to deliver you 100 bush. wheat. you must go to  
a court of law Ch<sup>l</sup> will not interfere it being prob<sup>l</sup>.  
It lies when an inferior court will not try a cause. So  
when one thinks he is legally chosen to some office in a cor-  
poration. this must be tried &c. is done by a mandamus.  
So an inferior court may throw one over the bar  
& a superior court may by a mandamus restore him  
to practice.

This does not issue to compel performance in  
an individual capacity.

This writ is drawn out of  
common law. it is not discretionary with the court  
if proper evidence is adduced. it must be issued and  
without delay. As if a court refused to perform  
a duty required of them by which an individual is  
injured.

You can sue a town for it is a corp<sup>l</sup> in law. but  
a county is not. so if a Co. owe you - you sue by a

Es. 609  
3 Bl. 111.  
3 Bac. 528  
B. M. 199



mandamus. which order says if he returns no money  
one other issue to all the justices ordering them to lay  
a tax.

Any off<sup>r</sup> who holds an office concerning the  
publics. a mandamus issues. As if a b<sup>l</sup> of probate  
should refuse to app<sup>r</sup>. I. L. adm<sup>r</sup>. C. 11. 1 P. 231.  
11 Co. 94. 1 T. Rep. 411. but not unless specific relief is wanted.

A b<sup>l</sup> of ap<sup>r</sup> is not a corporation.  
as for a library. 2 Balk. 175. 1 W. 11. 4 T. Rep. 125. Doug. 5th

of proceeding. The clerk would not record. I. L. 1. and  
damages might be recovered in b<sup>l</sup> of law but that  
would not give title. b<sup>l</sup> would not interfere be-  
cause there was no contract.

By b. l. I. L. goes with  
an ex parte complaint accompanied with affidavit  
vit. a summons then issues to the clerk to show  
cause. if he appears he makes a return which is not  
suff<sup>r</sup> a preceptory mandamus issues. if the clerk  
returns that no writ was delivered to him. this  
by b. l. is conclusive. the party then sues if he  
pleads at law. if he recovers. judg<sup>t</sup> for damages goes  
ag<sup>t</sup> the clerk & a preceptory mandamus goes  
with it.

There is a state of case & a similar one in  
some states allowing the party to traverse the return &  
a preceptory mandamus may then issue as the case  
may be.

1 Lab. 509  
1 Lab. 506  
1 Vint. 111  
3 Ba. 225

11 Co. 9  
Cutt. 171

1 Lab. 508  
1 Lab. 500

If the party makes no return at all nor appears a per-  
emptory mandamus issues & the off<sup>r</sup> is imprisoned  
for contempt.

App<sup>n</sup> for mandamus may be made to the court  
if in person or to one of the judges if not, with affidavit which  
is always in writing. - A return is always made on the.

If first mandamus issues ag<sup>t</sup> ~~several~~ only part are engaged in the false  
return, part only are punished & if part only refuse to do so &  
the writ of Mand. issues to them only. 3 B. & 547. If the  
party brings an action for false return, he may sue only one  
or two or all & the jury will decide the character of the return.

If a peremptory mandamus issues not obeyed the party is com-  
mitted in process for contempt. As to the power of the court  
in this case the court may keep the party in jail  
until he does it, if it is for life. When the commit-  
ment is for contempt in abuse or disturbance of court  
the imprisonment ends with the return of the court.  
Process only issues ag<sup>t</sup> the majority in the majority but the  
minority. - Co. L. Lit. 145



And. 275

2 B. Reg 1208

Barnes 428

If, however, upon the right Diff is obliged to pay costs, here being  
of all proceedings shown at damages.

4 B. Reg 262

1 B. Reg 348

3 B. Reg 360

In an attachment upon prohibition Diff shall recover damages  
costs except the party for proceeding after the writ of prohibition.  
11 B. Reg. 102

Prohibition. may be issued from any of the sup<sup>r</sup> courts  
in N.Y. Hall. by any sup<sup>r</sup> etc. It is meant to  
prevent inferior etc from proceeding contrary to law  
in cases where they have no jurisd<sup>n</sup> 3 Bl. 112  
4 Cal. 240. 12 Co. 6 4 Conn. 487. 1 Am. Bl. 100.

It issues not only against the  
but against the Def<sup>n</sup> in the orig<sup>l</sup> action also. The mode of  
obtaining it is much the same as obtaining a writ.  
It may appear from the face of the proceeding that the  
inferior has no jurisd<sup>n</sup> then there can be no difficulty in  
issuing a summary prohib. at once. But it may  
depend on extraneous facts. here affidavits become  
necessary. a rule issues to show cause why prohib. sh<sup>d</sup> not  
issue. the ct. then orders a show cause. if  
it is suff<sup>l</sup> there is an end of it. 1 P.M. 476. 1 Cal. 540  
2<sup>d</sup> Ray. 211. 40b. 57. If not suff<sup>l</sup> a summary prohib. issues.  
2<sup>d</sup> Ray. 220. It disregards the attract<sup>n</sup> of the inferior  
in a Def<sup>n</sup> and committed.

It may be questioned whether the court  
is a cognizance. the Def<sup>n</sup> then institutes a fictitious suit  
in which he sues one for not obeying the prohibition. the  
question is then framed? the party had procured the prohib.  
the court below suspended the proceedings. if the complain  
succeeds a summary prohib. issues. If he does not succeed  
an order to proceed issues. 3 Bl. 114. 4 Conn. 517. a writ of con-  
sultation

of same suit afterwards before same court is contempt in  
Def<sup>n</sup> before court if the court proceeds.

1 fac.

6u Lm. 29  
6u Cl. 440  
7u Lm. 378

1 Pol. 306  
1 Lid. 43



Audita Lurela. This remedy is used when one is prejudiced with the writ. It has no day in court although he has a good defence. As when it can be paid up. In the Court of Chancery. The process is very quick. The party applies to some judge & the hearing is reported. The inquiry the writ is discretionary with him. If it is a writ is taken from a responsible person to answer all costs damages &c. The writ certifies a supersedeas of all proceedings & voids all former process discharging the body goods &c. & all remedy after that is on the bond. If Deft is not recovered in the writ which always follows, he recovers damages & is discharged. If it goes against him the remedy is on the bond two defences is good to try and result from. The court under judgment immediately bonds in no can resist this release & discharge even this. The bond on writ of error does not release from sales.

This remedy is proposed when the party is deprived of the use of his arms by the misconduct of the B. Co. in any action is by negotiating to with draw suit according to promise.

The L. I. of L. B. issues this note in Eng  
d by the L. I. of L. B. in L. B. I presume a judge of any of  
the courts might grant it when state did not interfere.  
The course in Eng is singular & not explained.

1628

Two Warrants. This is where some person claims  
exercising some franchise or right which it is contended  
he has no such right to exercise. As of course on the  
part of a third thus say he was chosen. but the other!!  
Narrator person say he is not. the question is tried  
upon this writ.

Also where one holds a ferry or a mill  
which the complainant says he ought not to. Yelv. 191.  
2 Yelv. 265. 115 299. Cro. Jac. 527 544. 561. 204  
1559.

If a body incorporate at your own will, <sup>by cap. naming</sup> as admitting  
to the law. 2 Bur 869 2 Roll. 1151 the body. &  
judgt is rendered in behalf of the public. 1 Feat. 174.  
1 Show 284.



2. Kelt.  
2. BL 152

*Habeas corpus.* There are two kinds of the writ applicable to us  
civil, and not to the same. & so subject to the same. The first is  
directed to keep bring up a prisoner to testify in a certain  
case. the party may demand it. It was made a ques-  
tion whether the writ could be subject if the prisoner should  
speak without compulsion. it was decided by the judges that no  
law to be found that secured the writ. & thus a statute was made  
securing him in time of war which is to be in affirmance.

The second is a writ of *habeas corpus* & subject to the same. this is claimed to be con-  
sistent with the justice of every nation. it was regulated by Stat  
Ch. 2. & now I conceive that by the opinion of eminent men  
that that Stat has not added anything to Ch. 2. except perhaps in form  
3 Pl. 131.6 & it is so considered in America. so we may not be to  
know of our law.

The object of writs call the body before the Court to know  
the cause of detention. complaining of illegality of proceeding. to let  
to bail or release. It is directed to the imprisoner & it  
removes all species of restraint of locomotion.

It is grantable in term  
time or vacation. by the judges of the Court. It is a  
writ of right. but does not extend to restraint as final  
process. 2 Co. Inst. 52

In the Stat of Charles there is a provision al-  
lowing writs for the writ in vacation. The business of the Court is  
to discharge, bail or remove 2 Hale Pl. 103. to the same as a writ  
prison

There are persons taken  
this writ is not grantable, as persons of war. not by subject.

1 Feb. 355

2 Aug. 55

1 Oct. 78

5 Nov. 23

Dec. 794



It has been questioned whether subjects of a neutral power is  
entitled to this writ. 2 Ben. 765. they bring in the subjects nor  
enemies.


If the object is to bring up one charged with a crime & his no-  
tion, & the ch. is in prison must be in writing. The writ  
is signed by the ch. in b. t. time. is directed to the off. for  
him to bring up pris. with command of detention. the  
off. must return the name of the person committing  
2 Lev. 129 one alias & pluries if prison sometimes. If not  
obeyed it is contempt. Brunt. 31.

An hon. a h. corp. could not issue  
to 'ring a pris. from ch. b. because a h. corp. court could not  
punish for disobedience.

If a party return were made to a  
h. corp. the off. is doubtless injured. as that the imprison-  
ment was an ex. the court would receive it if not b.  
before the party to his remedy. 2 Inst. 55. Vaines Rep. 186.

There may have been cause of imprisonment but cause  
may wash it. not by traversing the return, but upon bail  
or when the bail is offered after he was shut up. the question  
having been agitated as to rights of bail in such case.  
is now settled that bail off. after imprisonment must be  
accepted. & the court does not send back to off. to bail  
the ch. bail, on the return.

If one is imprisoned on sentence after  
conviction. the writ lies if it is claimed the court that  
had had no power.



# Criminal Law

There are certain principles in Criminal Law that are universal in all countries. — particularly in relation to capital offences — The C.L. has been assimilated through all the States.

A crime is said to be an act in violation of some public law <sup>law</sup> which forbids it, or omitting to do some act that a public law orders to be done.

Misdemeanors ~~are~~ in common parlance means something less than crime. But some of the most heinous crimes are misdemeanors.

of force which is not described by some technical name is a misdemeanor <sup>as an attempt to murder</sup> — No intention is a misdemeanor unless accompanied by some overt act showing that intention. This whereas thus accompanied it is a misdemeanor.

So when any thing is omitted for which omission there is no statute finally, the C.L. steps in and punishes the offender ~~as~~ for a misdemeanor.

When crimes are committed there is <sup>generally</sup> an offence against one individual and they generally the public & individual both, never, damages — a man offends, into breaches of the peace generally.

We find in Eng Law. many crimes are committed from which



and this goes upon the ground that the private injury is merged  
in the public offence.

injury arises to individuals & yet the individuals as such can have no reparation.

10 Why should not a thief be answerable to the person injured in some way — there is no reason why one should not <sup>make</sup> reparation for injuries he has committed as far as he is able. —

The reason is that in all those cases where the individual injury is merged in the public wrong by B.L. the offender is as furnished with death & his property was forfeited so that there was nothing left out of which the injured person could get reparation. — But of late years those punishments have been mitigated & and particularly in the U.S. there is no attainment of blood, and thus few of those crimes which were capital by B.L. are now furnished with death. — So that the reason if good originally cannot operate here. —

So too we find that in all the lesser offences, the offender was subject to some way at the suit of the person injured. —

In Eng. have you often heard of the benefit of clergy — the growth of the wish of the courts of soften the penal code of B.L. — At first Clergymen were not to be punished with the full rigour of the law. & the proof of being a clergy man was the ability to read. — & so late as the reign of Henry — no women were admitted to the benefit of clergy — the at that time it was retained to them. —

That even however is so much the better which produces reformation also --



Crimes are divided into those that are mala in se & mala prohibita — The first are such as would be crimes in a state of nature & whether there were statutes against them or not. The others are those whose iniquity consists in transgression of the statute. —

The object of punishment is not to reform but to deter others. —

Reasons for capital punishments are two. to deter by the terror of the punishment & effectually to secure society. —

The b. l. punishments are fixed & the legislature and not generally being proportioned to the crime are altered by statute. — When a statute is severer than the b. l. it does not repeal the b. l. but the prosecutor may prosecute on which he pleases. —

If the punishment is less it is a repeal of the b. l. & the prosecution can never indict on b. l.

In this & some <sup>other</sup> of the states. Blasphemy was punished with death by stat. by b. l. the punishment was much less & no practitioners collected and indicted at the state — it was not an offence in relation to society sufficient to warrant capital punishment. —

When an indictment is made on a statute where there is a punishment provided at b. l. if any thing prevents

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conviction on the Stat. it is <sup>still</sup> a good C.L. in dictum  
& the C.L. punishment may be inflicted.

Of those persons who are unable to furnish punishment for  
committing acts for which others would be punished.

There can be no punishment for a person who does not  
act will - for in will consists the whole blame - where  
there is free agency the actor is accountable - but if not  
there is no blame - altho there may be some fault in  
being induced to such circumstances as prevent a free  
exercise of the will -

So that when one is void of un-  
derstanding he is not to be punished.

Yet there are cases  
in which this rule is relaxed. - If the act was but  
pretty accidental it is not criminal.

So you will re-  
member to make a man the subject of punishment  
there must be will & act, & both vicious.

and tho the will may be  
criminal in foro conscientia yet if there is no act there  
no crime.

The Lunatic & idiot are not subjects of pun-  
ishment - The law is however that if he knows enough  
to discover right & wrong, he is criminal - but if he  
is entirely deprived of reason he is not criminal.



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An infant is never punished for any crime he may commit under the age of seven years - founded on a presumption of law that cannot be questioned, that they are not of judg<sup>t</sup> enough to distinguish right from wrong this is the <sup>age</sup> called in the civil law called infantia

But between the age of seven & fourteen their judg<sup>t</sup> is to be exercised & tried and it to be determined from proof this is a doubtful period called pueritia. -

After fourteen years the plea of age is of no avail.

I observed to you that want of understanding does not always excuse as in the case of drunkards - I still however the principle remains entire for it does not proceed upon the ground of the criminals having bro't this state of delirium upon himself for thus many innocents might be ruined. - But the true reason is in the policy to prevent crimes being committed under false pretences - so that we must punish intoxication with death or punish the crimes committed in that state without any reference to the alleged excuse.

And I do not see how Lunaticism can answer any purpose, the maxim there <sup>being</sup> ~~there~~ *qui delapsus in vino culpabilis non est*. - There would be no safety if it was generally accepted. -





When the <sup>act</sup> done was not intended <sup>if he was in pursuit of a lawful act</sup> it is no crime - and I do not see how the distinction introduced by all can be supported. to wit, that where the actor is about lawful business he is not accountable; but if he was doing something unlawful he is accountable for all consequences.

The fact is there is no will in either case and certainly is not accountable if death occurs when there is no will. - This is founded in policy and seems to be an exception to the general rule and is ridiculed and I think pretty by D. Harris.

When a man ignorant of the real state of things is in attempting to drive out robbers he kills one of his own family he is not guilty here is no union of will & deed.

The obligation of civil submission is always an excuse as if an ignorant law is obeyed; it is no crime - so if an enemy gets possession of a section of the country & obliges the inhabitants to obey them the inhabitants are not guilty of treason for furnishing provisions &c. - but if the inhabitants enter voluntarily into the enemies service they are accountable or if they continue longer in their service then they are obliged to -

But compulsion is no excuse in case of private coercion as of master & servant.

It is some cases when the wife does not under the coercion  
of the husband it is an excuse for her. tho in no other  
case is her coercion an excuse as with command  
of a master is no excuse for the servant too. see tit.  
Bar. 4<sup>th</sup> from Rivers case. R. 14.




There is an exception to the general rule in case of the wife, but there is no other - and there is no remedy against the common law unless these circumstances occur. There is no means of knowledge, as when an officer orders an arrest under a forged warrant there is a remedy against the officer & the ap<sup>l</sup> who may be convicted.

So if labourers are sent into a field they cannot know to whom the land belongs & they <sup>are</sup> liable to be sued for trespass but have then a remedy against the hirer. With respect to the wife the law is different. - for in many cases she is not to be punished for what she does under his coercion. - If the husband is present & assisting the law presumes her coerced. - & extends to all cases except cases of treason & keeping a brothel <sup>for heinous reasons</sup> - but if the crime is malum in se & purely no she is answerable <sup>for the act</sup> by the coercion of her husband as murder - but if it is a crime by the laws of civilized society only she is not answerable if coerced & the husband alone is punishable. -

There is one case in which if the wife is not liable for what the husband is <sup>punishable</sup> - it is not merely being in company, he must also assist and then the act of the wife is presumed to be by combination in such case. -

Of stealing to satisfy hunger: this is a crime in *foro hominis* from policy and the case is left open for the exercise of mercy - that it is a crime in *foro con-*  
scientiae I do not believe -





## Of Principal & Accessory

An unpunishable crime can have no accessory - But there are crimes in which there <sup>can</sup> be no accessories as Treason from its enormity & the deeper crime or turpitude for the opposite reason - all intermediate crimes can have accessories -

A Principal is the person who perpetrates the act and those who stand by aiding & assisting are accessories -

The only question is what is presence - If any one is in the combination watching against interruption &c is enough loosely presence is not accessory

A person can commit a crime <sup>as principal</sup> with out being present as poisoning setting traps - turning out a wife &c without any particular object. Here he is a principal when absent. <sup>352.</sup> <sup>Hale Pl. 615.</sup> <sup>Partis. b. 1. Law 452.</sup>

If then it is accessory for the actor to be present to do the act he alone is principal who is present.

Accessories are of two kinds before & after the fact.

An accessory before the fact is one who advises commands <sup>or procures</sup> or encourages another to commit the crime and is ~~not~~ present at the commission.

Sometimes he advises to do an unlawful act and something sinister follows - as if one commands another to murder b. & in doing this b. is killed

But if he had been robbed the adviser would not be an  
accomplice



it is now settled that the adviser is an accessory to every thing that takes place as a <sup>probable or necessary</sup> consequence directly issuing from the deed advised. —

Again if one advises to commit an act it is immaterial in what manner it is committed he is an accessory before the facts, as if shooting be advised & the object is poisoned the adviser is accessory to the <sup>murder</sup>. If he were present at the time of commission he is a principal, but the advice merely makes him only an accessory. Hale. 615.

An accessory after the fact is when a person knowing the facts conceals the criminal — helps him escape, furnishes him with the means of escape &c. — It is not every act of charity that constitutes one an accessory. — but it must be an act that has for its object the escape of the prisoner from the hand of justice —

He is an accessory after the fact who receives the property acquired by the commission of the crime ~~as~~ a receiver of stolen goods — it was not so at C. H. but by a very ancient Statute it is since made very penal Hale 618. 2 Hawk 319.

To make a man an accessory after the facts the crime must have been completed. — He may be guilty of a crime but is not an accessory of that crime as if one murders or shoots one who has wounds with from which death ensues. — he is not accessory to the murder if the act is done before the death. There is one exception in favor

1. Hale 621-

On the other hand if acquitted when tried as accessory he cannot  
be tried again as principal. — Nat Law. 4 Pl. 40 — thus general.



2 Hawk. 320

So. L. furnishes one a temporary as necessary or  
it does a principal <sup>the punishment of a</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~has been~~ <sup>help</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>legislature</sup>...

If one is tried as a principal he cannot be convicted as an accessory at the same trial - the offenses are distinct, the reason of his acquittal might be that he was an accessory - But if the time when is afterwards comes, this same man might be convicted as a co-conspirator -

I shall now notice particular crimes & show you the  
C. L. which is the foundation of all laws on this sub-  
ject - the constitution of the crime is still the same -  
the statutes may vary the punishment and the definition is some-  
times altered



61 The truth is that the probability is if the out house is burnt the dwelling will be endangered.

Arson is defined to be at C.L. the wilful <sup>deliberate</sup> malicious burning the house of another. L. 136 210.

It must be wilful. for if it was unintentional. or thro negligence it would not be arson.

It must be malicious - the legal signification of this word is that, to do with a wicked motive. & it is not necessary that the actor should have any ill will to the injured - the Latin word *malitia* is much better than by our English - it is to be done *malis animo*. - Hale 615.

The word house in the definition has occasioned much dispute - the Latin term is *domus*. - a dwelling, house - & if the house burnt by C.L. is not a dwelling; it is not arson the statutes have made it so. - Hawk. 155.

Out houses within the curtilage of the dwelling house are considered parts of the dwelling house & the subjects of arson by C.L. but a distinct house is not. <sup>(2)</sup>

Some states have made it arson to burn others but I believe no statute makes it arson to burn a barn by itself unless it is filled with grain.

The Eng. law. is undoubted by that it is not arson to burn ones own house - Some states take out the words "of another" yet still our superior court

c. And so if not mentioned for the act is illegal, ita h. &c. -  
Contrary to the analogous case of homicide



have decided to not to be answer to burn our own house  
yet by the Eng Law if a neighbours house is destroyed  
by burning our own it is answer - if done maliciously  
1 Hawk. 166. Cro. 642. 377. 1 Hawk. 166

Suppose according to Eng Law that the life  
or lifeless burns the house - the decisions has been  
contradictory.

I suppose it would be answer in either of  
these if done with male animus - it is the whole house  
& more particularly perhaps the dwelling house of the  
lifeless - Hale. Crim. Law. Tit. 42.

The least possible burning in burning is suffi-  
cient to constitute answer, even tho it went out of  
itself if the fire was set with male animus.

If it intended  
to burn B's house & by mistake set fire to A's it is  
still answer -

The C.L. punishment is death without  
benefit of clergy - In many states it is death, in  
other perpetual confinement - In our state, it is  
confinement in newgate unless life is now given  
when it is death - as if fire is set to a house  
with a family in it. -

The law of New Jersey is the same  
as that of Gen. and in our trial there for burning a barn, the  
criminals life depended on which way the wind blew. -

9. The principle is that there is not so much danger & terror in an attack by day as when the world is at rest.



## Burglary

Burglary is the breaking & entering a mansion house in the night season with an intent to commit a felony. — all these are necessary to constitute burglary — it is not necessary you will observe to actually prove the actual commission of a felony —

Pilory in Eng is a crime which is punished with forfeiture of all estates & punishable at b. l. with death. —

We then mean in our instructions by the word felony that offence which is followed in Eng by forfeiture of lands goods & chattels & the punishment of which is death.

What is meant by night season? it is not night when a face can be distinguished by the light of the day. It may be felony at the so light from the moon that a face might be distinguished (9 y Co. b. Mon 660. 1 Hawk. 160. Cro. E li. 553.

What is meant by mansion house — it is a house in which someone dwells. — so by b. l. a store or a house not inhabited is not included. —

A church is a mansion house or included in the term. 1 Hawk 162

But the house is sometimes dwelt in and sometimes not



for the law is not scrupulous in favour of rogues. -

it is burglary to break them. - altho it happens at  
the time when there is no one there -

The law is the same  
respecting all buildings that are within the curtilage  
of the house. - but not with-out by C.L.

Asch with  
goods in it are not within the law by Statute for the  
protection of property in house. it has been deter-  
mined that every thing built for the protection of goods  
is within the definition of a house. - So too in bank the rule  
has been extended to vessels, packets, stores, shoe shops &c -

4 Co. 40. Kellogg 27. 52. Poph. 42.

There must  
be a breaking: not a mere legal breaking viz it must  
be going in <sup>the open door</sup> in the night. - and entry thro' door or  
window when is not breaking tho it would be trespass  
but if it be that it is enough so that lifting a latch  
is enough. - Kellogg 52. Hutton 20. Bro 6th 65. So crawling  
down chimney is breaking. -

a person may be let into a house and while it be breaking,  
as if fraud is practised by answering a friend whose as-  
ked who was there - so when the villain enters by  
means of a constable procured on false suggestion  
So if an accomplice admits them -

There must be an  
entry - thus it would be an entry if one put in his  
arm or a stick to get the goods so the putting a

If one watched while another entered, the watcher is deemed  
to have entered. — Knyfing. III.



Key in the door when nothing more was done was carried  
over waterings so holding a mistle part way within a win-  
dow - So if one puts his foot on the sill of the door and  
is then frightened away - Felings 111

It must be with an intent to commit felony it is not necessary  
that felony should have been actually committed. Show. 53  
Haw. 481. 1 Hawk 164.

The punishment of burglary by 6<sup>th</sup> is  
death without benefit of clergy - In U.S. it is different  
in different states. in some states it is death for the second offence  
in some it is transportation.

### Perjury

Perjury is defined to be false swearing, wilfully in a point  
material in the case by a person under oath administered by  
lawful authority, respecting some proceeding in a court of justice.

The oath must be administered by a per-  
son qualified to administer it by law. 1 Hawk 318.

A man may be guilty  
of perjury when the fact he swears to is true, is absolutely  
true if he swore it to be otherwise than he swore  
it was - or if he knew nothing of the fact if he  
swears concerning it.

It must be done wilfully as one who  
swears positively to fact concerning which he was im-  
plicated this would not be false swearing 5 Mod 315. 16 Mod. 195  
1 Sal 513. 1 Hawk 319. neither would it be if he were surprised

So it would be paying to swear falsely before persons appointed  
to transact some public business or proceeding.



It must be relative to some proceeding in a court of justice - it need not be given in court viva voce perjury may be committed before persons, authorized to take an affidavit or deposition -

It is perjury if a man swears wilfully to what he does not believe -

But if it is relative to some thing not before court it is not perjury - as an oath of office is not the object for perjury - 1 Hawk. 319.


It was a long time questioned whether perjury could be committed before arbitrators, but it is now settled that they are a court & false swearing before them is perjury -

But there can be no perjury indicated on an official oath, or private affidavit or promissory oath Geo. Ely. 185. 609. 168. 907  
1 Roll 39. 2 Roll 257.

It must be administered by lawful authority. 4 Bl. 157. Arbitrators cannot administer oaths & if they do perjury is not punishable on it unless one of them is a justice or they must call in a person authorized to administer the oath.

This has raised a question, whether a court suppose they can try the case where in fact they cannot - If the governing principle was that





it is perjury if any one is injured by the false swearing  
as an individual. it would not be perjury - but  
that is not the principle - for the witness knows nothing  
of the fact as to the jurisdiction he is just as  
guilty - the injury to the community is the gross  
principle & it is perjury. - 1 Kent. 181.

If a man swears the fact to be as he believes it to  
be it is never perjury -

A deposition is always falsely  
made when a man swears a thing to be so when he knows nothing  
about it, or believes it to be otherwise - 3 Mod 222. 1 Hawk 322  
Palmer 292

Some rules are laid down in the books that can now  
hardly stand - It was said that the witness must  
swear absolutely - a man might in this way cover  
up all the perjury in the world. - and the old rule is  
done away - but if a man says I am really at a place  
it really is not evidence of perjury - so that positive  
swearing is not necessary.

It must be in a court  
material. now witnesses tell long stories and something  
not material is the foundation of perjury -

But if a wit-  
ness tells his story to be truthful to gain confidence  
by a smooth story to gain credit & the story is false  
the nothing to do with the main point it is perjury  
see Ely 550. 1 Salk 514 Barth 422. Palmer 382.  
1 Hawk. 324 for here it is not to all intents immaterial.

It is also why the party injured by forgery could not recover the actual damage suffered, besides the amount of the penalty, for this was never intended as a reparation. - See also our different -

Statutes have made many things forgery that were not so by C.L. the there is nothing which was forgery at C.L. that is not so now.



How far material has been a question. It is relevant or does it conduce to know the point. that is the principle. 2 Ray 258. 889.

Subornation of perjury is nothing more than inducing a witness to swear falsely, and is punished exactly as perjury is. 1 Hawk 325.

This punishment was very severe it was death. afterwards the barbarous punishment was introduced of cutting out the tongue at the same banishment — Now the b. & L. punishment is fine imprisonment & the pillory <sup>at discretion</sup> as the criminal is guilty of the crime false & some more others for a witness.

The statutes of the several states as far as I have seen them give a remedy over by private prosecution <sup>or public statute</sup> to the person injured — they do not do away his liability to public prosecution unless expressly so provided — some states have limited the time of imprisonment others have left it as at b. & L. to the discretion of the courts.

### Forgery

Forgery at b. & L. was making or attesting any record or any <sup>the</sup> authentic matter of a public nature or any deed or will with an intent to prevent justice

It includes justly of course not of record of record to writing

It is a paper a writing not in a - not a - not of hand  
must not be faking the - high misdeeds.



and equity - 1 Hawk 335 -

Under the head of record is included, record<sup>or copy</sup> of  
courts or statutes of a private nature

By authentic matter of public nature  
is meant records of births, deaths, marriages or certifi-  
cates of them, or protections or grants by courts. - <sup>affidavits</sup>

By deeds are meant instruments under  
seal as deeds of lands notes be. but not notes  
without seal (the <sup>them</sup> are included) by statute, so  
to wills, covenants & bonds. -

Many more things are the  
subjects of forging by statute. - Our statute now  
filed dates all kinds you can think of & then says all  
other writings. 1 Hawk 335. Geo Eliz 196. 353.  
1 Roll 66.

It will be necessary to mention examples to  
explain this subject. - A sells to B by deed & then after  
wards sells the same land to C & to carry on the  
cheats he antedates his last deed to cheat B  
this is forgery you will remember if it is not done  
to prevent justice & equity it is not forgery.  
now we will suppose a case - A borrowed  
money some time since & now to secure to B  
the interest he antedates the bond this is not  
forgery - so that antedating of itself is not for-  
gery 1 Hawk 336 above 655. 759. & as this is to be  
our token star in cases of this kind. -



A person can execute a legacy which he cannot insert in the will & the person entitled to the legacy under the will is not a party.

Letting in a legacy into a will before the testator's death is not a legacy.


In the case before mentioned of inserting the legacy & no other effect than giving a man property to which he was not entitled & making an addition to the will but here there is merely an omission & it would be singular what to destroy the will on this account.

of scrivener writing a will for the testator & feeling  
some interest that his friend should have a legacy  
he introduced one without the knowledge of the tes-  
tator & omitted reading that item when he  
was signing. — It was forgery being an attestation

If a man  
writes a note over a blank name with a cir-  
cled <sup>to check</sup> sign, it is forgery — but not without. — It is  
however dangerous to meddle with these things.  
If to say on the paper the man had signed the <sup>note</sup> the  
drawee had persisted it would be forgery.

The following case is a very old one. — A  
man made a bargain to make his neighbor indebted  
to him 100 marks the bond was drawn for £100 and  
the owner when he got home finding the bond less  
than it ought to be altered it back to 100 marks  
the bond was made void but as the attestation was  
not made with design to cheat it was not forgery.

A man was directed to insert a legacy in a will and  
he omitted to do it & read it as if he had. was it  
forgery? — if it is the whole will must be consid-  
ered as a forgery as being different than was intended  
this case does not appear to have been determined. — There  
is a mere omission — not doing in itself is not forgery.





Punishment of this crime is fine imprisonment and  
flogging at discretion. <sup>By</sup> Eng Stat it is now death  
And in U.S. it is severely punished as it is a great  
offence in a commercial country.

### Robbery

Robbery is a felonious violent taking away from  
the person of another his goods or money no matter  
how little - it is likewise added putting in fear  
but this is never laid in the indictment & not  
necessary to be proved so I think the addition  
redundant. The law presumes the putting in fear if  
the other parts of the definition are established

The goods must be taken away feloniously - with a  
view to steal. - if not so however violent means  
no robbery if not done feloniously - Neither is it  
robbery unless done with violence for slyly steal-  
ing is not robbery.

By violence is <sup>meant</sup> ~~some~~ act by which  
the man sees his life is endangered or by words  
used - the delivery may be peaceable Ld Hawk 147

If the goods  
are once taken, giving them back does not purge the  
robbery - as is sometimes done by high minded robbers  
! Ld Hawk 147.

So the delivery must be in consequence of the fact this is  
the criterion -



The property must be taken - The robber cut a girl's  
apron which was attached to the horse's bridle and carried it  
away before he picked it up - it was not robbery -  
1 Hawk. 148.

Any one who is by watching is guilty of the violence  
+ as much a robber as the principal -

We find in the definition that the taking must be from  
the person - Case - Robbers order the man to deliver  
up the cattle in a certain lot - the court held it  
taking from the person since it was personal  
property 1 Hawk 148. & in his possession. 1 Gal. 613. 145.

It is true that it

must be such taking as would tend to make a man  
afraid <sup>before delivery</sup> - so privately taking a watch from one's pocket  
privately is not robbery whatever violence might follow.  
So a threatening aspect such as is used by street beggars  
is sufficient. Foster 6. L. 128.

Threatening to reveal a crime  
upon a man would be force enough in occasioning  
fear & he pays money to prevent it. Keeling 70. The  
case on which the charging is false - This ap.

of theft has no relation to the value of goods taken.  
I mention this because at 6. L. if the property taken  
in theft did not exceed 12<sup>d</sup> the law did not punish  
with death. - This crime of Robbery is punished with  
death at 6. L. & so in most of the states. For 6. L. if the  
Robbery is effected without weapons so that life is not im-  
dangered the punishment is for life - otherwise for life -



Whom of clergy was admitted to give entry in the name of a house. —

And when so taken the punishment is death & forfeiture of goods and chattels at C.C.

It was once thought that the bailor was not to be the subject of seizure, but now it is found that he has the nature of a trustee when bailor it is theft but if the man is a tenant after

The offences of Burglary and Robbery are commonly called compound Larceny and are included in the brief of charge — but the species of theft now to be mentioned are simple larcenies which are again divided into grand & petit larceny. Petit larceny is stealing in value less than 1<sup>l</sup>. In general same species of punishment is applied to grand as petit larceny but in different degrees. — The present value of 1<sup>l</sup> shows what it was when the rule was established gave great latitude to juries in construing the meaning of the rule.

#### Theft or simple Larceny.

Theft is defined to be the felonious taking and carrying away the personal goods of another <sup>by any person</sup> not from his person by violence that would be robbery nor in the night season that would be burglary — <sup>from his house</sup> 1 Black. 134

It must be feloniously that is with the animus furandi. — A man may take without liberty & will not be stealing neither will it if he claims it. — So taking a horse for any other purpose than to steal it would not be theft. so if after using he turned up the horse it is not theft.

If bailment is procured with a view to steal it is theft but if not after that it would not be theft but if circumstances show as hiring the horse to go to Stear



He will not be with the ship.

Can of Contrabands finding the Prison store. Had of the  
man in a heavy carrying off the whole of the

He will take too much care, he is a thief, but of the  
ship the whole he is not. - He is a man carrying  
away the whole of the ship. But if he takes  
the whole of the ship. But if he is delivered to a man  
want to be carried off with the ship, it is that the  
Lamp house is in the corner of the continent  
corner of the corner of the ship. - but the  
of the middle, the sailor & carrier. I do  
not understand. 1. Hand - 1. 36. 1. 3. 4



if he is next seen at Hartford offering the horse for sale it would show the animus furandi - unless the circumstance plainly show his intention originally to go to Sharon. — Leach. Cr. Law. 355. ~~253~~ 253.

Another set of cases where the goods are delivered in bailment attended with benefit to the Bailee — as corn carried to Mill. — it is delivered to be ground & being refused is told he is a thief if he steals it. 1 Hawk. 130. Kellogg 35. 43. 1 Roll 73. More 246. Pak. 84. 1 Sid. 254. 20 of a common carrier.

Case. A steals from B & then C steals from A. Story said A was not a thief because A had no property but the court said the property was never changed by stealing & C was convicted of stealing from B.

Crimes are punished only when it was committed, but a thief may be punished whenever he goes with the property — it is said the thief steals in every county through which he passes: — but I think this a significant point, for the crime is only once committed. — I think the thief must be tried where he stole. —

There must be also a carrying away. The first annotation amounts to carrying away. — 1 Hawk. 141

A man was found tying up shirts — so loading — horse under suspicion etc






circumstances it was carrying away — So taking some  
books out of the trunk he was convicted of stealing  
all he took & laid on the floor. So a sheep  
half owned. — It was decided however in ~~one~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~case~~  
that as the thief only set a bale of goods on one end  
was decided not be theft. so tearing an earing  
out of the ear & it lodged in the hair it was  
sufficient annotation. Helings 315. —

To the definition of theft  
there is an exception as to "any person" in favour of  
a wife, it is said a wife may give away the  
property of her husband. — But there is no authority  
to this point — I think if the wife was made  
use of as an instrument and the man took the goods  
unanimous ~~per~~ <sup>per</sup> ~~se~~ <sup>se</sup> it would be theft. — 1 B. & C. 125.

It must be per  
sonal property — so that cutting & carrying off trees or  
reaping & carrying off what it is no theft. but if  
he carries off apples which are on the ground or they  
cut or wheat reaped it would be theft. — because  
the property has become personal in these latter cases  
this distinction is very nice. — it is adherence to the  
old maxims — How in reality how long does it take  
for real to become personal property — 2 B. 223

Neither can choses  
in action be stolen or bonds notes &c the principle  
is that the thief gets no advantage by it. — But I think





that a bill payable to bearer is a species of money & may be stolen. — Some states have made bank notes the subjects of theft. But there was no occasion of it for the decisions have made its theft for they are in fact as much money as shillings suppose the bill counterfeited he took it as money and has a right to treat it so.

If a horse is stolen & sold the owner can reclaim it. But if it had been a bank bill the owner cannot call upon the man who received it from the thief — it is a matter of policy for it would otherwise be dangerous to take money for it might once have been stolen 4 B. & L. 233. 1 Mod. 891 1 Vent. 187. Stra. 1137. 8. 60. 33. — 1 Hawk 141

Wherever a man takes money & passes it to a bona fide holder it cannot be reclaimed by the owner —

Creations of which as dogs, cats, monkeys &c cannot be stolen tho they are subjects of larceny. — Theft cannot be committed on fish in a fishing place tho it may be if they are inclosed in a pond — 1 Hawk. 144

A man may commit theft on his own property as by secreting his own property to make an insurer <sup>or any licensee</sup> liable so if property is delivered on contract & the owner takes it to make the other contractor liable. it is theft. — Cro E. 536

Blasphemy is a crime at C. L. it is said to be  
the denial of true of god scoffing, contumacious  
reproaches. Punished by law from misnomer.



By G. L. grand jury <sup>punished with</sup> death with benefit of clergy  
Some stealing is generally more severely punished than other  
theft.

### Piracy.

Every species of theft or robbery at sea which <sup>would</sup> be  
felony if done on land is piracy -- unless it is done  
by the inmates of the vessel <sup>when it is embayed</sup> & it may be done  
privately or publicly / Hawk. 152. 4 Bl. 71 2 Wood. 421

Now it must be done without au-  
thority for privateers are not piracy.

As to the punishment  
of piracy it is by the Law of nations and is death. the  
point, is <sup>to be tried</sup> in an admiralty court & note that of G. L.  
& in all European countries. as apt. G<sup>th</sup> Brittain is by  
the judge. when it is tried by jury so it would  
be here as the right of trial is preserved by our con-  
stitution. - It would not be piracy if committed within the  
limits of a country.

### Riots.

A riot is a disturbance of the peace by three or more  
persons assembled together of their own head with the in-  
tent mutually to assist each <sup>other</sup> against every body that  
opposes them in the execution of some enterprise.

This en-  
terprise must be of a private nature - must be actually  
executed & by violence <sup>so as to involve</sup> & it is not material whether

They are often called by the name of "Liberators"  
for the purpose of being distinguished

By that there are accumulative punishments if the party  
does not desist in bearing the net read in recital.



the thing to be done is lawful or unlawful.

It must be  
by them and if there are indicted & only two convicted  
they are not rioters they must be all convicted. except  
indeed the jury find the two did it with another  
to them unknown.

They must be collected of their own head. 1 Hawk 293  
4 Bl. 146. 6 Mod. 43. 1 Salk 595. 1 Ray. 484. 1 Str  
196. i.e. not collected together by public force.

They must be assembled to execute a project of a pri-  
vate nature i.e. against an individual if otherwise  
is a rebellion or treason.

They must accomplish the  
the object. if they try to do not make out it is  
a rout - if they do not attempt <sup>before</sup> their hearts fail  
then it is neither riot nor rout but an unlawful  
assembly.


It must be done with violence - in such a  
manner as to excite terror. - 3 Hens. 1263. 1264.

Whether the thing to be done  
is lawful or not is perfectly immaterial - for there  
may be a riot in abating or destroying a nuisance  
3 Mod. 3. 2 Show. 235.

At Rout has all the incidents  
of a riot except the thing was not executed.

An unlawful  
assembly has all the incidents of a riot only they do not





only <sup>not</sup> execute their project but they did not attempt it.  
But any assembly to plan a riot is an unlawful  
assembly. Hob. 92. 1 Salk 594. 1 Vent. 369, 380. Hawk  
299. 4 Bl. 146


It is such a thing as to assemble to protect  
ones house or estate 5 Co. 91. 11 Mod. 116. and it be a  
lawful assembly for a man has a right to assemble his  
friends to protect his estate

These species of which I have  
been speaking are of much nature than any species of  
the peace need not wait a warrant & may command  
the peace to suppress it. & he is warranted if he makes  
a mistake. Private persons may also suppress if  
they chose but if they make a mistake it is at  
their perils. 22 121. 1 Roll. 76.

Punishment at C. L. is <sup>fixed</sup> imprisonment & some cases pillory  
killory <sup>at discretion</sup> however is done away by our Statutes

Battery is  
also punishable by fine as well by private prosecu-  
tion - This is distinct from assault, which is falling  
together by the ears without premeditation. 4 Bl. 145  
punished by fine -

Trial for this offence is not to be used in a private  
prosecution.





## Usury

It is not all usury that is criminal usury - it makes a bargain with B to lend him \$100 at 12% & the bargain is void - but it is no crime until the unlawful interest is paid. - It is all criminal in our sense but I mean by the word that which is liable to public prosecution


Whenever a man reserves more than the legal interest the bargain is void, if he receives more it is criminal -

If the note is good at first it is good at last tho the payer is liable to the penalties -

If the note is ever so bad he is not liable unless he receives more than lawful interest. A gives to B a note for \$100 - B did not let A have the 90. this note is void -

A gives to B a note for \$100 & B lets him have \$100 but B demands and receives more than legal interest. it does not hurt the note but B is subject to the statute penalties -

A wants to borrow of B \$100 goes to him & tells him he wants to borrow \$100. B says he must a premium - to wit 5% when the interest is 6 & then B lets him have a hundred - the question is, is that note void or is the payer liable? if he has reserved too much the note is void. if he has taken too much he is subject to the penalties. They say he has not reserved



too much but it is all a farce it makes no odds  
out of which protect the premium is paid -

Suppose

again the premium is but \$5. It does not alter the  
case. for its merely taking back part of the sum loan-  
ed & is the same as lending 95 & taking a note for \$100.

### Of Libels as a crime -

It is said sometimes that a libel is only slander written  
a libel must be written & all that if slander if  
spoken would be libel if written. yet there is a great  
difference - In order for a man to recover a law  
for slander he must be charged with a crime that  
would, had he committed it, have subjected him to pun-  
ishment.

Every thing which has a tendency to excite  
a man's passions, to render him ridiculous in the eyes  
of the world, tend to a breach of the peace - or tend  
to prevent mankind associating with him 2 Wils. 403.  
is a libel -

A libel may be effected by signs & pictures without words

You may indict two at once for libel where  
only one can be used in slander & slander is not  
in indictable at all




For truths when told are as likely to excite a break of the peace  
as untruths, & sometimes more. —

Convinced that my own words state what the government has  
done, & that by telling the truth might be given for evidence  
in a prosecution for the same, I have not hesitated  
to publish it as follows.

If it is said by others for London. to say give the truth in evidence.

But in public prosecution for private libels the truth cannot be given in evidence this has been granted with but I think unjustly. - for according to principle it is perfectly correct - and it perfectly immaterial whether the story is true or false. - and whether one or the other the public honor is equally endangered. But if the prosecution is a private one for damages the truth may be given in evidence - these are the principles of C. L.

From this it was supposed that when the public administration is libelled the truth could not be given in evidence & there was a statute made to permit it. but I do suppose that by C. L. rules the same thing might be determined as is now done by the statute. - It would be a discretion that would not allow of this. - We ought to be allowed to discuss the measures of the government. The opinion of one man, or that he thinks different from the government is no libel. - If an editor charge the government with having done what they have not done it is a libel. - Further there is no occasion to use reproachful language in discussing public measures, or ascribing to the government wrong motives, if editors so this let them stand for it.






By enacting this statute a door is opened for giving <sup>in</sup> evidence the truth in public prosecution, & thus from its very language the b. l. principle is destroyed. —

There may be such books as are libellous, or those which <sup>as tending to excite hemisphires of the laws of society</sup> are of an immoral tendency. — This has been as-  
tended or tried to be to see how our antislavery length  
& books may contain principles which you or I  
think may tend to loosen the bands of society  
but this is not the thing. Any sober description  
of any question is not a libel. — But vile books  
and such as tend to excite vile practices which are  
contrary to the laws of society are libels.

This libel must be published, for  
if one writes a libel & locks it up in his scrutoire  
& is not got at except by breaking it open it  
is not a libel. —

A private letter was considered as a  
libel as it tended to break the peace. —

Reading —  
Libels to our family from a newspaper because it  
was humorous is not publishing. — But if a man  
sets a libel in a newspaper and goes about to spread it, it is  
slander. In short it depends upon the manner taken pains  
to spread it with a view of diffamating slander. —






Chambers This as on a understood matter every  
man who purchased debts of any kind as notes bonds  
he or any other witnesses of debts. & said for  
them. it was an offence to have it in circulation  
lawfully but in process of time it became  
a matter of great convenience to part with  
such notes bonds & therefore it became ne-  
cessary to sell them & this sale began  
to be supported by law from whence it has  
become the idea that the law has be-  
come obsolete in all cases but the fact  
is the law remains the same so far as is  
necessary for the good of the public e.g. a  
man has money & of B & B hold notes e.g.  
at this if he buys of these notes for the purpose  
of <sup>recreation</sup> making money the old law remains as  
it was & the offence is punished by fine &  
imprisonment. but when such notes come in  
the way of trade and are received for the  
payment of debts the old law is done away  
with. 41 Geo. 3. 52. 1 Hawk. 525.

Upon the same principle is the law with  
respect to selling & disposing of title to land there  
is an act intended to prevent those sales & both  
the purchaser & seller are liable to punishment.  
because it is nothing more than purchasing a  
law suit. It is the business of the party out





of possession to bring the suit & get possession &  
the money sold this was an offence at C.L.  
The 8th of Mar 8th added more provisions which were  
inflicted in addition to the fine inflicted by C.L.  
this 8th makes the said void. Since it has been  
questioned whether in those states where there is no  
8th making the said void whether it is void.  
the answer to this is that our answer to C.L.  
this old statute with the 8th & the 8th is as much  
binding now as the C.L. itself. Plow. 80. 88. the  
whole sec. - 60. Chit 369. notes.


A question of an ag-  
graved crime arises out of this suppose a man sell a most  
gauge when another is in possession claiming it. or  
suppose mortgagee sells would he be guilty of  
this offence. this is depends upon the light in  
which mortgages are to be considered. if the  
mortgage is ~~of~~ real property then he is guilty  
of the offence if personal it is not an offence.  
The courts of mass in this state decided that it  
was not an offence & this I think is correct.  
Observe that it is no offence to sell to the one  
in possession for this settles the dispute upon the  
whole then a purchase to speculate merely is an of-  
fence & which is aggravated if done with a view to  
use otherwise it is no breach of the law. 4 Bl. 135





Chicanery - This is sometimes a mere private injury & thus it is a public offence & it is my object to show when it is a public offence, when one man sells to another property which he himself had acquired it is a private injury only for which an action will lie all the kind of overreaching or making good bargains or it is called is no public offence but it is a public offence when the man by mere action or conduct imposes upon the man with whom he is dealing. & this is indictable. ex. gr. a man goes into a store at 4th & gets another to call him Mr. Dunning upon the strength of which he is allowed to take up articles upon credit & then runs off & this is a public offence & indictable.

Every thing of this kind when a man appears in a style different from his usual by which he cheats it is a public offence. when a man cheats by tokens it is the same thing. so is selling by false weights & measures. - This is limited by fine imprisonment or pillory according to the nature of the case & the court may make them find penalties for good behavior or commit them.





## Pigamy


This is when a man has two wives at once & is an offence at B.L. and is punishable by fine imprisonment or pillory or the ear may be.

When the husband or wife is not heard of for 7 years at B.L. the husband or wife may marry again without being guilty of this offence.

Forcible Entry or detaining a man's home or land is an indictable offence. If a man attempts to get possession of his house when another is in possession or when the other remains in after the expiration of a lease it is an indictable offence if he does it by force but if he does it by artifice it is no offence because he has a right to be in possession. The reason of this distinction is a consideration of policy in order to preserve the peace. The law does not allow a man to take himself possession of his own if it will lead to a breach of the peace.

If a man comes to the house armed & bring a mob with him threatening to attack them if they do not give up the house it is the same as if he actually entered by violence for it serves to inspire





terror. - But there may also be a forcible detainer  
if the owner in possession detains a house with  
violence he is also guilty of a public offence  
liable to be indicted. the mode of proceeding is that  
the party complaining calls a court & they enquire  
into the circumstances & they go & turn the owner  
out but this does not decide the title. the one  
so turned out may be fined - whether he can be  
imprisoned I don't know. See Stat 256. Stra 443.  
D. Ray. 1514 Geo 3<sup>d</sup> 199.

Obstructing public jus-  
tice - When an officer suffers a man to escape  
this is an offence when it is against his will. but it  
is punished by nothing but a fine. Every escape by ac-  
cidents is called a negligent escape & however it  
may be against his will it is an offence punishable  
by fine. But if it is a voluntary escape it may  
be punished with imprisonment. By the old Statute  
when the prisoner broke prison he was punished  
by death. but now it is fine & imprisonment  
rescuing the prisoner from the officer is an offence  
for which formerly the party rescuing was pun-  
ished in the same manner as the prisoner would  
have been. but now it is fine & imprisonment  
at the discretion of the Court.

Compromising a felony  
is an indictable offence. - It can however be

Bribery is punished in the given & party bribes is first  
infringement if the officer is executive. & death if he  
is judicial.




turn two or more men to get an innocent man indicted in order to have him punished, then if the man is acquitted, the others are liable to be indicted & by C. L. they could not be given a witness their goods & chattels were forfeited & their lands forfeited for life. Their lives were to be rooted up, their lands blighted & they themselves imprisoned for life & fed on bread & water. This was the old Law on Law & shows the indignation with which it viewed this offence. In Eng a modern Statute makes it punishable with death if the man was indicted for a crime that was capital, but otherwise the punishment is imprisonment for life. — In this country the punishment I suppose would be at the discretion of the courts.

### Treason —

Much of the Eng. law regarding treason we have nothing to do with.

Laying war against the government, any attempt to change the government or forcible to change the administration. — So if any be taken to create a reform as in Gordon mob, this is treason — Acting with force to incur the repeal of a law is treason or if it be done with a view to compel the enactment of laws it is the same. There are certain things which however are different from treason — as suppose there is an in-





survation. when they have none of the objects above mentioned in view. But when they have some object in view & they aim themselves, such as there are nothing more than high handed riots.

Then are certain things declared treason by St. which before the Stat. were not so. as when in Eng. the old lords used to get their wapsals together & attack each other this was in feudal times. now there are declared treason by Statute & was owing to the particular circumstances of the country. This is one of the same nature as quarrels between students & sailors -

Lending aid to the enemies of the republic is treason & this whether the enemy is a foreign nation or your own countrymen who have rebelled, rendering them intelligence, giving them clothing &c or in short any thing which enables them to pursue their warfare is treason. But when these acts are done thro' compulsion it is not treason.

King v Gordon Serje. & Howard 37. 4 all 132 to 136 Pos. be. L. 211. 19. — In case of revolution when in fact the supreme magistrate is an usurper those who obey him are not guilty of treason. Those who constitute treason, there must be some overt act.

See 6 H. 125 — It has been questioned whether writing was treason. but now the law is that it is not. Then was indeed a violation of the law in the case





of Henry. Nos. 198. 10 Feb. 118. all are principally  
who are concerned in treason there are no exceptions.  
It is laid down in the Eng. books that there  
must be two witnesses to convict a man of treason  
whereas in the other cases one is sufficient. It is  
said a wife may be compelled to be a witness against  
her husband in treason but I see no authority to sup-  
port this - probably it is the dictum of some  
lawyer or judge on the bench. -

#### Homicide -

This is an interesting & important subject & there are  
no states varying the principles of the C.L. in any of  
the states, & the punishments are attached by the

Homicide includes murder, manslaughter, excusable  
& justifiable homicide. There are some cases

of murder not governed by the general principles, but there  
this is the policy -

To constitute murder there must be malice,  
by malice is meant acting from a wicked, in-  
excusable motive it discloses the malus animus.

The circumstances that attend the act must disclose  
the malice & be such as show an unocial heart  
as the actor was totally regardless of consequences.  
& when this principle is not disclosed it is not mur-  
der, unless in the case of policy as I shall  
mention.

Compulsory manslaughter is where the man did not intend any particular thing & where it is contrary to his wish & intention that the act should be done that constitutes the manslaughter. —



### Man slaughter

This is of two kinds voluntary & involuntary

Voluntary manslaughter is when one from sudden <sup>with or without an intent to kill</sup> unexpected provocation kills another. it does not disclose such a character or makes it dangerous for the actor to live — it is unpunished if he has <sup>had</sup> time to cool before the act done & after the provocation it is revenge & murder —

And you will understand that a slight provocation is no excuse — words are never an excuse — Heat & Passion are not the excuse it is the substantial provocation which <sup>reasonably</sup> excites them that constitutes the excuse. He might not design to kill. but death follows from the act which he voluntarily does. — The reason why it is not murder is because he has not had time to cool —

The second kind is involuntary manslaughter & happens in two cases when a man is engaged in some unlawful project & in the execution of it he kills a man it is manslaughter. — Again when a man is engaged in doing what is lawful but does it negligently it is involuntary manslaughter — so that it must be done for the course of some unlawful business or of some lawful business negligently done.

If a man however kills another in such case this negligence it is  
involuntary homicide.



Another kind is excusable homicide as it is called  
This likewise happens is done in defence say  
when a man does all that he can to escape  
killed the man attacking him. — In some cases  
homer killing in defence is justifiable homicide  
as is the prevention of a felony — as killing rob-  
bers, burglars, rapists &c — there is little difference

Excusable homicide  
presupposes a quarrel an affray & the man is  
bound to do every thing he can to prevent the  
injury before he kills the offender — & there is no question in  
such cases who was to blame. —

If a man in the  
execution of lawful business kills another without <sup>out</sup> ~~fault~~  
negligence it is excusable homicide. by ~~misad-~~  
venture or chance merely as it is called —

Justifiable  
homicide is the execution of a criminal by the  
State so when an officer has arrested a criminal <sup>or attempts to arrest</sup> he is  
bound to <sup>take</sup> keep him & may use violence for the pur-  
pose. — If he kills him there must be an appa-  
rent necessity — & if one is killed thro' revenge it is  
a different thing.

Case — a child creeps into a hay  
mow unknown to any one — a man unwittingly in  
getting <sup>kills him</sup> hay it is not murder there was no malice  
It was <sup>not</sup> justifiable homicide as technically used for it  
was not done under authority to execute public justice



*[The text on this page is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a handwritten letter or document, possibly in cursive script, spanning approximately 15 lines. The ink is very light, and the paper shows signs of age and wear.]*

It is excusable homicide by chance only - so if  
an ox flies off the wheel that was not to be ex-  
pected it is the same.


But if the ox had been  
used to fly off - it is <sup>not</sup> voluntary but involuntary  
manslaughter as done in the negligent execution  
of lawful business. - So was the shooting a man when  
one went to shoot a shark in order to steal it. -

The Eng. law is an entire deviation from this prin-  
ciple - that says if one is in pursuit of an act  
that is felony <sup>& kills a man</sup> it is murder - but if the act  
was less than felony it is only manslaughter.  
Now the distinction is exactly the same & this  
distinction is not followed by any court in our  
country & has been successfully ridiculed by my  
friend Waring.

Suppose in our country a man in shooting  
a partridge kills a man without culpability. it is  
excusable homicide by misadventure. -

Some games are  
lawful <sup>recreation</sup> or wrestling, some are not as throwing at  
cocks. - Now suppose one is killed wrestling it is  
excusable homicide by misadventure - but suppose  
one wrestles unfairly contrary to rule & the man  
is killed. it would be involuntary manslaughter.

Suppose a man in throwing at cocks <sup>kills another</sup> it was done  
in pursuit of an unlawful act it is involuntary.





manslaughter. — The temper of the heart is to be col-  
lected from all the circumstances —

I give you an exam-  
ple of a man in his wrath with a great club beats  
a man till he dies <sup>without intent to kill</sup> — it was done with an in-  
tention to do great bodily injury — for the big  
club — it was not an manslaughter because  
premeditated, not in self defence — It is murder  
it displays the unsocial heart the malice an-  
imous. —

A man was spurred to a company. he threw  
a large stone in among them & killed a man  
he had been laughed at but had not made  
provocation as to make it manslaughter it was  
murder. —

A man slipped a chair away from be-  
hind another who thus fell & by the fall came  
to his end this was held to be involuntary man-  
slaughter —

A without provocation aimed a blow  
B in such a manner as the killing B would have  
been murder — but by mistake B was killed it  
was held to be murder. —

Case of schoolmaster well  
explains it. — A whipped a boy in a proper  
manner — but unfortunately it was followed by  
death. it might be equally homicide by misadventure

*[The text on this page is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a handwritten letter or document, possibly in cursive script, spanning approximately 25 lines.]*



Another case the boy was whipped with an im-  
proper instrument & the boy died - it was doing  
a lawful act in an unlawful manner and no  
involuntary homicide. -

When a schoolmaster who  
was knocked down & killed the boy with a pair  
of tongs it was held to be murder from the in-  
strument. -


A man on the roof gives warning sufficient & throws  
off a man was killed. - There was no malice or design  
to kill or do bodily hurt - It is manslaughter homicide  
by misadventure if it had been done with inatten-  
tion. It would have been involuntary manslaughter  
although it was not usual for people to pass <sup>there</sup> but  
if carelessly done in a village much more in a  
city it has been held to be murder as showing  
the unsocial heart.

A driver of a train killed a child  
without carelessness by driving a wheel over it.  
There is no guilt. It is manslaughter homicide by misad-  
venture. -

But the train stops neglects the train in a  
street as by leaving it & a child is run over. it  
is involuntary manslaughter - And if with the  
train & gives orders to the children to go off but  
drives on & kills one it is murder. -

It was held to





be murder to drive a mad bull into the struts  
ed <sup>perils</sup> to make short was thrown into a crowd  
& one was accidentally killed. — The business was  
unlawful & that constitutes it involuntary  
manslaughter —

Another case was the same only  
the animal was very large & dangerous & it  
was held to be murder. —

A man had been invited to a  
dinner — he knew there was a pond near his friend's  
house about which there was game — he loaded his  
gun & took it along — drew the charge because  
as he found no game. — a gentleman in afternoon  
catching the gun loaded it & returned it to its  
place — the owner in attempting to show  
his wife how it would fire killed the wife upon  
whom he dearly loved. — this was determined manslaughter  
because there was no  
want of due caution. — This case was tried by Judge  
Porter.

With regard to justifiable  
homicide L. Baker says that if a <sup>of execution</sup> should execute a  
man in obedience to the command of a court  
who had no authority it would be murder but  
this I take to be wrong — the only ground of it  
is a technical rule that every man is bound  
to know the law — but here the officer did as

Homicides for the advancement of public justice are when  
an officer, in the execution of his office, either in a civil  
or criminal case, kills a person that assaults him. —

If an officer, or any private person, attempts to take a  
man charged with felony & is resisted, & in the endeavor  
to take him kills him — in these cases there  
must be an apparent necessity. 4 Bl. 179



be that its his duty to do without the murder an-  
nouncing. The most that can possibly be made of it is involuntarily  
manslaughter <sup>from the guards</sup> again with respect to justifiable homicide  
there is a distinction attempted to be made -  
An officer may take the life of a crim-  
inal if he cannot retain him without, but  
suppose he had escaped could you shoot at  
him after he had been once taken? it is said  
if the criminal was guilty <sup>charged with a</sup> felony might but  
if of trespass only you may not. I very much  
doubt the propriety of this distinction. I might be a  
good one if every person charged with a crime was guilty;

Of intruding as far as possible - while one does  
so & is still pushed he may defend himself at any  
hazard -

It has been said that it is manslaughter  
if the killer is the attraction but there is really  
no difference - If the man killed had killed  
the other it would have been manslaughter.  
but it is in both cases manslaughter as before said -

There is a case in the books <sup>when one</sup> attacked another on pre-  
text to bring on a quarrel in which he might  
kill his enemy it was called murder -

voluntary  
Manslaughter must be a cruel awfull act with an  
intent to kill or do some great bodily hurt & death  
ensuing





It must be upon a sudden quarrel & it is murder if he had had time to cool. It is not the injury that constitutes the crime for if so it would be equally strong in both cases - but it is the absence of proof of the unsocial heart.

Being in a passion is not itself the cause, it must originate in some personal abuse, words do not amount to it.

The intention to kill is to be learnt from the weapon used. By an unfortunate ~~man~~ blow of a cowhide applied to resent an insult by words occasioned death it was determined not to be murder - for from the instrument used it is plain that there was only an intention to chastise invidious & not to take life.

A man caught a boy stealing wood, seized him & tied him to his horse tail & whipped upon the horse the boy died but there was no proof of intent to kill it was held murder.

Another case a boy was whipped by another & the father enraged went a mile struck the other boy by which he died it is stated in some reports to have been determined manslaughter - this has been ~~that~~ wrong - circumstances will alter the case much - A great deal depends upon the



Heads & may this is a new to present a paper when the wife  
there is no known at all.

instrument used. - some say he followed the boy with a whip some with a cudgel - this is the great point in my opinion.

The husband kills the adulteress when caught in the act it is no murder but if he had time to cool it would be murder. -

There are cases where the general principle yields to policy & in most of them the matter cannot appear or does not. -

In all cases where an officer is killed in the execution of his official duty in whatever manner it is done it is always called murder. There is no enquiry to be made with respect to the malice animus. -

Even if an officer should make a mistake & take an innocent man he must submit & if the officer is killed it is murder tho if the man had been by a private man & the one arrested had killed him in his own defence it would have been excusable. -

There are instances of jailors having been convicted & executed for killing prisoners as when one puts a prisoner in a cell where he took the small pox the jailor is guilty of murder. -

The mother of an illegitimate child is punished for an act  
of the same nature for a year. By the Act of 1845  
but it has never been executed. without forming  
the child's name, precisely as required by the  
Statute -

In some of the states there is a difference in the species of  
punishment of these crimes. - In some the punish-  
ment of voluntary, is forfeiture of goods & chattels  
in addition to the other penalties, & is only inflicted in  
the case. - In Kentucky is hardly punished at all. the  
court inflict a fine as they please.

\* But if the court had jurisdiction of seduction only, they  
could not do so.



In several states duelling is declared murder, in many cases there is a total want of malitia & the act is a consequence of only a mistaken sense of honour.

For the prevention of duelling it has been enacted that every man in admission to an office must swear that he has not been engaged in any duel <sup>since the enactment of the act</sup> & that he never will be this is the law of Virginia N. York

Punishment of Murder is Death. of manslaughter it is fine & imprisonment & branding in the hand. the punishment is the same in quality in voluntary & involuntary. but different degree Execrable homicide was formerly punished by a forfeiture of goods & chattels. It has however been the fashion to think that no that one verdict of guilty in such case is now only an acquittal.

If a man is indicted for murder the jury may find him guilty of manslaughter if the court has cognizance of both.

A man is indicted for murder - the killing is proved. then the proof that it was not murder belongs to the prisoner. Hawk. P. Cr. Law in Law Pl. Com. -

Finding outlaws to keep the peace is sometimes a part of  
the punishment & sometimes when it is not when  
there is no conviction. — It is most commonly ta-  
ken at the suit of private persons, when on affi-  
davit the warrant issues. —



The law as it respects binding over to keep the peace & also binding over to good behaviour

Sentences of the peace are sometimes made part of the punishment. it being part of the judgment by law & here there is no discretion as it regards the sum.

In other cases it is discretionary & as in breach of the peace in presence of an officer - he may bind over <sup>an officer</sup> - it is not necessary that there should be an actual breach of peace. if there is any appearance of a danger of it. this is not part of judgment.

If not done in the presence of a magistrate - but the offender is brought before him although he cannot have cognizance of the case he may bind over or not as part of the punishment for there is no conviction, but only evidence of a breach of the peace.

There is another class of cases as when one is afraid of his life or of great bodily hurt. if there is reasonable ground of fear the threatened may be bound over to keep the peace - this is a remedy given to husbands & wives tho they have no action against each other - and the oath of the party is part of the evidence you will observe.

This binding to keep the peace is upon some fear of a breach of it.



Bending to him, the prince is as serene as the old

Walk in the night. & sleep in the day. way alone, whom  
those no one knows where he comes to in winter  
he goes. Ridiculous in Eng as a child of 10


If the recognition is forfeited the money belongs to the  
public.

Binding to good behaviour you will observe it a different thing - It is a part of the punishment of some crime and depends upon a st of Ed. 3. 1 proceeds upon the ground of securing obedience to the laws of the land - Such a persons rate of good fame who may not have been convicted - it depends upon the character - This statute is a singular thing & has been copied by most of the States - By it Justices are empowered to bind to good behaviour all rascals, droppers, vagabonds all those who act contra bonos mores. You will do very wrong just to help a badger in distress it would be contra bonos mores -

If the security is not formed the offender is committed of course & remains confined until the county court comes -

In the commitment in both cases must state the ground of the offence that the cause of it may appear. The bond is never forfeited if the person keeps the peace or good behaviour. The justice must state all the facts proved to the next court.

This recognizance may be discharged by the court at discretion, or if the person at whom investigation it was taken or if there is no longer in fear of Hawk 126. 129 all the cost must be paid before he is discharged





This bond is forfeited by the commission of any act that would be ground of taking it — any breach of the peace — or that which tends to it. but respectful words or a trifling quarrel are not sufficient a challenge to fight however is

attachment There is a mode of proceeding against an offender by attachment by which he is committed directly — as for any obscene, improper conduct in or near the court, or insolence to any officer of the court. — The court directs the clerk to issue an order to bring the man before for the court immediately & if he does not give a good receipt he is committed that can be confined in this way only during the session of the court. He may afterwards be prosecuted for the contempt. —

So when a man refuses to obey a preceptory mandamus the commitment here is to force obedience & he may be confined until he obeys —

There is another kind of attachment against the officers of the court as Shff. jailors & Shff. Surors &c for contempt. — as if Shff. takes unlawful fees for any neglect of duty he or either of the others may be committed at discretion for a limited time. Shff. too are not only liable to be thrown over the bar but to be committed

1 Hawk 142  
1 Galk 84  
1 Stra. 185  
444. 546  
6 mod 73



So jurors for receiving a bribe referring to his  
sworn - or to try a case - So upons to appear  
so it is with witnesses -

Any legal rule of courts  
making the duty of a man to perform certain ser-  
vices if they do not they are liable to attachment

The mode of proceeding is if not immediately  
in the presence of the court an affidavit is  
made & an order is issued to the man to show  
cause. - & if he does not show good cause he is  
committed: in this case he is bound to answer  
all questions under oath that are put to him for  
this is not such questions as would tend to in-  
juriate him - & what is very singular if the  
man clears himself by swearing the court  
proceeds no farther but leaves it for any one to  
prosecute for perjury - ~~but the state of the law~~  
~~with regard to perjury is not settled in the common law~~  
C. 2.



Haw. Pb. 96

ad. 97  
1 Lw. 209

## Bail

In most cases if a man is arrested he may be admitted to bail on finding security to appear in court.

The security is called the bail & has the security of the prisoner just as the officer had. — the body is pledged to the bail who can take it whenever he finds it. it is his property — not as an officer but as to his own property — even in Virginia if hearing there with testimony <sup>called bail power</sup> from the courts of being bail. — He may also commit him when ever he pleases. —

If the man runs off & the bail is liable & paid up — & the offender returns he may be again arrested & tried. — unless the 1<sup>st</sup> of limitations destroys the indictment. —

The C L appears to be that all offences except homicide were bailable — even treason was bailable offence if bail was found before commitment. in other cases bail might be taken any time after commitment. —

The old law was that no bail could be taken after commitment — but the old law has been altered —

The supreme court may bail in any

Stalk 98.  
Litch. 12  
5 mod 323

1 Stalk 133  
1 Bulb 85  
5 mod 554



case. but it is discretionary & not demanded absolutely  
in those cases where bail is allowed by law spe-  
cifically.

Thason & arson are now deprived of the  
privilege of bail as much as homicide. so also  
breakers of prisons - & Thieves taken with the  
stolen property upon them & all 101 so when the  
offence has been completed.

I observed that there was no bail after conviction  
to this. there is an exception, if a physician of  
reputability will certify that confinement is  
dangerous life.

The Judge's court are very careful about  
granting bail where other magistrates cannot  
as in 2d Sta. where a man stabbed himself  
to get bail by endangering his life. the court  
refused bail

Yelv. 99.  
1 Lid. 414

Palm. 388  
Shov. 399  
Salk 460

Sta. 679  
1 Vint. 68.

## Of Indictments & informations

It was a great rule of the 6<sup>th</sup> c. that there must be a trial before the grand jury before the indictment is laid in court. for all criminal prosecutions. except when a thief was taken with the goods in his possession. But our customs have made it usual to omit the trial before the grand jury — & as I think was originally the spirit of the rule not being neglected for it was founded in the severity of the punishment of felony.

When a statute makes an act criminal the particular process must be followed as laid down in the statute.

When the penalty is merely pecuniary it now goes before the grand jury.

Informations are carried on before the court without an intervention of the grand jury —



Of this nature it is found that  
the law is quite out of the way that there must  
be a trial before the grand jury before the in-  
dictment is laid in order that the grand jury  
may be able to find the truth in the case in his  
opinion. But on some cases down to us and to  
the grand jury before the grand jury is a bill  
in an order to the grand jury not to find a bill  
in the case in the name of the grand jury of the

And as to the matter in the indictment the grand jury  
has the right to find a bill in the case in the indictment

And the grand jury is not to find a bill in the case in the indictment  
And the grand jury is not to find a bill in the case in the indictment

And the grand jury is not to find a bill in the case in the indictment  
And the grand jury is not to find a bill in the case in the indictment



